Against the background of Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the awarding of the EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, countries of the EU's Eastern Partnership (EP), came not as a huge surprise. Still, the Western Balkan countries, which are engaged in a rather tedious and frustrating EU accession process for more than two decades, must have felt dispirited about this new situation. Although the EU's 2018 Western Balkan strategy acknowledged the geopolitical realities as defining factors of its policy towards the Western Balkan region, not much happened to move these countries close to membership. While the EU Enlargement Policy moved towards the East, the EU integration currently shows similarities to the less integrative Eastern Partnership policies. The Western Balkan countries are constantly put off their aim of EU membership, whereas for the Eastern Partnership countries membership was not foreseen.

The panel discusses how geopolitical factors influenced the EU's policymaking and how a war in one region triggers policy change or a change in policy implementation in another region. This “blurring” of these two EU policies - the Eastern Partnership and the EU Enlargement - raises a number of questions, as well as challenges for the EU.

Hence, this panel brings up among others such questions as: In what way is the EU candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova impacting the EU's enlargement policy? How geopolitics influences the EU’s decisions on enlargement and what are the outcomes of such geopolitical decision-making? Is there going to be a new enlargement policy for the Eastern Partnership countries? How is the EU's policy in the Western Balkans changing against the background of the Ukraine conflict? How is the EU addressing conflicts in both regions in the framework of the enlargement process, if their guiding principle states that no disputes can be imported into the EU? How are other neighbouring regions, such as the Baltic states or the Visegrad Group positioning themselves in relation to the EU accession of Ukraine and Moldova? Can we talk about the “blurring” of the EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood policies and what will be the implications of this process for the closest EU neighbours?

This article intends to explore whether and how the rising geopolitical tensions are reshaping the European Union’s approach to the enlargement policy. In that regard, the research focuses on the ramifications of the rapid recognition of several eastern partners’ membership prospects, while maintaining modest progress and even marginalization of “old candidates” within the “enlarged enlargement agenda”. We argue that these varied outcomes of the EU’s geopoliticized decision-making towards the Eastern Partnership (EP) and Western Balkan (WB) regions stem from the EU’s tactic reaction to an immediate exogenous threat instead of a strategic response in line with its proclaimed “geo-strategic” enlargement agenda. Through the realist approach, the authors examine this phenomenon in the context of ambivalence between the EU’s intention to act strategically (and homogeneously), and the individually-driven member-state preferences.

The authors find that the “blurring” between the two policy domains primarily benefits the “laggards” – chiefly the post-Soviet “geopolitical candidates”, and some less advanced WB parties (Bosnian candidacy, Pristina’s membership request). Despite some procedural advancement of most WB candidates during the annus horribilis (2022), the authors find that their long-awaited bureaucratic “upgrade” sharply contrasts with the tectonic changes exemplified in the fast-track inclusion of several eastern partners. With such a short-sighted EU’s reactiveness, and despite the formal “enlargement policy seniority”, the authors consider that the geopolitical developments may cause additional hardship on most WB candidates, especially the “frontrunners”.

Whereas, there is a largely shared view that since 2013 the EU enlargement policy is halted and no significant steps forward were being made over the last decade, the return of geopolitics in Europe led to important symbolic changes in the relations between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. Undoubtedly necessary from a political perspective, these steps brought important questions and concerns about the future of the EU’s enlargement policy as they blurred the line between enlargement and neighborhood policies. This paper will concentrate on the EU’s political response to Russian aggression and its implications for the enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans candidate states. Grounded in a critical analysis of official EU statements and political activities, the paper will examine the nature of the political declarations and reflect on their implications for the EU’s enlargement policy.

For the new EU candidate countries of Ukraine and Moldova, the path to EU membership will be based on the same "established criteria and conditions", which are eligible for the Western Balkan countries. However, the Western Balkans EU process was launched with additional conditions, such as regional cooperation, reconciliation, and good neighbourly relation. At the time from a EU’s perspective, it made sense to include improving relations with one's regional neighbours in the framework of regional cooperation. Despite the good intentions, these policies are still facing obstacles in the Western Balkans, but how and to what extent could these become part of the EU-integration process with Ukraine? The paper argues that different regions require a customised EU accession process, as the conditions set for the Western Balkans, are not achievable for the states in the neighbourhood of Russia. That would mean that regional specificities need to be taken into consideration. This raises a number of questions, especially regarding fairness to the Western Balkan countries. The paper will discuss these additional Western Balkan conditions and try to apply them to a Ukraine scenario. Additionally, EU documents in relation to Ukraine's EU accession process and additional documents issued by the EU will be analysed.

The scales of European weakness in a moment of danger

With the brutal Russian aggression of Ukraine, the already problematic balance between cohesion and enlargement within European integration has been shaken. The ‘East’ reappeared on the EU’s map when Russia started attempting to erase a country from it. This historical move has resulted in an awakening – that of NATO. The question is if the EU is up to the challenge of ongoing history at its Eastern borders. In the same way, we need to look (also) elsewhere on the global map than the Ukrainian battlefield to shape strategies to end this aggression (China, India, and all those who abstained at the UN resolution vote on March 2nd, 2022), the EU should not lose sight of the South-East European SAP-countries: though these countries officially condemned the Russian aggression of Ukraine, public opinion is fractured and influenced by other neighbours than the EU (Russia, China, Turkey). In the present-day geostrategic framework and in terms of power relations, the Western Balkan countries’ weakness is the EU’s weakness – a key concept to consider when it comes to European perspectives and the geopolitical place and role of Europe in the global world.