This series of two panels looks at third country cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. Analysing the dynamics of third countries’ relations with the EU from both an inside- out and an outside-in perspective, the panels address the perspectives of the European Union itself, as well as those of third states. Particular concerns are to discuss to what extent we observe changes to patterns of cooperation against the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions, to specify what might characterise these changes, as well as discuss how they may be theoretically accounted for. Addressing these concerns, panellists map both formal and informal dimensions of third country cooperation with the EU, as well as analyse the form and content of cooperative arrangements. Thus, exploring both theoretical and empirical aspects of third country cooperation in the era og geopolitics, papers analyse 1) specific substantive issues and cases (Russia’s war in Ukraine, space policy), and 2) specific geographical areas/countries (United Kingdom, Norway, the US, Canada, Japan).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 posed a significant challenge to European foreign policy. The war forced the EU to react and resulted according to some in a geopolitical shift in EU foreign policy. Several institutions and high-ranking officials, including the President of the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Policy, argued that the EU should become a geopolitical actor that knows how to execute hard power. This paper explores one element of the supposed geopolitical turn in EU foreign policy. It analyzes the EU’s signaling (strategic communication) to Russia, the USA and NATO and aims to answer the question to what extent the signaling represents a geopolitical turn.

In the next 15 years, the global space economy will likely grow from $450 billion to surpass $1 trillion, signaling the start of a new Space Age. So far, the US accounts for half of this investment, with Europe in second place. Unprecedented cooperative initiatives are underway as the US and Europe work closely together on the Artemis program’s return to the Moon and the establishment of Gateway, a permanent multinational lunar base. What accounts for this resurgence in collective efforts to explore and expand into space? And will growing tensions on Earth derail these cooperative efforts, ratcheting up a sense that space is actually the next battlefield? Will China’s explicit goal to surpass the US as the dominant actor in space, lead countries to cross the line into weaponization of space for the first time? Drawing upon archival research, policy documents, and participant observation of key space actors, this paper analyzes the narratives at the intersection of transatlantic security cooperation and the US’s and Europe’s shared goals in space. It uncovers the intricacies by which transatlantic security cooperation influences transatlantic space policy, and argues that through space diplomacy the US and Europe are actually pulling the world away from a future that turns space into the next battlefield.

EU-US relations after nearly four years of the Biden administration are a puzzling mixture, especially when considered in contrast to the preceding Trump administration. On the one hand there have been intense coordination of economic and diplomatic measures against Russia, continued declarations of partnership and a commitment to multilateralism in issues such as climate diplomacy, and institutional development at the bilateral level with the initiation of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council and related bodies. On the other hand, there is strong evidence on both sides of domestic preoccupations and a new form of mercantilism centred on state aids and industrial policies, combined with US unilateralism and ‘domesticism’ and the EU’s potential diplomatic marginalisation in areas such as the Indo-Pacific or the Middle East. Alongside these apparent contradictions there are asymmetric responses to the assertiveness of China and associated geopolitical and geo-economic tensions. How are we to make sense of the tensions and counter-currents that continue to characterise transatlantic relations? This paper sets recent and current EU-US relations in a broader historical and analytical context, by briefly reviewing a series of crises in transatlantic relations since the late 1950s, drawing attention to the ways in which the Euro-American system is structured and driven by a set of underlying forces, considering developments since 2017 in light of these forces, and exploring the potential implications of the 2024 elections in the EU and the US.

Trade has long been considered 'the principal instrument of foreign policy for the EU' (Sapir, 1998, 726). Bossuyt et al. (2020) argued that differences between EU trade and foreign policy were growing, highlighting an apparent lack of 'synergetic coherence between the trade and foreign policy realms in the EU' (Bossuyt, 2020). However, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) can be seen as the European Union's attempt to integrate trade policy into its foreign policy objectives. For example, the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021) emphasized the significance of securing FTA deals with 'like-minded' countries in the region.

This paper examines the nexus between the EU’s trade and foreign policies and their potential impact using the EU-NZ FTA as a case study. Arguably, the success of EU foreign policy relies on positive reception from third countries. This study presents New Zealand's perceptions of the EU and the EU-NZ FTA. The methodology involves a two-fold approach: firstly, employing a systematic media analysis to explore how the New Zealand media portrays the FTA; and secondly, conducting 30 interviews with key figures in New Zealand across three cohorts: government, business, and journalists.

The paper reveals an increasing inclination of the EU towards Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs) (Borchert et al., 2021). Yet, the New Zealand case study shows that the FTA's impact on local perceptions of the EU was less significant than anticipated, despite considerable efforts by the EU and its 27 EU Member States to incorporate New Zealand's preferences. This can be attributed to historical conflicts and a perceived lack of accommodation by the EU in certain sectors.