The presentation is based on recently published book that examines the seismic impact of Brexit on the British political system, assessing its likely long-term effect in terms of a significantly changed political and constitutional landscape.

Starting with the 2015 general election and covering key developments up to "Brexit Day" and the Covid period, it shows how Brexit "transformed" British politics. The unprecedented turmoil – two snap elections in two years, an unprecedented alternation of Prime Ministers (albeit from the same party), the biggest ever defeats for the Government in Parliament, an impressive number of rebellions and reshuffles in Cabinet and repeated requests for a second independence referendum in Scotland – triggered by Brexit would suggest that the process of leaving the EU might could entail structural changes in the UK' domestic political system. Taking Lijphart’s "Westminster model" as a point of reference to evaluate longitudinal change, the book assesses the impact of Brexit along three dimensions: elections and parties; executive–legislative relationships; and the relationship between central and devolved administrations. Based on a wealth of empirical material, including original interviews with key policymakers and civil servants, it focuses on the direction of travel for the UK political system. The picture that emerges from the analysis points to an uneasy co-existance between the persistence of some institutional innovations of the last tewnty-five years (such as Devolution and the Supreme Court) and a strong push in the direction of the "Westminster model".

In September 2022 the former Liz Truss government published its EU Retention (Reform and Revocation) bill. The bill aims to remove all existing EU laws from the UK statute book by the end of 2013 (unless a case is made to keep them), replace them with new British laws and in so doing fulfil the Brexit promise to regain the country’s full independence from the EU. The period of UK membership of the European Union (1973-2020) was shaped and so often understood by the academic community through the lens of Europeanisation in the three realms of politics, policy and polity. The context has fundamentally changed. Theresa May’s call that Brexit means Brexit (primarily meaning escaping Court of Justice rulings and ending free movement), Boris Johnson’s claim that Brexit has been delivered and the New EU Retention bill together suggest that the UK is set on clear trajectory of de-Europeanisation. Any such interpretation requires much closer scrutiny as do claims that Brexit has been delivered. This paper does both and questions the degree of de-Europeanisation that is actually possible. The starting point for any analysis is an appreciation of the commitments made by the UK under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement (2019) and the subsequent Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2020). How far did these limit a de-Europeanisation trajectory? Evidence of new UK laws, as in the case of the Subsidy Control Act (2022), shows a new UK law that bears considerable similarity with the EU state aid rules. We are seeing similar developments in other areas such as aspects of environmental policy. The internal UK devolution settlements and the fact that Northern Ireland remains within the EU single market for goods further complicates the picture. This paper argues that while the issue of de-Europeanisation plays well to Brexiteers it masks many of the realities that the UK is still looking to the EU at least as a starting point for policy development. Rather than seeing developments as de-Europeanisation this paper introduces the idea of Orbital Europeanisation as the way to understand the UK’s engagement with, and links to the EU. It does so through illustration of developments in relation to competition policy and environmental policy and through an analysis of the shape and look of new UK laws.

Following UK withdrawal from the European Union, the AUKUS agreement, and deterioration in Anglo-French relations, the previously close Anglo-French defence and security relationship is undermined by mistrust, even antipathy. This threatens European security and defence capability, coherence, and resilience. We argue that both the EU and UK must recognise the risks from degraded European defence and security cooperation. To enable re-engagement, France must lead on ensuring EU relevance and capability within NATO, thereby convincing the UK of the necessity for full cooperation with France and its EU partners. The onus is on the EU to make itself an indispensable actor and partner, fully compatible with NATO obligations, and committed to upgrading European capability and military-industrial heft. This requires member states’ commitment to the recommendations in the EU Strategic Compass (SC), substantial uplift in resourcing of capability, and integration through PESCO and joint operations. The EU must be open to full UK participation in CSDP-related activities, including European defence-industrial projects. Full implementation of SC recommendations will strengthen the EU-NATO partnership and assist European-level strategic autonomy, encompassing the UK, and benefiting both NATO and the EU.