In the history of European integration, the role of peace has often been emphasised as a sine qua non condition for grounding a supranational region based on democracy and market economy. However, the more the European Union (EU) becomes a complex polity the more it needs to cope with its external dimension and inherent relations. At this level, and although it may sound like a truism, ignoring geopolitics (as Biscop (2018) has stated) would appear as a mistake, given the ongoing geopolitical power interplay by which the EU is surrounded.

For long, the EU has addressed its external relations, especially those based on territorial proximity, with reference to the enlargement and neighbourhood policies, two successive territorial rings, beyond the EU borders. The connection between both policies is obvious, but the whole logic has long been focused on the preservation and the expansion of the characteristics of the inner European circle (the integrated EU member states), and thus only allowing membership condition to states willing and effectively making a substantial transition towards EU patterns, as defined in the enlargement criteria. Internal peace and stability have therefore been underlying conditions for this process. Other neighbours, in turn, meet the economic and political support of the Union, namely through partnerships, which serve the twofold function of providing them with means for development, and the Union with a ring of stability and presumably friendly partners around.

In this context, the case of Ukraine is by no means standard and inaugurates a new and potentially risky approach to enlargement. The European Union has been supporting Ukraine against Russia and is at the same time negotiating the acession of Ukraine to the EU. In the broader geopolitical context major challenges to multilateralism and democracy have emerged, which might frame the support to Ukraine as an EU statement, with reference to those challenges; or, at the very least, as a defensive strategy, in seeking to contribute to the stabilisation of a bordering nation. In the process, the EU has had to re-access and to reinforce its connections with NATO and the ‘Western bloc’, but also to consider its own ‘strategic autonomy’. The whole process begs the question on whether the EU is going through its own looking glass and embracing new power challenges that take it well beyond the ‘normative power’ Europe we were used to. This is the core question discussed in the paper.

The paper analyses how the war in Ukraine has impacted Germany's security and defence policy and Germany’s role in the Euro-Atlantic security order. It focuses on how Berlin has shaped, adapted to, or resisted changes in its role as a shaper of the Euro-Atlantic security order and the European Union’s foreign and security policy in a world of increasing strategic competition. The end of the stability of the euro-Atlantic strategic environment has challenged Germany’s role as a status quo power, both in its European and transatlantic policies. The purpose of the paper is threefold: first, it assesses domestic changes in Germany’s security, defense and energy policies, and how Berlin, by shaping, adapting to or resisting change contributes to reshaping the EU’s foreign and security policy; second, it takes stock of Germany’s position vis-à-vis arms deliveries to Kiev and support for Ukraine’s bid for EU and NATO membership and its impact on the EU’s response to the war; finally, it focuses on how the bilateral relationship between Berlin and Washington has empowered or hindered the development of EU foreign and security policy in the euro-Atlantic context. As one of the EU’s most relevant members, Germany’s role is crucial in creating a post-war European security order that enhances the EU’s international actorness while ensuring that the US remains engaged in euro-Atlantic security. The focus thus is also on how Germany has delivered on the pledges Chancellor Scholz made 23 months ago in his ‘Zeitenwende’ speech, to step up Germany’s commitments as a reliable and pro-active European partner and transatlantic ally, and to actively shape the EU’s and transatlantic security cooperation.

Due to the changing nature of security after the Cold War, the tradition of explaining security problems only in terms of their military dimension has begun to be questioned. Ontological security, which finds its place in critical security studies, criticizes the limitation of the security of states to concepts such as danger, power and anarchy only within the military framework. Ontologically security-seeking states, like individuals, seek stability both internally and in their interactions with "others" and seek to make the external world relatively secure and stable by developing routine relations with other states ( Mitzen, 348). In this sense, the European Union has contributed to peace and security by creating an area of economic stability on the European continent after the Second World War. However, the European Union's attempt to Europeanize migration policies by incorporating them into the founding treaties creates ontological insecurity. As is well known, Europeanization is a process that leads to change(Olsen, 2002). The fact that the European Union's decisions on migration do not produce positive results on the continent causes anxiety among ordinary Europeans, thus leading them to ontological insecurity (Kinnvall, Manners ve Mitzen,2018: 249-265). This situation develops a protectionist reflex in member states and state-centered immigration policies emerge as a reflection of this reflex ( Mitzen, 2018: 393-413) .

Keyword (s): Ontological Security, migration, europeanization