This paper provides a comparative analysis of democracy perceptions in eleven Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States of the European Union in the crisis years of 2020-22. Democracy's pre-existing problems in Central and Eastern Europe, have been affected by recent crises, such as the COVID19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. The economic recession, the energy crisis and rising inflation could also threaten faith in democracy, especially in a region that is geographically close to the war zone.

The underlying assumption of this paper is that individuals could have a significant role in preventing democratic backsliding. Citizens' perceptions of the functioning of the democracy affect how they vote at elections, what institutions they trust, and what policy decisions they accept or reject. Consequently, analyzing the views of individuals on democracy is of paramount importance for the survival of democracy as a whole and the protection of democratic values in the Union. Since, the political systems of the Member States are embedded in the unique, supranational political system of the EU, democracy perceptions can measured both at country and EU levels. Are CEE nationals satisfied with the way democracy functions at country and EU-levels? Do they believe that they voice counts in their country and in the EU? What are the main components of democracy according to the people? What do they think about free elections, freedom of speech, equal rights? What institutions do they trust as national and EU levels? And at last, but not least how do they value democracy in crisis times? My paper aims to provide answers to these questions by building on recent results of Eurobarometer surveys on these issues as well as results of other surveys on perceptions of democracy.

The purpose of this research is to identify the main reasons for two unusual results concerning the activities of the Spanish regional parliaments within the framework of the Early Warning System (EWS): first, the smaller number of subsidiarity complaints (or so-called reasoned opinions) authored by these assemblies since 2010, as compared to certain Austrian and German cases; and second, the greater submission of other kinds of opinions on EU draft legislative proposals under this subsidiarity mechanism by several Autonomous Communities, and as a result, by the country as a whole. For the independent variables, novel data have been obtained through interviews with key members of the regional parliamentary administrations, as well as using questionnaires completed by senior officials within each of the seventeen Spanish regional assemblies. The findings support, on the one hand, the impact of the lack of any obligation for Las Cortes Generales to consider the subnational outputs on the disengagement of many regional assemblies from the EWS, and on the other hand, that having an in-house expert and/or an institutionalised cooperation on EU affairs with the administrative dimension of the regional executive increase the likelihood of submitting opinions on EU legislative proposals under this scheme. Ultimately, it is shown how most Spanish regional parliaments are not embedded in the EU as a compound democracy, due to certain flawed dimensions of the Estado de las Autonomías.

This paper analyses Italian responses to the Treaties of Rome in 1957 by looking at the media’s role as a tool to both amplify voices and construct ideas on European integration. It attempts to expand upon and also challenge existing narratives on integration in Italy - which have tended to assume that “Euroscepticism” largely emerged in a post-Maastricht context - by showing that there was already significant contestation on this matter, and that political actors used the outlets at their disposal to influence public opinion. Indeed, the Italian media conversations enveloping the Treaties of Rome - at a time when the introduction of RAI television was revolutionising the media landscape, and the Treaties were broadcast and politicised as a landmark event - highlight the variety of visions of European integration that had emerged. On the one hand, the ruling Christian Democratic government had radio and television under its harness, and used these channels to push a pro-integrationist orthodoxy on the Italian public. Nevertheless, we also see dissenting visions expressed in much of the printed press, not only from the anti-Western Communists and Socialists, but from a broad church including neo-fascists, monarchists and even federalists. The article crucially finds that there was a deliberate effort from government-aligned journalists to marginalise - rather than engage with - any dissenting views on European integration. This helped to develop the contours of what is now called “Euroscepticism”.

The right to access to justice in environmental matters is one of three pillars of environmental democracy rights under the Aarhus Convention and a crucial procedural safeguard for environmental protection and environmental justice. In practice, access to justice in environmental matters remains limited, both before national and international courts and tribunals. Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) is the most common form of modern international investment arbitration. The IDDS has been criticized in academic and policy circles for granting privileged access to justice to foreign investors while limiting the regulatory and judicial autonomy of States. Although many ISDS cases concern public interest and environmental matters, affected individuals and communities are generally excluded from participating or making submissions in the proceedings, thus limiting their access to justice in environmental matters.

In the 2018 landmark judgement in the Achmea case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) found intra-EU ISDS to be incompatible with the general principle of autonomy of EU law, particularly with the uniform interpretation of EU law. In the aftermath of the judgement, ISDS between EU states was formally prohibited and the EU has worked on a reform proposal for investment arbitration in the form of a multilateral investment court.

This paper examines how the EU’s current reform proposal for a multilateral investment court can shape access to justice in environmental matters in investment arbitration cases in the EU through the lens of principle of autonomy in EU law. Our hypothesis is that in relevant cases the CJEU has interpreted this principle narrowly and omitted concerns over environmental democracy rights and democratic legitimacy. This is reflected in the 2019 EU proposal for a multilateral investment court which, while adhering to higher standards for transparency, fails to provide effective access to justice in environmental matters for affected communities and individuals.

Key policy competences in economic governance have shifted to the supranational level within the European Union, since the Maastricht Treaty onwards. At the same time, recommendations for the national parliaments of member states to act up and provide scrutiny, accountability, and thus legitimacy to justify policies have risen. The surveillance role of the national parliaments, however, especially in the field of the national macro-economic policies, is rooted in an idealized vision of national parliaments that might no longer exist. First of all, EU’s own historical development and the specifics of the EU integration project have deeply transformed and often weakened the parliaments of member states. Second, we live in times of a profound crisis of party politics and a crisis of representation, with parliaments enjoying less and less trust from society. Both these developments trigger conflicts of sovereignty within member states expressed in different claims to identification of where the final authority lies. In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, this has become particularly visible in Southern and Eastern Europe, where claims to popular sovereignty have strongly clashed with claims to parliamentary sovereignty. In the two paired comparisons analysed in this article – Greece and Slovenia, Italy and Bulgaria - we interpret these sovereignty conflicts as both caused by the weakening of parliaments and causing their further weakening, thus impeding them to exercise surveillance. It is in these types of circumstances, that a specific practise of doing politics – technopopulism – is gaining strength. Techno-populists invoke popular sovereignty to weaken parliaments, and invoke parliamentary sovereignty, to ignore the people. Ultimately, both popular and parliamentary sovereignty remain trapped in a technopopulist loop that not only reflects new conflicts of sovereignty but also exacerbates them, leading to a state of permanent crisis.