Conference Agenda

Full membership in European welfare states is typically based on the fulfillment of one of three conditions: 1) citizenship, 2) regular employment, or 3) kinship/marriage to someone meeting conditions 1) or 2). A fourth possibility opening the door to European welfare states – albeit often only half-way – is the application for protection. The number of persons in this latter category of (partial) welfare-state membership has increased significantly in recent years across Europe, against the backdrop of various crises that force(d) people from different parts of the world to seek protection in countries other than those of their origin/previous residence.

This article examines how political actors in national governments have adapted welfare-state access for this group of persons under the impression of crises affecting both the respective states’ welfare and incorporation systems. Specifically, the article looks at political reactions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and of Russia’s war against Ukraine; whilst also taking into consideration perceptions of national welfare states coming under strain based on various interconnected factors such as labour shortages, demographic change, globalisation, digitisation, and inflation (NB: the article does not study all these factors, but the arising perceptions among political actors of an already strained welfare state). In a comparative analysis of two ‘most different systems’, the article focuses on two European countries that entered the timeframe stipulated above under very different circumstances: namely, Germany and Sweden. These two countries differ not only in their respective traditional welfare (social democrat vs. conservative-corporatist) and incorporation (liberal vs. restrictive) regimes, but also in their governmental composition: in Sweden, a right-wing coalition with the support of the far-right Sweden Democrats took over from a long-serving Social Democrats-led government in 2022. In Germany, a new coalition of social democrat, green and liberal parties ended the 16-year rule of a government led by the conservative Christian Democrats.

Via a narrative analysis of draft legislation concerning forced migrants’ welfare-state access from the period 2020-2023, this article seeks to answer the question: How did the German and Swedish governments construct and adapt welfare-state membership of forced migrants under the impression of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine? The analysis reveals an unexpectedly similar political construction of membership in both examined countries. This, in turn, produces important insights on how crises, and resulting crisis management, leave a lasting mark on the regulation of different categories of welfare-state membership.

However counterintuitive it may sound, there is little evidence that more development in the developing countries necessarily translates into less migration to the developed countries, and the vast literature on the relationship between socio-economic development and migration is inconclusive at best. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, the European Union (EU) has increasingly focused on development cooperation and trade policy as a means of addressing irregular migration. As a result, a narrative of the migration-development nexus was embraced in the concept of ‘addressing the root causes of irregular migration’, which soon after became a fundamental assumption underlying numerous EU policy initiatives. In this context, the EU has linked migration, development, and trade in its approach to developing countries (i.e. the trade-development-migration nexus – hereafter, T-D-M nexus), and trade has been framed as part of crisis solutions in the EU's external migration policy. This paper aims to map and synthesise various narratives that have unfolded over time around the EU's T-D-M nexus, and to juxtapose them with policy outcomes. The study examines the T-D-M nexus from 1995 to 2022 using Narrative Policy Analysis. It draws on material concerning, among others, the European Commission’s Knowledge Centre on Migration and Democracy, selected Association Agreements, Team Europe Initiatives, and the negotiations of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with the countries of the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. While exploring the gap between research and policy-making, the findings have the potential to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms linking policy narratives and policy outcomes in the EU's T-D-M nexus.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with roughly 85% of their population comprised of non-citizen foreigners, present a unique opportunity to understand immigrant integration. Migrants from the European Union, in particular, live and work in staggering numbers across the GCC. Yet, scholars know very little about how these European fare on the ground. Existing paradigms rooted in the study of immigration in Western contexts fall short in capturing the nuances of integration trajectories within exclusionary and ethnocratic regimes like the Gulf, often dismissing immigrant inclusion as an impossibility. However, despite the strict kafala sponsorship system and nationality-based migration hierarchies that undoubtedly constrain migrant life, inclusion does occur. Immigrants in the Gulf carve out dynamic social relationships, become deeply embedded in economic activities, forge meaningful political identities, and articulate a sense of belonging that suggests scholars must rethink the notion of immigrant inclusion altogether. Based on 35 in-depth interviews with migrants from the U.K and continental Europe in the State of Qatar, this research finds that immigrant inclusion occurs primarily vis-à-vis the diaspora community itself and is shaped by two dynamics. First, the sheer size, diversity, and interconnectedness of the broader diaspora community in Qatar helps migrants avoid the traditional pitfalls of excessive co-ethnic network dependence and isolation. Through regular interaction with the international community, European migrants acquire valuable cultural and migrant capital that facilitates meaningful economic and social mobility despite restrictive state policies and institutions. These effects were seen both within Qatar, but also in the context of return migration. Second, through their experiences in Qatar, the European migrants in our sample emerged as valuable vehicles for the transmission of social remittances back to their home contexts. The interview data confirms that both processes represent unique sources of empowerment, belonging, and social mobility for migrants within highly exclusionary integration contexts. This research makes two significant contributions to the overall field of European migration studies: it advances our rudimentary knowledge about European emigration to highly exclusionary regimes, and it highlights the importance of studying Europe as a sending, rather than just a receiving context for migration.