The European Union (EU) trade policy is adapting to an international context in which economic coercion is present. The Commission has proposed the creation of a new trade instrument -the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI)- to respond to such threats. This paper adds to the EU and comparative trade policy literature by analyzing the EU’s proposed ACI, comparing it with the section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act and its 1988 addition, USC 2420, “Super 301”. The objective is to assess how ACI enhances the ways in which the EU, primarily the Commission, can engage in geopolitic and geoeconomics through EU trade policy. In other words, how the ACI enables the Commission to pursue interests and values beyond purely commercial considerations.

Transatlantic relations have been undergoing turbulent periods. Frozen talks on trade liberalization and a different view of the relations under the Trump administration affected the EU-US cooperation and brought tensions to the partnership. A changing course brings the Biden administration when some old disputes may be resolved and the collaboration refreshed.

This paper aims in capturing the setup and institutional structure of transatlantic economic relations, to describe and further analyze the changes over the past decade with a particular focus on cooperation in technological change, mitigating climate change, sustainability, and other current challenges.

The governance of EU-US relations has been in the past captured by Pollack and Shaffer (2001), through the prism of liberal intergovernmentalism. Alternative views were offered by Peterson and Steffenson (2009) who focused on transatlantic cooperation, its structure, and its actors more systematically. Other works offer a closer look at specific areas of transatlantic cooperation (Whytock, 2005, Bow, Zaiotti, 2020). Whytock, (2005) applies a concept of transgovernmental networks (based on Raustiala, 2002, Slaughter 2005). This offers the potential for designing a robust framework that will be applied to understanding the institutional structure of the economic cooperation between the EU and the US.

Bow, B., Zaiotti, R. Transgovernmental networks, and security policy coordination in North America and the European Union: A framework for transatlantic comparative research. Journal of Transatlantic Studies 18, 177–189 (2020)

Peterson, J. and Steffenson, R. (2009), Transatlantic Institutions: Can Partnership be Engineered? The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 11: 25-45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2008.00355.x

Pollack M.A., Shaffer G.C. eds. (2001): Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy. Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers.

Raustiala, K. 2002. „The Architecture of International Cooperation – Transgovernmental networks and the future of International Law“. Virginia Journal of International Law 42(1): 1–92.

Slaughter, A. M. 2004. A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Whytock, C. A. 2005. „A Rational Design Theory of Transgovernmentalism: The Case of E.U. U.S. Merger Review Cooperation “. Boston University International Law Journal 23(1): 1–53.

Building on earlier work[1] this paper explores the driving forces of EU-UK-US relations after Brexit. We first look at this trilateral relationship and its bilateral elements in a historical perspective. We examine the various tensions that exist and how far potential solutions at a bilateral level are mutually contradictory or complementary.

Brexit has changed the nature of the EU-US-UK trilateral relationship. Before Brexit, the UK played a role as a mediator between the EU and the US. For the US, the UK was the No.1 transatlantic partner,. Outside the EU, the UK must seek a new place in the transatlantic relationship.

Until Brexit the 3 bilateral pillars of the relationship were complementary. But in the early years after Brexit “Global Britain” project the US as an alternative partner for the UK. Post-Trump the US chose to prioritise relations with the EU, as exemplified by the Trade & Technology Council, the US EU alignment on climate change, the Steel and Aluminium agreement, US support for the EU & Ireland position on the NIP etc.

Observing the current transatlantic relationships after the UK left the EU, the bilateral aspects look like getting stronger than before. The most important tie is now between the EU and the US. The EU and the US see each other as the best ally to navigate volatile geopolitics and to achieve economic sustainability However, many tensions remain, including the EU vs US position on the WTO, US opposition to the “Brussels Effect”, the reaction to the IRA. The EU has a less antagonistic relationship with China than the US.

UK’s position is isolated despite seeking closer Indo-Pacific alignment. It is outside the Trade and Technology Council and a follower on environmental issues.

However there are forces that may bring the EU, US and the UK closer together in the quadrilateral context. We note that if the EU and the UK can find a less “unilateral” approach to rule making and regulatory hegemony this would also facilitate cooperation with the US, and potentially even with those Asian partners who have fears about EU regulatory hegemony[2].

[1] P.Holmes and Minako Morita-Jaeger “Bilateral, Trilateral or - Quadrilateral? The UK-US trade relations in a global context” forthcoming in E.Fahey (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Relations (2023)

[2] See the power surplus : Brussels calling, legal empathy and the trade-regulation nexus

BERCERO, Ignacio Garcia; NICOLAÏDIS, Kalypso https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/70675