Conference Agenda

Mediation is built into the EU’s DNA as a peace project and a negotiated order itself. Yet, the EU’s approach to conflict resolution is different to that (and often considered less legitimate than) other international actors, as its capacity to mediate is affected by structural factors regarding its internal foreign policy-making process. Why, then, and in what circumstances does the EU engage in peace mediation? Is it faute de mieux or in pursuit of broader foreign policy objectives?

This paper explores the role of the EU in three conflict resolution processes located on the African continent (Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007-2013; Libya, 2014-2020; and Zimbabwe, 2007-2014). It does so by moving away from a primary conception of mediation as a technical and neutral tool to broker peace to adopt a framework based on Foreign Policy Analysis, which links the international politics of conflict resolution to those of the integrating political order of the EU. The argument is that peace mediation is an instrument of foreign policy in its own right and is mobilised by the EU to extend its internal integration process in the field of conflict resolution, development cooperation, migration, and, more broadly, a common foreign and security policy. The application of an FPA approach to mediation thus unveils the interlinkages between the development of the EU’s global actorness and conflict. The paper indeed provides an understanding of how isomorphic practices of mediation allow the EU to respond to external conflicts by opening dynamic spaces of political power at the operational level, which would not otherwise be available to it politically. By analysing how internal political purposes of the EU generate mediation, it also analyses how mediation blurs into diplomacy and statecraft, taking the form of ‘mediative diplomacy’, as a way in which Europe and other international actors can offer to solve conflicts and a new analytical lens.

This argument is empirically tested through a process-tracing approach in the study of the three cases mentioned above, which are realised by triangulating primary documentation, third-party commentary, and semi-structured interviews.

This aim of this paper is to analyse how the myth of exceptionalism has been used by EU élites to legitimate the European project, using the case study of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Whilst a number of political myths exist within the EU, and particularly within EU élite discourses, one that is particularly understudied and mis-characterised in EU studies is that of the myth of exceptionalism. Moreover, from understandings provided by post-structuralist discourse theory (PDT) and the political myth literature more broadly, political myths are particularly significant for processes of legitimation during moments of 'crisis'. As it is in these moments where political elites can re-produce narratives about why a political community was formed, as well as the reasons for its continued existence. Therefore, using the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study, this paper will conduct a discourse analysis of speeches made by key supranational EU elite actors during the 'crisis'. In doing so, this paper will lay out an understanding of precisely how these actors use the myth of exceptionalism to construct widely held understandings of both the past, present, and future of Europe, that simultaneously provide a contextualised rationale for why the European project should continue, as well as moral justifications for the EU's actions and continued role in international affairs.

Many European countries have been extremely reluctant to step in and condemn communism in the early 90’s and pretty long time much after. The strange cohabitation with the Moskow regime during the last three decades has kept them deaf to the warnings coming from former “Eastern countries” similar to parents pretending to listen their kids without caring too much about the core message. Hence, the delay they come to understand the real aim of the present war in Ukraine; hence the hesitations and double games they actually practiced during the first year of the war; hence the present state of troubled affairs at the end of which accepting the lines of the occupation defined borders will undermine their decades-long narrative about international law, sovereignty and self-determination. Contesting the wartime borders will extend the demand for support and open-mindness simultaneously with their energetic crise and that of the traditional relations to Russia.

My essay will try to analyze this dilemma bearing in mind that there is a multiple played game, that any sort of peace treaty will have to bear effects over a medium and / or long time, while also stressing the uneven status of such countries in the (irrational) collective memory. While the Ukrainian file is on the table, Europe does not display any wide set of options, turning its political profile narrow and vulnerable. I intend to look to Europe’s expected set of values, institutional reform (to come) as well as its tools to handle such navigation hurdles. In this scenario, Ukraine will not act as a final destination but as a challenge, the voice just raising questions. How is Europe supposed to answer and how is it prepared to do will be my main axes of research. For it, I will use discourse analysis of some outstanding European politicians, a little bit of game theory as well as history tracing with the view of Russia’s style of decision making.

I claim that such exercises are of extremely timely now, in order to highlight the pitfalls along with the strengths of Europe’s stance at the negotiations’ table.

At a time of crisis and upheaval in the European neighbourhood, understanding the possibilities and limitations of different European Union’s (EU’s) cooperation tools has never been more urgent. We address the role of the EU’s capacity building via trans-governmental networks during a major emergency in Europe – Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine. In the literature, such networks are typically seen as weak policy instruments because of their relative informality and non-binding legal status. This paper argues, however, that in times of extraordinary challenges capacity building via trans-governmental informal networks has a key advantage—they can be used as a quick and flexible instrument to respond to extraordinary challenges. Building on the case of EU-Ukraine cooperation and drawing on a unique dataset based on TAIEX cooperation, the paper demonstrates that trans-governmental networks can accommodate the rapidly changing needs of Ukraine, and thus contribute to the resilience of state institutions: both the cooperation requests and the actual cooperation activities’ foci have changed to address institutional risks stemming from the war. At the same time, these adjustments are limited in scope. In all, the paper adds to existing literature by demonstrating that trans-governmental networks have a particular role to play during times of emergencies by providing quick assistance to state institutions.