As the largest and economically strongest EU member states, Germany and France bear a special responsibility to advance European integration, especially against the background of accelerated transformation processes. Franco-German coordination is therefore essential but cannot be taken for granted due to the political differences between the two countries. This paper explores whether and under which conditions the new Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA) has contributed to the convergence of political positions in France and Germany since its foundation in 2019. It identifies factors, both internal and external to the parliament, that favour Franco-German coordination. These include the ability to recognise and formulate different points of view through regular and structured parliamentary exchange. Other factors are the Assembly's decision-making capacity and the use of the instrument of hearing ministers. External facilitating factors include governments taking the FGPA seriously and that crisis situations can also speed up decision-making in the parliamentary space. Two policy examples, the management of the Corona pandemic (1) and foreign and defence policy (2), are used to show the ways in which, on the one hand, a rapprochement has been successful and, on the other, a deadlock persists. The analysis is based on interviews with members of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly, as well as on plenary minutes and resolutions of the FGPA since 2019.

European cities and regions play an increasingly important role in the global arena, developing international partnerships and influencing their countries' foreign policy. The cooperation also engages partners outside Europe – yet, this phenomenon is often overlooked in the analysis, most of which focus on describing the relations of sub-state entities within the European Union. Meanwhile, many countries maintain intensive contacts and lively cooperation with entities outside the EU. Germany may serve as an excellent example, with about 200 partnerships between German and American subnational entities and over 60 partnerships with China.

The paper aims to compare Germans subnational cooperation with the US and China, showing the similarities, differences, and determinants of collaboration. The comparison will be based on the results of two surveys conducted in 126 cities and 16 German states (in 2020/21 and 2022/23) and interviews with city and regional officials. On their basis, we will map subnational links with the US and China and create a matrix of conditions that facilitate/hinder their cooperation (e.g. city size, location, history, diaspora, strong/weak business links, academic centres, institutionalisation, and mayor's attitude). Moreover, the paper will present the main findings on the influence of subnational cooperation on German foreign policy towards those two superpowers.

The paper contributes to the studies on German foreign policy and EU international relations, helping to understand their multi-level character better. It also contributes to city diplomacy studies since our analysis includes smaller cities, which has often been omitted in the literature.

The Franco-British bilateral relationship (FBBR) has gone through an exceptionally bad period following the UK’s 2016 Brexit referendum. Brexit disrupted a bilateral relationship conducted largely within/inside the European Union (EU) for over 40 years. Many Franco-British diplomatic routines were suspended during the Brexit negotiations and the relationship became highly politicized, subject to the vagaries of relations between the countries’ political leaders at a time of fractious UK-EU talks. During the UK’s Johnson and short-lived Truss premierships (between 2019-2022), relations sunk to a new low as the UK’s leaders resorted to easy populist and anti-French tropes, and French diplomacy found itself on the back foot with regards to the implications of ‘Global Britain’ for the UK’s security and defence relationships (AUKUS). The re-election of President Macron and the appointment of Rishi Sunak as UK prime minister in 2022, in the context of tactical cooperation both on the war in Ukraine, and in the case of the worsening humanitarian crisis in the Channel, offered scope for a strategic reset of the FBBR in 2023, including a long-delayed Franco-British summit. This paper explores the possibilities and constraints of such a diplomatic rapprochement: how can the FBBR thrive in its new multilateral diplomatic setting ? To what extent can it be separated from the broader EU framework ?

Small states are defined by limited capacities to design and conduct policies when compared to larger countries. In the European Union, where the majority of the member states are small, but the EU as a whole has got policies towards regions all over the world and on most topics, the small states are often unable to formulate positions on all items on the agenda. They need to specialise and concentrate on relevant issues only. This fact has been widely recognised in academic literature. Specialisation, however, opens a path to political and bureaucratic contestation.

The proposed paper will map the arguments surrounding a change in Czech foreign policy’s specialisation. Czechia traditionally specialised in Western Balkans but, over time, re-focused on Eastern Partnership countries. This change involved a discussion both within the ministry and in the public sphere. By identifying the respective arguments in the Czech political debate, strategic documents, and interviews with stakeholders, the paper seeks to test two alternative explanations anchored in sociological and rational choice institutionalism. The former sees policymaking driven by ideas and identities, whereas the latter brings interests into the foreground. As a result, the paper will advance our understanding of the emergence and adaptation of foreign policy specialisation and generate new research questions.