Good Cop/Bad Cop: Frontex’s Intelligence-led Policing for People Control
Panteion University of Social & Political Sciences, Greece
Frontex, the EU border control agency was first established in 2004 so as to coordinate and build on the management of EU external borders. After 15 years of operational activities and substantial organisational, staff and budgetary enhancements, Frontex became the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Under new EU Commission plans, to meet new challenges, the Agency will expand from 1,300 operational staff to 10,000 within 2020 managing an 11.3 billion budget for the 2021-2027 period. Yet, Frontex has not only expanded its operational activities but also its field of action.
This paper argues that Frontex is now moving from border control to people control. Employing debriefing during its joint operations and deployment at the ‘hotspots’, implementing the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), as well as promoting, financing and trialling high-tech lie detection technology (i.e. AVATAR system, iBorderCtrl), Frontex engages in people control activities. This describes an intelligence-led policing that shifts from border management to a people control direction with the collection, processing, use, exchange and managing of personal data and information on intended travels as well as direct interaction with border crossers. Through the application of the principal-agent model, the paper explores how the Agency managed to expand its role beyond the limitations set by its mission and legal basis assuming new tasks and responsibilities that were not originally anticipated. The paper sheds light upon a little researched aspect of the Agency’s activity.
The lack of coordination in EU counter-terrorism as a hindrance to effective prevention and response – focus on information sharing and cooperation in police and intelligence.
Dublin City University, Ireland, UACES Scholar 2019
The EU response to terrorist acts is characterised by 28 approaches addressing one problem. Different threat perceptions and strategic cultures explain the divergent policy approaches guided by high-politics and driven by exogenous shocks, while the complexity of governance structures has led to inter-agency competition. In the largely open-border, single-market space of the EU, the absence of strategic, coherent, cross-border response created accountability gaps exploited by extremist groups. As the issue of terrorism is new to the EU, policy-making until 2015 was short-term and reactive instead of driven by strategically coordinated prevention and response. Despite the bodies and mechanisms in place to facilitate policy and operational cooperation, until 2015 the latter lacked to such an extent so as to cause gaps in governance and inefficiency of the policy including decreased capacity for prevention and response. The article uses a case study to illustrate the aforementioned gaps, consisting of the timeframe between two interconnected terrorist attacks (Paris, 13 November 2015 - Brussels, 22 March 2016).
This article thus focuses on the inherent and unparalleled in any other EU policy cross-border element of internal security (Monar, 2014, p.33). As a policy within that domain, counter-terrorism is a prime example of a field, the sheer functioning of which is contingent on cross-border governance, conditional itself on such factors as well-tailored legislation, trust and interoperability between national authorities. EU counter-terrorism is a hybrid policy stuck in the limbo of European integration. Nevertheless, despite its incremental, exogenous-shock-driven integration, it has evolved from de facto intergovernmental governance to gradually heading towards harmonisation. The presumed added value of EU counter-terrorism governance, as conducive to cross-border operability, is thus easily deductible, however this paper will aim to complement this hypothesis with rigorous theoretical and empirical basis, in order to prove its validity. The article will aim to demonstrate the increased efficiency of cross-border and inter-agency coordination in the EU’s counter-terrorism policy since 2015 due to the improved institutional design and legislative framework, leading to further policy integration, and will extrapolate the added value of such harmonisation.
The European Arrest Warrant in crisis scenarios: legal and political developments
University of Surrey, United Kingdom
Over the past decade, the EU has faced successive existential crises which have presented distinct challenges for the unity of Member States, and for the strength of the Union itself. Trends of rule of law regression at national level on one hand, and the UK's complex path to Brexit on the other, are two such phenomena creating legal and policy challenges for the Union and Member States. Against that background, this paper reflects on developments relating to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system. First, it considers the CJEU's approaches to handling crisis phenomena in the EAW context, evaluating the extent to which its post-Aranoysi and Caldararu jurisprudence puts a fresh complexion on when crisis phenomena - such as rule of law regression, or the prospect of Brexit - can be successfully invoked as justifications to prevent the execution of an EAW. This caselaw has implications for the future functioning of the EAW in Member States, raising important questions over the practical efficacy of CJEU guidance for executing judicial authorities, and questions over the automaticity of mutual trust - a doctrine already fractured in the EAW context. Second, it considers the UK's vision for extradition in the context of Brexit, assessing the future implications of Brexit for criminal justice co-operation between the UK and Member States. This vision has - at the time of writing - failed to fully anticipate and address obstacles to future co-operation in the field of extradition, risking a crisis of co-operation post-Brexit.