The point of departure for this paper is the observation that research on regional activities and strategies within a multi-level system is underdeveloped. This is in contrast to research on national strategies and actions. As integration processes shows, states choose different ways to adapt to EU policy. This is also a case for regional and cross-border actions.

There are relatively few studies that assess the potential changing behaviour of regional actors as a result of the opportunities and costs of EU decision-making. Those that exist largely concentrate on either defining concepts of regionalism or assess the regional impact of specific EU policies. While most European integration theories recognise that EU decision-making involves sub-national actors, they do not explore the sub-national level in any dept.

Regions in Nordic countries have a long experience of cross-border activities. However, until recently, there have not been any Nordic EGTC. In other parts of Europe, EGTC is relatively common. Kvarkenrådet was established in 1972 and transformed to an EGTC in 2020. This strategic development makes Kvarkenrådet particular interesting as a critical case to analyse potential behavioural change in a MLG system.

To do this, we make two propositions. First, cross-border politics need to be analysed in relation to “the bigger picture”. The theoretical framework of “differentiated integration” may serve as a fruitful analytical tool to determine the most important elements for the empirical research. Second, we need to address a historical perspective to be able to identify the mechanisms that explain cross-border dynamics.

The idea of a ‘room for manoeuvre’ under EU law is contested in Norwegian debates on its relations to the EU, with consequences both for policy decisions and public support for European integration. Recent events in Norway have shown this clearly, as it was uncovered in 2019 that Norwegian rules on benefits were in conflict with EU regulations, leading to the so-called ‘benefits scandal’. At the same time, faced with public opposition to EU membership, Norwegian politicians in favour of the current EEA agreement have an interest in defining the current framework for EU relations as relatively flexible. This raises the question of how this ‘room for manoeuvre’ is presented by Norwegian politicians.

In this paper, we develop the ‘room for manoeuvre’ as a theoretical concept, bringing together the literature on EU politicisation and the legal-institutional literature identifying a room for manoeuvre. We examine ideas of a national room for manoeuvre empirically, through a study of the case of Norway, as a member of the EEA. We ask how Norwegian politicians have presented the room for manoeuvre in the period 1987-2022 and build our analysis on an extensive database of political documents from the period. Our main focus is on how different political actors present such a room for manoeuvre, with regards to whether there is one, in what parts of the policy cycle it is identified and with relation to which political issues.

Since the 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, the Commission has emphasised the importance of trans-European networks (TENs) for the physical completion of the single market. Despite the 2004 and 2013 revisions to the TEN-T regulation, redefining and expanding the multimodal network, many projects remain unfinished. This article explores the Commission’s enduring role in EU policy coordination from the perspective of hybrid governance, focusing on the mediating role of high-level ‘European Coordinators’, the use of stakeholders forums, recourse to policy evaluation, and the development of new financial instruments. Drawing on recent audit and evaluations work by the EU institutions, it explores reconfigurations of implementing actors, and engages with notions from the literature on experimentalist governance, including networks, informalism and deliberation. The analysis suggests that the Commission demonstrates resilience as a coordination body in its commitment to ‘physically complete’ the single market, while recognising limitations to its coordination capacity.

It is often stated by EU negotiators that everything important happens backstage, i.e., informally (e.g. Christiansen & Neuhold, 2013; Coremans, 2020; Juncos & Pomorska, 2011). This paper challenges that notion by examining the role of informal communication in the EU legislative process. Drawing on insights from diplomatic practice theory (e.g. Adler-Nissen, 2016; Versloot, 2022) and sociological institutionalism (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989; Reh et al., 2011), I study how restrictions on physical presence during covid-19 affected formal and informal negotiation dynamics in EU fishing quota setting.

This is done based on interviews with participants over the course of 2022 complemented by document analysis. First, I demonstrate that existing informal networks were able to convert their communication to mediated alternatives, cushioning the short-term impact of restrictions to physical presence in negotiations. However, building new informal relationships was not amenable to “going online”, sparking concerns about the long-term effects of lockdowns on the negotiation process. Second, I show that while some types of informal communication can move online relatively painlessly, a degree of dynamism is lost, which is deemed essential by practitioners for handling complex, multilateral negotiations.

Thus, the article contributes with new empirical insights about how informal communication practices, both in-person and mediated play different roles and complement each other. Theoretically, the article contributes by showing how micro-level practices can better be understood in light of the institutional context in which they unfold.

References

Adler-Nissen, R. (2016). Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(1), 87-103. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12329

Christiansen, T., & Neuhold, C. (2013). Informal Politics in the EU [https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12068]. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(6), 1196-1206. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12068

Coremans, E. (2020). Opening up by closing off: how increased transparency triggers informalisation in EU decision-making. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(4), 590-611. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1599043

Juncos, A. E., & Pomorska, K. (2011). Invisible and unaccountable? National Representatives and Council Officials in EU foreign policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(8), 1096-1114. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.615197

March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis of politics. Free Press.

Reh, C., Héritier, A., Bressanelli, E., & Koop, C. (2011). The Informal Politics of Legislation: Explaining Secluded Decision Making in the European Union. Comparative Political Studies, 46(9), 1112-1142. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011426415

Versloot, L. (2022). The vitality of trusting relations in multilateral diplomacy: an account of the European Union. International Affairs, 98(2), 509-528. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab260