In this talk, I will present a quasi-realist approach to the problem of meaning normativity in inferentialism. Inferentialism is a metasemantic theory that explains the semantic content of expressions by relying on inferential relations between them and other expressions. One of the biggest problems for inferentialists is its potential incompatibility with naturalism. Put simply, inferentialists rely on a normative notion of rules to explain the semantic content of expressions which presents a challenge for naturalization, given the difficulty of naturalizing normativity. Recent literature has explored various solutions to the problem: showing that norms exist in the natural world (Hlobil 2022), appealing to the weaker forms of normativity (Glock 2022), or giving a causal story about emergence of rules (Peregrin 2022, Weiss 2022). In this talk, I will propose an alternative solution, drawing inspiration from Blackburn’s (1993) quasi-realist approach to moral discourse and Reiland’s account of regulative rules. This strategy will enable me to address two key objectives: 1) answering the metasemantic question of how expressions acquire their semantic content, and 2) offering a naturalistic explanation for why inference rules are normatively loaded.

Quasi-realism in metaethics acknowledges two perspectives on moral discourse—one external to the discourse from which naturalistic functional explanations of the discourse are provided and another, internal, from which one can talk about moral truths, properties, and beliefs. In a similar spirit I will distinguish two perspectives within an inferential linguistic practice. The explanation of what gives meaning to linguistic expressions comes from an external perspective. Expressions have meanings because a linguistic community accepts certain constitutive, naturalistically non-threatening inferential rules. Conversely, the internal-discursive perspective considers the viewpoint of participants in linguistic practice. From this standpoint, the semantic rules have their full normative force. However they also are not problematic from a naturalistic standpoint, as their normative character applies only when engaging in a language game.

To fully explain why expressions have meaning in inferentialist metasemantics, I will draw on Reiland’s (2023) concept of regulative rules. This will also clarify both internal and external perspectives on linguistic practice. According to Reiland, regulative rules are somewhere in between normative truths and orders. Unlike orders, they contain propositional content, and unlike normative truths, they can only be in force, not true. The acceptance of a rule within a community depends on their acceptance of what Reiland calls “bare propositional content.” What I will suggest is that rules of inference should be understood precisely like Reiland’s regulative rules. Unlike orders, each rule of inference carries specific propositional content. For example, the rule “From ‘this is red’ infer ‘this is colored’” has a propositional content which can also be in force in a certain linguistic community. This second feature of inference rules (their ability to be in force) is what distinguishes them from normative truths.

The picture is, then, the following. What metaphysically constitutes an expression’s meaning is a fact that members of a community follow specific inference rules (understood as regulative rules in Reiland’s sense). I will argue that from an external perspective on linguistic practice this fact of following inferential rules can be explained solely in terms of dispositions. The fact that a rule is in force stems from the dispositions of individuals within a linguistic community to accept specific linguistic patterns. For instance, within a specific community, the phrase “This is red” means that something is red because individuals are disposed to accept an inferential move to “This is colored” but not to “This is blue.” However, it may seem that there is more to rules being in force than merely individuals’ dispositions toward certain linguistic behaviors. There appears to be a sense of normative force linked to the acceptance of rules. I will argue that this appearance of normativity is captured by considering the internal point of view of linguistic practice. The internal perspective is characterized by participants of linguistic practice having a pro-attitude toward specific propositional content. This pro-attitude not only establishes that a particular rule is in force within a linguistic community but also gives it a normative force. In contrast, from an external standpoint, one can only hold a belief, formed by observing the dispositions of a particular community, that a linguistic rule is in force. Importantly, this belief does not fully capture what it means to follow a particular rule; namely, it does not grasp the normative, inherently motivating aspect of the rule.

In a nutshell, the quasi-realist view I propose offers a naturalistic account of what determines the semantic content of expressions: people’s dispositions to follow regulative inferential rules. The account I am defending also explains why these rules generate normative force—it is because members of the linguistic community hold a pro-attitude towards them.

References:

Blackburn, S. (1993) Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.

Glock, H. J. (2022) “Norms, Reasons, and Anthropological Naturalism.” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 50, No. 1: 9–32.

Hlobil, U. (2022) “Teleo-Inferentialism.” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 50, No. 1: 185–211.

Peregrin, J. (2022) “Inferentialism Naturalised.” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 50, No. 1: 33–54.

Reiland, I. (2023) “Regulative Rules: A Distinctive Normative Kind.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Weiss, B. (2022) “From Tools to Rules: The Evolution of Rule-Following.” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 50, No. 1: 55–82.

Normative generics and discourse

The distinction between generic sentences (“generics”) and non-generic sentences is by now well known: generics express generalizations without any overt characterization of the distribution of the kind members with respect to the property being ascribed (in contrast to overt quantifier expressions, for example). But theorists have also posited a distinction within the category of generics themselves. Descriptive generics merely describe the above mentioned generalizations. The second kind of generic, which philosophers have recently started to call “normative generics”, are thought to have a distinctly normative flavor to the kinds of generalizations they express. (Cf. Burton-Roberts 1976, 1977; Cohen 2001; Leslie 2015) Even if the distinction is a bit vague, the contrast between descriptive and normative generics turns out to be quite striking, as (1) and (2) show. The (a)-sentences provide examples of descriptive generics, describing putative regularities in the world, whereas the (b)-sentences seem to make something closer to a normative claim.

(1) a. Rugby players don’t cry.
b. Boys don’t cry.

(2) a. Philosophers work at universities
b. Philosophers care about the truth.

Given the descriptive sense of (2a), arguably not much normative information follows from such an utterance. But with the normative sense of (2b), one gets the impression that philosophers who fail to care for the truth, or care for the truth in the right way, are normatively inadequate. Yet, while this flavor of normative generics is easy to identify, it is harder to characterize or explain. One way to get a purchase on it is by observing the discourse effects of utterances of utterances of normative generics. To this end, philosophers and linguists often discuss this in speech act-theoretic terms, pointing out that they have a hortative or prescriptive force. (Leslie 2015; Haslanger 2011; Hesni 2021) It’s been said that normative generics give instructions, provide advice, or prescribe appropriate behavior. We concur that these are important and central uses of normative generics, but argue that the analysis should broaden its focus on some of the wider ways that normative generics figure in discourse.

Normative generics as derogatives and threats

Here are some examples of what we have in mind. First, utterances of normative generics often involve derogation or depreciation. Consider a very conservative family member uttering the following to a working mother, when both know the latter has no intention or means to stop working:

(3) Women stay home to raise families.

As an instruction or bit of advice not to work, this utterance would be otiose. Felicity conditions for instructions tend to include expectations that the addressee has an interest in following the advice, or that there is a reasonable expectation that they will follow it. (3) would be a felicitous utterance even with a clear understanding that the addressee neither would nor could possibly follow the advice. A better way to understand this utterance of (3) in the envisioned context is as a means to derogate the addressee, pointing out the grounds for this derogation.

Or, consider a coach addressing a young player sitting on the field crying after a painful tackle. The coach utters (1b). Again, though it is easy to detect the normative flavor of this utterance, and there is something hortative or prescriptive about it, we find unhelpful to think of such an utterance as, e.g., a command not to cry. (Commands tend to be infelicitous when it is common ground that the addressee won’t comply with it. Cf. Mandelkern 2019.) Instead, we think it is more promising to understand the discourse function of such an utterance as a threat to the status of the addressee.

Scripts and definitions

We maintain that these kinds of uses of normative generics—as a means of derogation, or as a giving voice to threats—are fairly central to normative generics, yet the main accounts of normative generics (for example, those of Burton-Roberts 1976, 1977; Cohen 2001; Leslie 2015; Hesni 2021) wouldn’t adequately explain why this is so.

After making the case for these central uses of normative generics, the rest of our talk focuses on bringing together theoretical resources that allow us to explain them. We follow a recent proposal by Berio and Musholt (2022) which argues that a function normative generics discourse involves the activation of schemata and scripts (in the sense of Schank and Abelson 1975, 2013) in specific social situations. Berio and Musholt argue, following Bicchieri and McNally (2018), that failures to meet the expectations engendered by schemata and scripts often trigger reactive attitudes and a dispositions to attempt to reestablish compliance with these expectations.

We argue that combining this proposal together with the metalinguistic account of generics from Krifka 2013 allows us to see normative generic discourse as a means of negotiating and policing normative expectations about the relevant kinds, and this, in turn allows us to analyze the relevant uses described above as derogations and/or threats.

References Berio, L. and K. Musholt (2022). How language shapes our minds: On the relationship between generics, stereotypes and social norms. Mind and Language 38(4), 944–961. Bicchieri, C. and P. McNally (2018). Shrieking sirens: Schemata, scripts, and social norms. Social Philosophy and Policy 35(1), 23–53. Burton-Roberts, N. (1976). On the generic indefinite article. Language 52(2), 427–448. Burton-Roberts, N. (1977). Generic sentences and analyticity. Studies in Language. 1(2), 155–196. Cohen, A. (2001). On the generic use of indefinite singulars. Journal of semantics 18(3), 183–209. Haslanger, S. (2011). Ideology, generics, and common ground. In C. Witt (Ed.), Feminist Metaphysics, pp. 179–207. Springe. Hesni, S. (2021). Normative generics: Against semantic polysemy. Thought. 10(3), 218–225. Krifka, M. (2013). Definitional generics. In A. Mari, C. Beyssade, and F. D. Prete (Eds.), Genericity, pp. 372–389. OUP. Leslie, S. (2015). “Hillary Clinton is the only man in the Obama administration”: Dual character concepts, generics, and gender. Analytic Philosophy 56(2), 111–141. Mandelkern, M. (2019). Practical moore sentences. Nous 55(1), 39–61. Schank, R. C. and R. P. Abelson (1975). Scripts, plans, and knowledge. In IJCAI, Volume 75, pp. 151–157. Schank, R. C. and R. P. Abelson (2013). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding: An inquiry into human knowledge structures. Hillsdale: Earlbaun Associates, Inc.

An orthodox characteristic of Moore’s Paradox (Moore 1942) presents it as a problem of adequately explaining why the following assertions seem self-contradictory or absurd, although their content is perfectly consistent:

(MP) p, but I don’t believe that p.

Moore’s Paradox is therefore often dealt with by appealing to properties of the speech act of assertion and the belief it expresses. Many theorists (e.g. Black 1952, Searle 1970, Shoemaker 1995, Alston 2000, Woods 2018, Mandelkern 2021) noted, however, that Moore-like phenomena also seem to arise in cases of (partly) non-assertoric speech acts, such as:

(1) Please phi, but I don’t want you to phi.

(2) p? - but I don't want to know if p.

(3) I order you to phi, but you may not phi.

(4) I promise to phi, but I will not phi.

This observation according to some (Woods 2018) stands against the standard analysis of Moore’s Paradox in terms of expressing irrational belief. In my talk, I will aim at explaining the puzzling nature of such sentences without dropping this crucial assumption and demonstrate, that such constructions reveal interesting, yet widely neglected features of non-assertoric speech acts and their interaction with the conversational common ground.

I will start by presenting and critiquing the characterization of these speech acts present in the literature, distinguishing different forms of Moorean speech acts, which I label “sincerity” (i.e. denying, in the second conjunct, the sincerity condition of a speech act performed in the first conjunct, e.g. (1)-(2)) and “satisfaction” formulations (denying, in the second conjunct, the satisfaction condition of the mental state expressed in the first conjunct, e.g. (3)-(4)). I shall argue that blurring this distinction led to many existent solutions to lack needed generality: in particular Searle’s (1969) and Woods’ (2018) analyses in terms of speaker’s commitments and Mandelkern’s (2021) analysis in terms of conversational pretense. In contrast, I will hypothesize that non-assertoric speech acts have a double effect on the common ground (understood as common belief or common knowledge) presupposed by the speakers usually thought to be reserved for assertions (Stalnaker 1978, 1984): that, once accepted, such speech acts make speakers accept that the speaker is in a mental state conventionally expressed by these acts and that their satisfaction condition is or will be met:

(B) By performing the speech act α, conventionally expressing mental state M with a satisfaction condition s, the speaker proposes to add the proposition that s occurs or will occur to the common ground (e.g., by promising that they will phi, the speaker to add to the common ground the proposition that they will phi).

(R) By performing the speech act α, conventionally expressing mental state M with a satisfaction condition s, the speaker offers M as a reason for why s will obtain, obtains, or why the hearer should make it the case (e.g., by promising that they will phi, the speaker offers their intention to phi as a reason why the proposition that they will phi is true).

B and R both provide the immediate solution to the initial puzzle. Given that non-assertoric Moorean speech acts conjoin both (a) the proposal to add to the common ground the proposition that s obtains or will obtain or that they are in M, and (b) the proposal to add to the common ground the proposition that s does not or will not obtain or that they are not in M, in effect they aim at introducing contradictory propositions to the common ground, which gives rise to Moore-paradoxicality.

In the remainder of my talk, I shall discuss motivations standing behind accepting both B and R as descriptive claims about the effects of non-assertoric speech acts on the common ground and some possible objections towards it. This claim builds on two crucial observations: (a) the fact that non-assertoric speech acts introduce new intuitively acceptable presuppositions to conversation, (b) that non-assertoric speech acts may often be realized by assertoric means reflecting the content of B and R (e.g. one may promise by simply asserting “I will phi” or “I intend to phi”). Building upon the observations of Ninan (2005) and Portner (2004, 2007), I will claim that these two features may be fruitfully explained in the common ground framework by appealing to the fact that non-assertoric speech acts may serve as a way of establishing a common plan and allow for rational coordination.

References:

Alston, W. P. (2000). Illocutionary acts and sentence meaning. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Black, M. (1952). Saying and disbelieving. Analysis, 13(2), 25-33.

Mandelkern, M. (2021). Practical Moore sentences. Noûs, 55(1), 39-61.

Moore, G. E. (1942). Reply to My Critics. In P. A. Schlipp (Ed.), The Philosophy of George Edward Moore, Menasha: George Banta Publishing Company.

Ninan, D. (2005). Two puzzles about deontic necessity. In New Work on Modality. MIT Working Papers in Linguistics, 51 (2005).

Portner, P. (2004). The semantics of imperatives within a theory of clause types. In Semantics and linguistic theory (Vol. 14, pp. 235-252).

Portner, P. (2007). Imperatives and modals. Natural language semantics, 15, 351-383.

Searle, J. (1970). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shoemaker, S. (1995). Moore's paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 77(2/3), 211-228.

Stalnaker, R. C. (1978). Assertion. In Pragmatics (pp. 315-332). Brill.

Stalnaker, R. C. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Woods, J. (2018). A commitment-theoretic account of Moore’s paradox. In Pragmatics, truth and underspecification (pp. 323-348). Brill.