On 23rd of June 2022, the heads of state and government leaders of the European Union member states granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status. Thereby, they did not only coup-like transform the European Neighborhood Policy but also begin accession talks with states whose territory is occupied, and the governments are not exercising the “authoritative allocation of values” (Easton 1965) - again. Even though the geopolitical conditions and political outlooks differ strongly, the accession of Cyprus to the European Union could be portrayed as a comparable act. Invaded by Turkish Troops in 1974, the island in the Eastern Mediterranean remains divided into two political entities with Turkish soldiers on juridically EU soil. The EU regretted the Republic of Cyprus’s accession. Since then, numerous complex sovereignty issues and border disputes have arisen during the EU’s enlargement processes. Several remain unsolved and increase the complexity of foreign policy. For instance, Cyprus’s position against Türkiye significantly influences the EU’s viewpoint and incentives.

Even though much has changed in the European enlargement policy, some essential decisions apparently remain the same. However, this provokes several questions: If the EU seeks to avoid integrating conflicts, how could they issue a membership perspective for Ukraine and Moldavia? Does the EU reflect on past experiences? Recently, a newly elaborated theoretical framework linking the historical legacy of political practice and policy implementation with a framing approach emerged in comparative politics. This theory is called the “ideational policy stabilization” approach (Zuber 2022).

This paper applies the approach to EU policy-making and implementation in the decision on the candidate status of Cyprus and Ukraine. Ontologically constructivist with a strong emphasis on understanding, this approach allows us to analyze the ideas and beliefs communicated via a discourse analysis in the Parliament and within the European Council. Scrutinizing the elite discourse, this analysis follows a process reconstruction method. This paper aims to provide a solid argumentation about the EU’s dispositions and current incentives that shape their policy paradigm and lead to the declared candidate status of Moldavia and Ukraine in June 2022.

More than a decade after their accession to the EU, Bulgaria, Romania and (until last year) Croatia continue to be trapped in what appears to be an eternal waiting room to enter the Schengen Area. Meanwhile, these Schengen Candidate Countries have started to apply a growing share of the actual Schengen acquis. Particularly in the field of external border management, current Candidate Countries have turned into de facto Schengen members as they are charged with the same obligations as existing Schengen members. While Schengen Candidates’ borders with third countries are guarded as EU external borders, their frontiers with existing Schengen members, such as the Hungarian-Romanian and the Slovenian-Croatian border, constitute a border regime sui generis that seems only indirectly governed by EU law. This ambiguity translates into profound uncertainty regarding the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU migration law instruments, such as the Return Directive, at these borders. The presented paper will shed a light on the current patchwork of EU border management regimes resulting from the particular position of Schengen Candidate Countries. It furthermore addresses the undesirability of the lack of legal certainty at Candidate Countries’ borders for the overall integrity of the Schengen Area, especially in view of ongoing fundamental rights concerns at its fringes. Finally, the paper explores how the position of Schengen Candidate Countries trapped outside Schengen cooperation impacts EU integration and EU Citizenship rights such as free movement.