In its 2019 strategic outlook on EU-China relations, the EU defines a cooperation partner, a negotiating partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. “China as a systemic rival” promoting alternative models of governance appears dazzling as the EU largely prioritize its economic interests and enagement policy is the main theme. With the surprising annoucement for the conclusion of EU-China comprehensive agreement on investments (CAI) on 30 December 2020, the EU-China relations dramatically exercerated as both sides retaliated each other originating the EU’s sanctions against Chinese offifcial due to human rights violations in Xinjiang, a move more than 30 years after the Tianmmen Square massarcre. EU-China relations suffered from further challenges when Vilnius decided to accept Taiwan’s representative office and Beijing reacted fiercely and furiously. China’s economic coercive measures and the shock of supply chain disruption in the wake of COVID-19 caution the EU its weaknesses in over-depending on China and how China may weaponizes this economic interdependence. The EU thus looks to technological sovereignty and underlines strategic autonomy.

In the context of this changing geopolitics, this paper probes the future of EU-China strategic partnership. The EU is widely referred to as a ‘normative power’, and the EU itself aspires to be a global actor. In contrast, China claims to be a ‘responsible great power’, while the US has pressured China to act as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. In view of the complexities involved in these terms and their various interpretations, one may not be so confident about the compatibility of these two types of power and, consequently, the feasibility of forging a genuine partnership. What does this strategic partnership entail, and how will its character shape the investment liberalisation and protection agenda? Constitutionally, the EU is instructed by the TEU to “promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations” and to “promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance”. At the same time, China places great emphasis on the ‘diversity of international world’ and ‘democracy in international relations’. In view of the differences of European and Chinese approaches in international relations, I ask how such partnership would impact the multilateralism in international law, and to question how the EU reconciles economic interests and normative values when engaging China, in view of the increasing threat that China poses in presenting alternative models of governance.

This paper examines the implications of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and to what extent it affects the Union’s trade partners' perception of the EU. It is a contribution to understanding the broader effects of CBAM as well as understanding the EU’s unilateral turn in trade policy. The empirical focus will be on India and South Africa, two developing countries which will face substantial costs due to increased tariffs on CBAM goods imported into the EU. Furthermore, the focus on reactions by developing countries addresses concerns on the design of CBAM, where issues related to equity and conditionality cause friction between the developing world and a new assertive EU. The paper will draw on role theory and image theory to understand the interplay between the EU’s external image and its self-image. It will use discourse analysis to identify the changing perceptions of the EU after the implementation of CBAM. Analysing minutes from meetings, interviews, talks and strategic reports, representations and prevailing perceptions can be uncovered to identify the external and self-image of the EU. This paper will examine the relationship between the EU’s pursuit of greater autonomy and assertiveness, its priorities of supporting multilateralism and the rule-based international order, and how this conflicts with its trade partners' perception of the EU vis-à-vis its self-perception as a global actor.

Environmental impact assessments (EIA’s) are increasingly applied in the context of trade agreements, but empirical research on the politics of EIA’s is scarce. The lack of standard guidelines surrounding its interpretation call for focus investigation of two key questions : how are EIA’s of trade agreements organised at multiple levels and in bilateral and multilateral settings ? Do they converge between states or diverge according to the specific environmental sector and related trade flows and value chains?

Based on an exhaustive survey of EIA’s of trade agreements we assess the role of actors, agencies, and EIA agendas. The criteria used and the methodology adopted to estimate the impact on the environment are critically examined and a comparison is made between developed and emerging economies, setting at the center of the discourse the EIA processes and policies mandate of the EU.

Several specific features of the EU practice are noticed: the systematical bilateral form of the review, following the adoption of a transparent process in which stakeholders are involved and the integration of the EIA in the more comprehensive sustainable impact analysis framework . Compared to non-EU OECD countries, the EU approach aligns better with the recommendations of international institutions such as UNEP or the OECD. However, several issues remain. First, while the assessment is bilateral it is executed by one interested party exclusively . Second, the ex-ante evaluation may diverge from the impact found ex-post. Third, in most cases, the impact assessment seems too general and qualitative to be taken into account in the trade negotiations. So far, no developing country or regional organisation other than the EU has carried out systematically EIAs of trade agreemenst. We discuss a number of ways the impact of the EIA can be increased when negotiating a trade agreement and its institutional position strengthened.

2.12.0.0

2.12.0.0

On June 30, 2022, European Union (EU) Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, announced the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two partners. The deal was seminal for several reasons, including the inclusion of a chapter on the promotion of Māori Trade and the Economic Cooperation and a Climate change clause. From an economic perspective, the agreement would mean the elimination of 100% of New Zealand tariffs on EU exports to New Zealand and up to 97% on New Zealand exports to the EU (after 7 years).[1] It has been projected that due to the FTA New Zealand’s economy will grow New Zealand will gain an extra NZ$1.8 billion per annum by 2035.[2] Yet, despite the momentous occasion, sectors from New Zealand’s meat and dairy industries have been heavily critical of the deal. The economic benefit for the European Union is expected to be minimal – in 2020 New Zealand trade with the EU was worth only 0.2% of the EU’s total trade.[3]

The paper finds that economic benefits were secondary for the EU, with political motivations at play for the European Union and its 27 Member States, which is seeking to assert itself in the Asia (Indo) Pacific. Secondly, the muted reception in New Zealand can be attributed to two factors: that Free Trade Deals do not interest the general New Zealand public and that the domestic lobby groups from the meat and dairy industries dominate narratives. Thirdly, despite some condescension in Europe, the EU-NZ FTA is likely to gain broad support and provide a template for future deals, especially the chapters on sustainability and indigenous recognition. Finally, given New Zealand’s strong historical and cultural ties with the United Kingdom (UK), the FTA may be even more important for bringing the EU and New Zealand closer together.

[1] Katie Scotcher (2022) EU-NZ trade agreement 'by no means a done deal' | RNZ accessed 27.2.2023 August 27.

[2] European Commission, European Commission (2022). EU27 Trade in Goods by partner (2021, excluding intra-EU trade). https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf (accessed 19 January 2023) p.1.

[3] European Commission, European Commission (2022). EU27 Trade in Goods by partner (2021, excluding intra-EU trade). https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf (accessed 19 January 2023) p.1.