In virtue of what does a use of a proper name on a particular occasion (i.e., a linguistic utterance, inscription, token, or particular) refer to whatever it in fact refers to? Saul Kripke (1980) and Keith Donnellan (1970, 1974) sketched different answers to this question. To put things roughly, Kripke takes proper name tokens to refer to what the name names—for Kripke, the thing to which the name was given at the origin of a chain of communication of which the current speaker is a part. Donnellan, on the other hand, takes proper name tokens to refer to the thing that explains a speaker’s use of the name on a given occasion—the thing a speaker “has in mind”. In Kripke’s view, the difference between him and Donnellan over the reference of proper names is resolved by distinguishing speaker’s reference from semantic reference. Donnellan’s view is then said to concern the former while Kripke’s concerns the latter. A different resolution, which Kripke dismissed, is that not only definite descriptions, but also proper names, have a semantically significant referential use, as well as an attributive use, extending Donnellan’s (1966) distinction. Donnellan’s view then concerns the referential use, while Kripke’s concerns the attributive use. This talk develops this other resolution.