War in Ukraine represents the most serious military conflict in Europe since the end of the WWII. The conflict has its impacts on domestic politics in particular EU member states and it also finds its reflection in the public opinion of the citizens of European countries. The outbreak of the hot phase of the conflict at the end of February 2022 was also preceded by a period of numerous attempts in the cyber and information sphere aiming to influence public opinion in these countries. We may have also observed rising polarisation in public opinion and within the domestic political spheres of different European countries.

In the case of the Czech Republic the attitudes to Russia and Eastern Europe have represented long-term controversial topic, dividing both the internal political actors and also public opinion. The broader research that Masaryk University conducts in cooperation with the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs focuses on: a) the overall picture of the Ukrainian conflict in Czech public opinion (incl. the possible outcomes of the conflict, possibilities of peace negotiations, a continuation of weapon deliveries as well as humanitarian assistance to Ukraine etc.); b) the information sources which the respondents frequently use for gaining information about international affairs and Czech foreign policy; c) the general questions concerning the respondents´ attitude to the orientation of Czech foreign policy (support for democracy, values, human rights protection vs. economic interests; pro-Western, pro-EU, pro-NATO orientation vs. more orientation towards Russia, China and other actors etc.).

The paper is based methodologically on a genuine public opinion poll made on a representative sample of 1258 respondents in the Czech Republic in January 2023. Results of polls are confronted with voting behaviour in Czech regions framed by a complex analysis of the socio-economic status of particular regions through a series of over 180 indicators of the business environment, demography, development and structure of the economy, education, employment, environmental situation, security and safety situation and social situation of the regions’ population.

The aim is to find the correlations between particular positions towards the Ukrainian conflict, Russia and connected issues, certain socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents (age, gender, socio-economic status, region, place of settlement – urban vs. rural environment etc.) and the information sources which the respondents frequently use. The results of the opinion polls are interpreted in the wider context of electoral behaviour and socio-economic characteristics of the region where respondents live.

Over 330 days later, the Russia-Ukraine war has continued to hold sway despite the sanctions and strict rules given to Russia from the West and America. Both Russia and Ukraine account for about 30% of wheat exports in the world and Ukraine 15% of corn exports, Russia is also the third largest producers of the world’s oil just behind US and Saudi Arabia¹, as such both countries have been adjudged as the food basket of the world. Thus, the war has sharpened the way and manner trade all over the world is done, with Africa bearing a big chunk of the repercussions of the War. Russia and Ukraine played a significant role in Africa before the war began, both are major exporters and suppliers of wheat, corn, fertilizers, oil product among others to the continent. For e.g. over 2.9 billion and 4 billion dollars’ worth of agricultural products were imported into Africa from Ukraine and Russia respectively in 2020 alone². However, with the war inflation in Africa has taken a huge chunk of the economy coupled with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the increase in the prices of staple and non-staple goods, products and services. For instance, Fertilizers shortages in countries such as Cameroun, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, etc has made a lot of farmers venturing into other means of livelihood. Moreso, the oil sector has also been affected in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and Egypt which imports between 17%-20% of petroleum products into their countries, for example the price of fuel and diesel in Nigeria has tripled since the start of the war in 2022³. This paper explored from a qualitative perspective, the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war in Africa. On the one hand, Africa’s dependence on imports has caused a disadvantage as can be seen from the high rate of goods, services and living conditions in the continent as a result of the war as well as pushing over 30 million into poverty and 20 million not accessing sufficient food in the Sahel region⁴. On the other hand, it created new opportunities for Africa whereby some countries are already exploring intra-development, such as the establishment of the fertilizer plants in Nigeria by the Dangote group as well as the gas plant building which boast to produce over 650,000 barrel of oil per day for export in Africa, Europe and other parts of the world⁵.

Following Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU and its Member States adopted a stance of non-belligerence: they have supported Ukraine in all possible ways short of entering the war themselves, while adopting severe sanctions against Russia. Very quickly, however, the limitations of European military aid were laid bare: for lack of significant stocks of weapons and ammunition, far less was available for transfer to Ukraine than many expected. Moreover, the European defence industry has not been able to accelerate production, hence supplies remain at a low level. At the same time, warfare in Ukraine is teaching important lessons about how new technologies are deployed on the battlefield as well as against the institutions of the state and against the civilian population. Some advanced weapons have a high operational impact, even when deployed only in small numbers; yet other sophisticated weapons rely on mass deployment and have but limited impact if that mass is not available. Simpler but more easily produced weaponry, deployed alongside “classic” infantry, armoured vehicles, and tanks, decide the outcome of many battles. As EU Member States are replenishing their own stocks and continue to support Ukraine (which they have to prepare to do over the long term), this paper will assess whether the composition of Europe’s armed forces must be reviewed, and the industrial base adapted accordingly, for deterrence and defence, and crisis management outside Europe, to be ensured.