Conference Agenda

While the ILO supervisory bodies have reiterated all workers should enjoy the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining irrespective of employment status, workers who fall outside of the standard employment relationship, hardly enjoy such rights mainly due to the existing regulatory framework. Collective agreements for platform workers, for example, are restricted by competition law. Moreover, employers’ group questions the applicability of Con No. 98 to all platform workers, most of whom have been mis/classified as the self-employed. While the ILO has recommended “developing specific collective bargaining mechanisms relevant to self-employed workers”, we have not seen many developments to promote their rights.

Against this, I attempt to tackle the questions like “who should be held accountable for respecting the right to collective bargaining?” and “how does the regulatory framework for collective bargaining need to change for protecting workers in diverse forms of work arrangement?”.

For answering these, I examine how self-employed workers have organised and engaged in collective bargaining in Korea since the late 1990s. At first, they attempted to organise unions, and to get a legal recognition, being confronted with narrow legal interpretation of “worker”. Second, they had to overcome employers’ refusal of collective bargaining or establish counterparties of industrial relations. Moreover, they must win through restrictive institutional framework – bargaining unit and levels, standards to determine the representative status of unions and facilities afforded to workers’ representatives etc. In addition, they have faced to interference of competition authorities and criminal penalty even after concluding collective agreements.

I analyse historical and social context and legal issues above mentioned, with cases of owner-truckers, informal workers in care service sector and freelance workers in the media and culture industry. Many of them increasingly work in platform economy, too. I examine the evolution of issues surrounding collective bargaining for self-employed workers over decades. Also, I review the relevant cases in the Committee on the Freedom of Association, with a view to narrow the gap between the ILO principles and domestic application of collective labour rights. Particularly, I explore in what way the rationale for employer’s responsibility could be revised, and how the purpose and scope of collective bargaining should be rebuilt to promote the right to collective bargaining for all workers.

Digital labour platforms often display a preference for self-employed workers for cost curbing or flexibility purposes (Rubery et al., 2018; Schor et al., 2020; Thelen, 2019). However, we find empirical exceptions from this trend including the food delivery platform Just Eat/Takeaway, which has a global strategy of decent work and working conditions as well as an industrial relations department at global level. Just Eat/Takeaway pledge to work with employed platform workers in 12 out of the 20 countries, where the platform is active, and the company has engaged in collective bargaining in several cases. Instead of reducing protection for workers by replacing the wage-nexus of an employment relationship by a commercial civil law contract, these collective agreements

potentially fix the wage-nexus by re-embedding workers into a traditional employment relationship. Drawing on interviews with platform managers from Just Eat/Takeaway in Denmark, Spain and Italy, interviews with union representatives as well as document analysis (of strategies and agreements), this paper analyses the employer strategy by the same platform in different national contexts. We compare three countries from various industrial relations regimes (Visser 2009), where Just Eat/Takeaway is employing couriers and negotiating with unions: Denmark (Organised Corporatism) and Italy & Spain (Polarised/State-centered). We analyze how national managers implement the

global strategy of decent work by explaining under what conditions, and the extent to which, they employ platform workers as employees and how they initiate negotiations with unions and conclude collective agreements. We found product and labour markets as well as the country-based industrial relation systems explaining the way in which the platform triggers strategies - and respond to counter-strategies of trade unions and

workers collectives - to negotiate collective agreements.

Introduction

The expansion of the platform economy in Europe has significantly transformed traditional employment structures. Many individuals engaged through digital platforms are not formally recognised as employees, limiting their access to guaranteed social benefits and minimum wage standards. This study examines how the recognition and enforcement of minimum wage as a labour right impact platform workers’ employment status and protection.

Research Questions

1. How does the EU Platform Work Directive influence the right of platform workers to receive minimum wage, and to what extent does it ensure their proper employment classification and wage protection across member states?

2. How do minimum wage regulations in the EU member states (Spain, France, Germany, Italy) and the United Kingdom apply to platform workers?

3. What impact do national court rulings have on the classification of platform workers and their entitlement to minimum wage protections?

4. How to shape adequate minimum wage protections for platform workers?

Methodology

This research uses a qualitative analysis of the EU and national legal frameworks, relevant literature and key court decisions:

Spain: Glovo case (Supreme Court, No. 805/2020)

France: Uber case (Court of Cassation, No. 374/2020)

Germany: Bicycle Courier case (Federal Labour Court, No. 9 AZR 102/2020)

Italy: Foodera case (Court of Cassation, No. 1663/2020)

the UK: Uber BV v. Aslam (UKSC 2019/0029, 2021)

Contribution and Findings

The study provides critical insights into the effectiveness of minimum wage regulations and court rulings:

1. The EU Platform Work Directive strengthens platform workers’ right to minimum wage by introducing a presumption of employment, enhancing enforcement mechanisms, and promoting harmonisation across member states. However, its effectiveness depends on national implementation.

2. Spain’s „Riders Law” (2021) and the UK’s proposed Employment Rights Bill (2024) presume an employment relationship between parties.

3. Courts increasingly recognise platform workers as employees, entitling them to minimum wage protections.

4. Employment classification should reflect economic dependence rather than ridig legal categories.

5. Minimum wage protection must be complemented by collective bargaining rights.

6. Stronger enforcement mechanisms are necessary to regulate gig work.

7. Extending wage protections promotes economic justice.

Conclusions:

The combination of legislative initiatives and supportive judicial rulings underscores the importance of a comprehensive approach. Adequate minimum wage protection for platform workers requires a broader regulatory framework, including collective bargaining and stronger enforcement. Policymakers are encouraged to continue refining legal frameworks to ensure that all workers, regardless of employment classification, receive fair wages and adequate labour protections.

The gig economy has emerged as an essential component of Malaysia’s Labour market, providing flexible employment options and substantially enhancing the country’s economic growth. However, its swift growth has exposed various challenges, such as wage disparity, income instability, insufficient social protection, and dominance of foreign platforms. These issues expose fundamental deficiencies in labour market institutions, which are currently unable to provide adequate protections to gig workers. The fragmentation of regulations exacerbates the situation, with overlapping responsibilities among various ministries result in inefficiencies. Most gig workers are deprived of basic protections, leaving them susceptible to financial and occupational hazards. This study addresses the formation of the Malaysian Gig Economy Commission (SEGIM) as a centralised regulatory body to overcome these challenges. SEGIM seeks to standardise policies, establish minimum wage regulations, and enhance labour protection specifically designed for gig workers. By clearly defining employment statuses, SEGIM can eradicate ambiguities that hinder workers from obtaining basic labour rights including paid leave, insurance and retirement funds. Furthermore, SEGIM could significantly contribute to the advancement of local gig platforms, reducing dependency on foreign operator. This study employs mixed-method approach, integrating quantitative analysis of gig economy data with qualitative insights derived from interviews with gig workers, platform operators and policymakers. The result underscore the imperative for strong labour institutions to address domestic labour issues while contributing to global initiatives to establish inclusive and resilient labour markets. SEGIM could also promote tax reforms, enhance skills development via specialized training programs, and foster equitable competition within the gig economy. This research highlights the significance of flexible institution in the digital era, promoting SEGIM as innovative model to protect gig workers and foster sustainable economic growth. SEGIM offers a comprehensive solution to the challenges of Malaysia's gig economy by protecting worker rights, enhancing their representation, and strengthening the principles of decent work. This initiative provides a valuable framework for other nations aiming to address comparable challenges and promote equitable, inclusive, and sustainable labour practices in the changing landscape of employment.

The lack of a legal employment relationship between workers and digital labour platforms, complicates discussions regarding labour rights, responsibilities of platform businesses, and the role of the state. Research on this issue from the Global South is scant, albeit rising. India, the largest supplier of global supplier worldwide and having 8% of all digital platforms globally, presents a strong case for this study. My paper uses data gathered from a field survey of 326 online food delivery workers from three Indian cities. I find that majority (84%) workers were not a part of any informal workers' collective, while only 0.6% were associated with some organization. However, nearly 58% workers wanted to see some change in their working conditions. Discussing instances of gig workers' protests from across India over the years, and examining workers' views on collective action, it fills an important literature gap. It is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to discuss workers' perceptions of unionizing, their fears or motivations to assert their rights in the gig economy, and ways in which they try to make their voices heard. Thereby, it discusses the roles and responsibilities of platform businesses and the state in ensuring 'decent' working conditions in India's platform economy.