With Brexit “done” in early 2021, the Labour party in opposition was faced with the need to adjust their discourse and policy to the new reality, as part of their effort to appeal to voters, especially the traditional northern working class voters who had voted Leave and switched to the Conservative party in 2019. Empirical evidence shows that Labour leaders chose overwhelmingly to first ignore the topic then stressed their intention to mitigate the effects of Brexit once in power without addressing the fundamental flaws of the Brexit project and confronting the Brexit ideology. Drawing on discursive institutionalism, this paper assesses the power of dominant ideas in the political debate and the constraints it imposes on all actors. I contend that the (mostly Conservative) Brexit discourse constrains the language - and action - of leaders even when they fundamentally disagree with its premises.

In November 2020, the UK Government admitted that the EU Settlement Scheme is likely to discriminate against some groups protected by the Equality Act 2010 and published an official assessment on this concluding that any discriminatory effects are justifiable. However, discrimination of this type is often defined on a single axis, such as those seen in statistics published quarterly on the EUSS (age, nationality, local authority). This paper will scrutinise a specific group of individuals that risk being discriminated not on their single-axis characteristics, but at the intersection of multiple identities: here, the intersection of gender and class. The former focuses on women, the latter on non-linear career trajectories such as those involving unpaid care or part-time employment.

The argument in this paper is that those who interrupt their continuous employment are at higher risk of being offered protection under the EU Settlement Scheme, disproportionately affecting women more as they are more likely to interrupt full time employment to assume carer roles more often than men. The reliance on automated checks in Government databases to prove residency as one of the main criteria for successful status under the EU Settlement Scheme exacerbates the precarity faced by these women, who are already at risk of falling outside the scope of protection under EU law due to undertaking non-traditional work or care. By tracing the origins of this intersectional discrimination in the EU citizenship legacy and its dependence on the market citizenship paradigm, this paper seeks to explain how this risks being replicated in a post-Brexit Britain. 

The much hyped Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act (REUL) of 2023 forms a core part of the Conservative government’s post Brexit strategy. The 2019 Withdrawal Act had converted all EU law into domestic law. This ‘copy and paste’ exercise – amounting to some 5020 pieces of legislation that covered 300 policy areas – was far from representing a true Brexit and many Brexiteers demanded the removal of these laws from the statute books. REUL was the intended vehicle to do exactly this, but how much of this so-called retained law has been removed or assimilated and why? REUL in a devolved UK political system has necessitated - to maintain a common approach across the UK and a British internal market - the development of Common Frameworks in policy areas that were governed by EU law but now form a part of devolved policy competences. Policy divergence is allowed for, but how much, where and why have yet to be fully determined. Much remains opaque. The situation in Northern Ireland adds further complexity. We will be able to analyse developments as the government is pledged to publish data on its REUL dashboard every six months from January 2024 until 2026. The catalogue of retained laws has never provided a comprehensive analysis of the laws that fall under the powers of the devolved administrations. There is little transparency and any warrant much closer investigation. This paper explores the UK’s relationship with the EU post Brexit with specific reference to the devolved adminsitrations in Belfast,Cardiff and Edinburgh. In doing so i returns to the concept of Orbiting (or Orbital) Europeanisation to examine the interplay between them and Whitehall and questions just how far the Common Frameworks will work and actually deviate substantantially from the EU rules.