The concept of European sovereignty (or/and strategic sovereignty) has been in the focus of attention since President Macron held his speech at Sorbonne in 2017. With the revival of debate about the future of the European Union, it seems a key issue to the implementation of the goals of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Capacity building has started in various areas related to security, defence research and industry but participation of member states is uneven.

The CSDP is the youngest policy area of the European Union. It has developed only since the late 1990s after the disappointing and devastating experience of the Yugoslav wars. The milestone in this process was the St Malo declaration of France and the United Kingdom in 1998. The document emphasised that the EU must have the capacity to take autonomous actions. In the early 2000s, the legal background and the decision-making structures of security and defence policy were developed, and consequently the EU deployed its first CSDP missions and operations.

During the last two decades, parallel to the development of the crisis management structures and to the debate on the EU’s relations to NATO, the idea of strategic autonomy appeared repeatedly. As all EU institutions or a critical number of member states did not support it, no serious steps were taken. Practically, the realisation of this concept continued to be unthinkable until 2016. During the last seven years the various EU Institutions and EU member states have supported the acceleration of the deepening of Europe’s security and defence cooperation.

This paper examines the concept of European sovereignty based on the content analysis of various strategic documents related to CSDP from 2016 (the year of the publication of the EU’s Global Strategy) to 2023 (following tha acceptance of the Strategic Compass and the Russian invasion in Ukraine). Our interdisciplinary approach may offer a new perspective on diverse interpretations of European sovereignty and autonomy.

The importance of security aspects in EU-Asia relations has for a considerable time received less prominence than economic matters, a view not only confined to the policy making arena, but also to academic circles. However, two interrelated aspects have in recent years both broadened the content of security and renewed interest in EU-Asia security relations. One is the growing importance of non-military security aspects, such as climate change, energy security, cyber security and food security (Caballero-Anthony and Gong 2020). The other is the recognition of the increasing use of economic instruments (economic statecraft) by powerful states for strategic ends (Meuniere and Nicolaides 2019); a view particularly associated with the rise of China and the Russian war in the Ukraine, but also with the growing Sino-American economic and military confrontation.

Hence the context of EU-Asia security relations needs to be enlarged, incorporating not only ‘outside” influences such as the Sino-American rivalry and the Russian aggressions in the Ukraine, but also the role of internal matters in that relationship. While the EU is trying to shape security matters in the Asia region, especially in the non-military field, it also forced to respond to adverse attacks on the integrity of the internal market. It therefore needs to adopt countervailing measures through, for example, trade defence mechanisms, and to avoid that investments or company acquisitions of critical infrastructure installations undermine the national security of member states by introducing investment screening mechanism. It is the nexus between economic and security, especially the role of economic statecraft, that deserves increasing research attention.

With this proviso, the proposed paper will focus on two specific aspects of EU-Asia security relations: threats to the security of the EU internal market and to critical infrastructures within the EU, and threats to safe passage of seaborne trade in the Indo-Pacific. This will involve examination of how the EU Anti-economic Coercion Instrument and the EU Foreign Investment Screening Mechanism are applied, and what steps the EU is taking in the pursuit of critical supply chains and in the contribution to regional, maritime and cyber security in Asia? It will include examination of the rate of co-operation or opposition these EU actions engender either with Asian partners or the US, and what potential impact they will have on EU-Asia security relations?

The paper will draw primarily on official EU sources, secondary sources, and potentially interviews conducted with officials of the European External Action Service.

The European Union is taking on an increasingly dynamic and active role in shaping international politics, not least given the Russian invasion in Ukraine. However, the willingness of member states to sign on to EU-led foreign policy initiatives can be unpredictable, and the plague of least common denominator decisions remains prescient. Even before the invasion, scholars sought to understand how economic and political interests drive or stymie cooperation, especially in the area of foreign and security policy. Moreover, there is a growing interest in the way narratives facilitate or hamper this cooperation. Yet, little attention has been paid to the role of ontological security seeking practices within the EU and how these practices can impact member states’ willingness to buy-in to EU narratives. This paper will explore this dynamic in the French context by showcasing two cases: one in which ontological security seeking practices helped France align more easily, and one where they caused divergence from EU messaging.

The increased role of the EU in peace and security means the EU is also beginning to establish itself as what David Campbell called a “capital FP” Foreign Policy actor. This means that the EU is increasing taking part in the foreign policy rituals, everyday diplomatic action, and establishment of significant relationships that shape an external identity. This is coupled with an internal effort in the EU which explicitly deals with crafting an EU narrative. In short, the EU is becoming an ontological security seeking actor.

Yet, states are generally considered primary ontological security seekers and providers for their citizens, including EU citizens. For whom, then, does the EU provide ontological security? Using France as a case study, this paper explores moments in which EU member states might turn to the EU as an institutional provider of ontological security, and also instances in which the EU’s efforts may chafe against member states’ own concerns. In 2011, when faced with growing criticism for its handling of the Jasmine Revolution, France turned to the EU and in some ways ceded its primacy in the region. However, during the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal negotiations, French leaders continued to seek distinction from the EU, thereby downplaying the common European effort. This dynamic process of ontological security seeking vs providing has consequences for cooperation, especially in the face of ever more frequent ontologically critical situations.