Even though foreign policy was seen as a – comparatively – less contentious aspect of the Brexit negotiations, any clear strategy for post-Brexit engagement with the EU remains lacking. The question therefore arises how the UK will or will not interact with the EU on foreign policy topics. The integrated review “Global Britain in a Competitive Age” discusses interaction with the EU where it serves UK national interest. One clear area of shared interest could be the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. Except for the case of Ukraine, the UK has hardly prioritised this area in its foreign policymaking, while the EU is a driving actor. And indeed, in the Eastern Neighbourhood, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age” foresees “working with our international partners” in supporting the Eastern neighbourhood to “build their resilience to state threats”.

However, this paper finds that this intention is not reflected in British foreign policy discourse as expressed in Parliament. Analysing debates on the Eastern Neighbourhood in the House of Common and House of Lords, it instead emerges that the EU is strategically omitted, and instead attention is drawn to interactions with other international bodies such as the OSCE or bilateral partners.

The 2016 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom ushered in a period of political chaos, culminating in the collapse of Theresa May’s government and the rise of the pro-Brexit faction within the Conservative Party under Boris Johnson. Despite early indications that foreign and security policy would be an important area of stability post-Brexit, the Johnson government oversaw efforts to shift Britain’s international role in important ways, including in overseas development aid, the strategic relationship with the EU, in the signing of new trade and security agreements, and in changes to the UK’s force posture. None of these changes were inherent in the Brexit agenda, but may rather be traced back to the ideological concerns of the Johnson government – especially its preoccupation with sovereignty – and to the significant domestic changes which occurred during the course of the EU-UK withdrawal negotiations. Drawing on over 20 interviews with policymakers and senior think-tank officials, this paper demonstrates the impact the growth of conservative ideology has had on UK foreign policy since the 2016 vote. In doing so, it contributes to our understanding of the link between party ideology and foreign policy and the conditions under which party positions ‘matter’ for external policies.

Addressing the German federal parliament on 27 February 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that the start of Russia’s massive assault on Ukraine three days earlier marked a Zeitenwende in the history of the European continent. He went on to use this term (which roughly translates as “epochal change” or “watershed moment”) a further six times during his speech, using it to express the significance of what had just happened. While he announced a set of policy changes during the speech, he did not actually, in contrast to what was widely and enthusiastically reported at home and abroad, announce or call for a Zeitenwende in Germany’s foreign and defence policy. His choice of words illustrates how German elites and public are only starting to rethink their understanding and conceptualisation of the world, and the German and European role within it. They are starting to question the idea of Germany as a civilian power that operates in and benefit from a stable rules-based multilateral order and considers geopolitical categories and the projection or use of hard power a thing of the unenlightened past. This paper dissects this identity crisis, trying to determine whether it is starting to produce a genuine and sustainable shift in Germany’s international role or follows the example of previous German debates on the need to take more responsibility, such as those following the Russian annexation of Crimea or after the election of Donald Trump, which also created expectations among allies that were ultimately disappointed