Employer Power, Labor Saving Technical Change, and Inequality

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Abstract: How does employer power mediate the impact of labor saving technical change on inequality? This question has largely been neglected in the recent literature on the wage and distributional consequences of automation, where the labor market is assumed to be competitive. In a simple task-based model, with search frictions which generate an equilibrium wage distribution even with identical firms and workers, we explore the implications of labor saving technical change for equilibrium outcomes. We show that employer power is a crucial determinant of the nuanced comparative statics of technical change. Among a range of results, we show the possibility of Kuznetsian inverse-U relationships between employer power and inequality, and labor saving technical change and inequality. We further show that when employer power is sufficiently low, labor saving technical change can both increase total output and increase wage inequality. With free entry of firms, labor saving technical change leads to both a first order dominating shift in the age distribution and an increase in the Gini coefficient of wage inequality.

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1 Introduction

Labor saving technical change is held to be one of the reasons behind rising income inequality. It is argued that technical progress is displacing basic unskilled labor in favor of capital and skilled labor, thereby lowering the share of labor overall and the share of unskilled labor within that (Autor et. al. 2003, Kotlikoff and Sachs, 2012, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). The theoretical analysis has moved from a conventional capital-labor production framework to a task-based framework (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) represents further developments in this strand of thinking, where counters to the conventional displacement effect of labor saving automation are posed in terms of a productivity effect, a capital accumulation effect, and a deepening of automation effect. The impact of labor saving technical change is thus argued to be nuanced, depending on the relative strengths of these different effects.

However, a striking feature of this literature is how little attention, if any, is paid to market power and specifically to employer power. The labor market is assumed to be competitive. The wage adjusts to clear the labor market in a standard competitive supply and demand framework. Thus the role of employer power in mediating the impact of labor saving technical change on employment, wages and inequality is left unexamined. And yet, the issue of degrees monopsony power in labor markets remains central to analysis and policy. The literature launched by Card and Krueger (1994) is still going strong, and the minimum wage remains at the forefront of policy debate (Manning, 2003; Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom, 2010; Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix, 2017). And the decline of the bargaining power of labor relative to capital has been a recurring theme in the work of Pranab Bardhan (Bardhan, 2017).

Is the impact of technical change on inequality magnified or muted when there is employer power in labor markets? How does the nature of the impact, on employment and on the distribution of wages, vary with the degree of monopsony? This paper shows that there is indeed a significant interaction effect: while labor saving technical change and employer power can both increase inequality, the two working together can reinforce each other. Thus reducing employer power is good for reducing inequality not only on its own terms, but also because it helps to counteract the inequality increasing effects of labor saving technical change.

The framework we use to develop our analysis is a model of job search frictions whose equilibrium leads to a wage distribution even when skills are homogeneous. Labor saving tech-
Technical change is modeled as some tasks now no longer needing to be done by labor. This leads to both a displacement effect and a productivity effect in the terminology of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018). Employer power is captured by the limited number of firms operating in this labor market and the markup on wages they enjoy as a consequence. Our focus is on equilibrium unemployment and the wage distribution among those employed, and we conduct comparative statics of a higher rate of labor saving technical change, conditioned by different degrees of monopsony power. We show:

1. Lowering employer power increases expected wages.

2. Lowering employer power generates a Kuznets curve in wage inequality – an increase followed by a decrease.

3. Labor saving technical change polarizes the wage distribution, increasing the unemployment rate but raising the highest wages further.

4. Labor saving technical change lowers total production efficiency - the sum of wages and profits – when employer power is high, but raises total efficiency when employer power is sufficiently low.

5. Labor saving technical change lowers the expected wage when employer power is high, but raises the expected wage when employer power is sufficiently low.

6. Labor saving technical change increases the Gini coefficient of wages when employer power is sufficiently low.

7. With free entry of firms, labor saving technical change leads to a first order dominating shift in the distribution of wages, resulting in an increase in the expected wage, and an increase in the Gini coefficient.

The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model of jobs arrival, search and the wage distribution equilibrium with fixed number of firms. Section 3 conducts the comparative static analysis of the impact of technical change for varying degrees of employer power. Section 4 presents the analysis of long run equilibrium with free entry of firms. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model and Equilibrium

There is a large number $N$ of job seekers, and $M$ number of employers. The lower the ratio of employers ($M$) to workers ($N$), $\lambda_o \equiv M/N$ the greater is employer power. Each employer seeks to hire enough workers to complete one unit of labor input. The completion of this unit of labor input requires the completion of a continuum $i \in [0, 1]$ of tasks. The unit labor requirement of each task is assumed constant at $a$. Let $P$ denote the revenue that an employer receives upon completion of all required tasks, and let $p$ denote the productivity per worker, evaluated as the revenue per worker $p \equiv P/a$.

We treat labor saving technical change here as an exogenous technological shock, which permits the designation of a fraction $1 - \theta \in [0, 1)$ of tasks to be completed by alternative means, e.g. by machines or offshored, at cost $r$ per task performed. $\theta$ is thus the fraction of tasks that continues to require traditional labor inputs.

To fill each one of the $a\theta$ number of job vacancies, the employer proposes a wage offer $w$ to a randomly chosen job seeker. Assume that $F_\theta(w)$ is the cumulative distribution function of all wage offers, to be determined endogenously in the sequel. Every job seeker rates any and all offers received, and the best job offer is chosen.

The $N$ job seekers have two employment alternatives: (i) resort to a fall back option, which earns her a reservation wage $c$, or (ii) select a job from the(possibly empty) set of job offers that she receives. Specifically, search friction prevents the job seeker from receiving the full set of offers made by every employer in the labor market. The likelihood that a job seeker is met with $z = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ offers is given by a Poisson distribution with parameter $\lambda_o a \theta \equiv (M/N) a \theta$, or, $\Pr(z; \lambda_o a \theta) = e^{-\lambda_o a \theta} (\lambda_o a \theta)^z / z!$ (Mortensen 2003). The associated cumulative distribution of the maximal offer received is:

$$H_\theta(w) \equiv \sum_{z=0}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-\lambda_o a \theta} (\lambda_o a \theta)^z F_\theta(w)^z}{z!} = e^{-\lambda_o a \theta (1 - F_\theta(w))}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

$H_\theta(w)$ is the probability that the best offer that a worker receives is less than $w$.

From an employer’s perspective, the likelihood of consummating a match with $a \theta$ workers by offering each $w$ is thus $[H_\theta(w)]^{a \theta}$. The profit maximization problem of each employer is:

$$\pi_\theta(w) = \max_w [H_\theta(w)]^{a \theta} (P - w a \theta - r (1 - \theta))$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)
subject to the constraint that wages are no less than the fall back option c. \( r(1 - \theta) \) denotes the cost associated with diverting \( 1 - \theta \) share of tasks elsewhere. We assume that \( r < ac \), so that labor saving technological change saves cost for all employers that hire positive number of workers.

2.1 Two Effects of Labor Saving Technical Change

The Productivity Effect

In (2), \( (P - wa\theta - r(1 - \theta)) \) denotes the profits per employer. Henceforth denote

\[
p_\theta \equiv \frac{P - r(1 - \theta)}{a\theta}.
\]

\( p_\theta \) reflects the revenue per worker hired net of the cost of alternative inputs \( r(1 - \theta) \). Clearly,

\[
p_\theta - p_1 = p_\theta - p = \frac{(P - r)(1 - \theta)}{a\theta} > 0.
\]

We call this the productivity effect of labor saving technical change. In essence, by allowing a fraction of tasks to be completed at strictly lower cost through alternative input use, the revenue gains that employers can expect by completing the rest of the tasks workers increases. Since the completion of the rest of the tasks ultimately involves hiring laborers, labor saving technical change in this setting raises the productivity per worker hired. The size of the productivity increase is given by \( p_\theta - p - a \) a function only of \( P \), \( r \), and the size of the labor saving technical change \( 1 - \theta \). Indeed, from this perspective, the larger \( 1 - \theta \) is, the larger will be the implied productivity gains \( p_\theta - p \). The profit maximization problem can thus be simply restated as

\[
\pi_\theta(w) = \max_w [H_\theta(w)\alpha \theta (p_\theta - w)a\theta].
\]

Maximization of (4) by choice of \( w \) yields the following:

\[
f_\theta(w) = \frac{1}{\lambda_o a\theta} \frac{1}{p_\theta - w}, \quad F_\theta(w) = \frac{1}{\lambda_o a\theta} \ln \left( \frac{p_\theta - c}{p_\theta - w} \right).
\]

It follows that:

\[
H_\theta(w) = e^{-\lambda_o a\theta} \left( \frac{p_\theta - c}{p_\theta - w} \right).
\]

At every point along the distribution \( H_\theta(w) \), employers balance the effect of a higher wage offer on profits \( p_\theta - w \), and on the likelihood \( H_\theta(w) \) of a successful hire.
The Displacement Effect

While $H_{θ}(w)$ gives the distribution of the highest wage offer that a worker receives, such a wage offer results eventually in employment if the employer in question is able to attract the required number of additional workers $(θa − 1)$ to complete the task at hand. Thus, let $G_{θ}(w)$ denote the realized wage distribution facing workers, where $G_{θ}(w)$ is the joint probability that (i) the highest wage offer received is at $w$ (with probability $H_{θ}(w)$), and (ii) the employer with the highest wage offer is able to amass enough workers to complete the task at wage $w$ (with probability $[H_{θ}(w)]^{aθ−1}$). Thus:

$$G_{θ}(w) = [H_{θ}(w)]^{aθ} = e^{-λ_o a^2 θ^2} \left( \frac{p_θ - c}{p_θ - w} \right)^{aθ}. \quad (7)$$

From (7), the likelihood of unemployment is given by the fraction workers paid a wage no greater than $c$:

$$G_{θ}(c) = e^{-λ_o a^2 θ^2}.$$

Clearly, the rate of unemployment is inversely related to the number employers per worker $λ_o$ – our measure of (the inverse of) employer market power – as well as the number of jobs available per employer $aθ$. Thus, labor saving technical change, by decreasing $θ$, introduces a displacement effect in the labor market:

$$G_{θ}(c) - G_1(c) = e^{-λ_o a^2 θ^2} - e^{-λ_o a^2} > 0,$$

whenever $θ < 1$. We summarize these observations in the following proposition:

**Proposition 1.** At given $λ_o$, a labor saving technical change always gives rise to a productivity effect, raising the revenue per worker hired,

$$p_θ - p_1 > 0,$$

in addition to a displacement effect, which increases the overall unemployment rate

$$G_{θ}(c) - G_1(c) > 0.$$

To see how these findings, set in a task-based framework with labor saving technical change, differ from the canonical search friction setting, take the special case where there is no labor saving technical change ($θ = 1$), (7) simplifies to

$$G_1(w) = G_1(c) \left( \frac{p - c}{p - w} \right)^{a} = e^{-λ_o a^2} \left( \frac{p - c}{p - w} \right)^{a}. \quad (8)$$
as the productivity effect \((p_\theta \neq p)\) and the displacement effect \(G_\theta(c) \neq G_1(c)\) no longer apply. Furthermore, (8) can be further simplified by removing task considerations in our model by setting \(a = 1\). In this case, the original Mortensen (2003) formulation of a wage distribution applies, where

\[
G_1(w) = H_1(w) = e^{-\lambda_o \left( \frac{p - c}{p - w} \right)}.
\]

\(9\)

### 2.2 The Role Employer Market Power

Before we turn to the effects of labor saving technical change as a function of employer power, we review the role of employer market power on aggregate labor market outcomes in a model with search friction such as ours (e.g. Mortensen 2003, Chau, Goto and Kanbur 2016), and derive new results related to wage inequality that will be useful for our analysis to follow. Thus, for now, set \(\theta = 1\). Increasing market competitiveness by raising the number of employers per worker, \(\lambda_o\), gives rise to a first order stochastically dominating shift in the wage distribution \(G_1(w)\). At the limit as \(\lambda_o \to \infty\), \(G_1(w)\) puts unit weight on worker’s marginal product \(p_1\). Along the way, an increase in \(\lambda_o\) unambiguously decreases unemployment since the unemployment rate is given by:

\[
G_1(c) = e^{-\lambda_o a^2}.
\]

The expected wage in the labor market \(\bar{w}_1\) can be expressed as

\[
\bar{w}_1 = cG_1(c) + \int_c^{w_1^+} wdG_1(w) = \bar{\alpha}_1 p_1 + (1 - \bar{\alpha}_1)c,
\]

(10)

where \(\bar{\alpha}_1 = 1 - (ae^{\lambda_o a} - e^{-\lambda_o a^2})/(a - 1)\). The expected wage in the economy is a weighted sum of the productivity of labor \(p_1\) and the reservation wage \(c\). As should be expected, the expected wage in (10) rises as employer power dissipates through higher values of \(\lambda_o\). Furthermore, an increase in \(\lambda_o\) improves the pass-through of any change in productivity \(p_1\) to wages. Indeed, for any values of \(\lambda_o\) other than the competitive benchmark where \(\lambda_o\) tends to \(\infty\), there is imperfect pass-through of productivity changes to the expected wage, since

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial p_1} = \bar{\alpha}_1 < 1.
\]

Increasing market competitiveness improves this pass-through, as

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \bar{w}}{\partial p_1 \partial \lambda_o} = a^2(e^{-\lambda_o a} - e^{\lambda_o a^2})/(a - 1) > 0.
\]
Now let \( Y_1 \) denote the sum of total profits and income of all workers including the unemployed, and \( y_1 \equiv Y_1/N \) the per capita income, it is straightforward to verify that:

\[
y_1 = (1 - G_1(c))p_1 + G_1(c)c = \alpha^y_1 p_1 + (1 - \alpha^y_1)c,
\]

where \( \alpha^y_1 \equiv 1 - e^{-\lambda_o a^2} \). Thus, national income is also a weighted average of the productivity per worker \( p_1 \) and the opt out \( c \). By inspection, since the share \( \alpha^y_1 \) is strictly increasing in \( \lambda_o \), competitiveness in the labor market raises per capita output, precisely as it lifts workers out of the unemployment pool.

While the impact of employer market power on aggregate labor market outcomes such as unemployment and the expected relationship would seem to be monotonic, there is an interesting inverted-U Kuznets relationship between wage inequality and employer market power. Specifically, let \( L_1(g) \) denote the Lorenz Curve where \( g \) denotes percentage of the workforce. \( L_1(g) \) gives the share of income of the lowest \( g \% \) of the total workforce according to the wage distribution function \( G_1(w) \). Using (8)

\[
L_1(g) = 1 - \frac{a(w_1^- - p_1g) - p_1(1 - g)}{(a-1)\bar{w}_1} + \left( \frac{a}{a-1} \right) \left( \frac{w_1^- - p_1}{\bar{w}_1} \right) g^{1-\frac{1}{a}}.
\]

Let \( I_1 \) denote the Gini coefficient of wage inequality associated with the Lorenz curve above. Figure 1 plots the relationship between the Gini coefficient and employer market power. Starting from a perfectly competitive regime with \( \lambda_o \to \infty \), there is perfect equality among all workers as they are each paid their marginal value product \( p_1 \). Starting from this benchmark a small increase in employer power will necessarily increase inequality, as some workers \( G_1(c) = e^{-\lambda_o a} \) become unemployed, while almost all others receive a wage less than \( p_1 \) based on the wage distribution function \( G_1(w) \). Further increases in market power will continue to increase inequality. At some point, additional increases in employer market power decreases inequality, as increasingly more

\[\text{To see this, note that for wage rank less than the unemployment rate } G_\theta(c), \text{ the wage income of the least wealth } g \text{ percent of the total workforce, } w_1(g) \text{ is simply } c. \text{ For } g > G_1(c), \text{ it follows from (9) that } w(g) = p_1 - e^{\lambda_o a}(p_1 - c)g^{-\frac{1}{a}}.\]

The Lorenz curve is

\[
L_1(g) = \int_0^g \frac{w(g)}{\bar{w}_1}dg.
\]

\[\text{The parametric assumptions are: } P = 30, \ a = 3, \ \theta = 1, \ c = 1 \text{ and } r = 2.85(<ca = 3).\]
workers join the ranks of the unemployed. This process continues until \( \lambda_0 \) tends to zero, reaching another benchmark of complete equality, with all workers are unemployed, earning the opt out value \( c \).

### 3 The Interactive Effects of Employer Power and Technical Change

We now proceed to show that the productivity and displacement effects of labor saving technical change in a task-based setting can give rise to a set of very nuanced distributional and overall labor market level consequences. Furthermore, we show that these effects interact in interesting ways with the extent of employer market power. Specifically, we ask

1. What are the distributional and aggregate labor market consequences of labor saving technical change?
2. What are the pre-conditions that will pave the way for a more labor-friendly labor saving technical change?

The first question is a simple “first difference” effect, which examines whether labor saving technical change brings positive or negative outcomes along the wage distribution, as well as in the aggregate. The second is a “cross-difference” effect, and questions the pre-conditions that will enable workers to better harness the benefits (or to reduce the adverse consequences) associated with a labor saving technical change. We discuss each of these in turn.

#### 3.1 Distributional Consequences

It is straightforward to see that labor saving technical change impacts both the equilibrium range of wages offered, as well as the frequency of any particular wage offer along the range. By definition, the wage lower bound is simply the reservation wage \( c \). At the other extreme, the wage upper bound \( w_\theta^+ \) is defined by \( H_\theta(w_\theta^+) \equiv 1 \), or equivalently,

\[
w_\theta^+ = \alpha_\theta^+ p_\theta + (1 - \alpha_\theta^+) c, \quad \alpha_\theta^+ \equiv 1 - e^{-\lambda_0 a_\theta}.
\]

The maximal wage in the labor market is a weighted average of worker productivity \( p_\theta \) and the reservation wage \( c \). The weight \( \alpha_\theta^+ \) determines the extent to which there is imperfect pass-through of the productivity gains \( p_\theta - p_1 \) to the maximal wage.

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Note the similarity between this pattern and the traditional Kuznets curve arising out of a process of population migration from a low mean/low inequality rural sector to a high mean/ high inequality urban sector.
From (11), the extent of imperfect pass-through depends on both $\lambda_o$ and $\theta$. The more competitive the labor market (higher $\lambda_o$), the higher $\alpha^+_\theta$ will be and the maximal wage is more responsive to productivity improvements. Note that labor saving technical change has the effect of reducing the job arrival rate $\lambda_o a \theta$, while reinforcing market power of employers with the remaining vacancies. Thus, labor saving technical change adversely impacts the extent of imperfect pass-through. This tends to decrease $w^+_\theta$. But going in opposite direction, labor saving technical change directly improves labor productivity $p_\theta$ from Proposition 1, which tends to increase $w^+_\theta$.

On balance,
\[
\frac{\partial w^+_\theta}{\partial (1 - \theta)} = \frac{1}{\theta} \left( (1 - (1 + \lambda_o a \theta) e^{-\lambda_o a \theta}) \frac{p - r}{\theta a} + (c - \frac{r}{a}) \lambda_o \theta e^{\lambda_o \theta a} \right) > 0.
\]

In other words, labor saving technical change always gives rise to a more dispersed range of wages. Taken together with the displacement effect in Proposition 1, the following result is immediate:

**Proposition 2.** For all $\theta \in (0, 1)$, there exists $\bar{w}_\theta \in (c, w^+_1)$ such that for all $w \leq \bar{w}_\theta$,
\[G_{\theta}(w) \geq G_1(w).
\]
Otherwise, for all $w > \bar{w}_\theta$,
\[G_{\theta}(w) < G_1(w).
\]

Thus, labor saving technical change produces a single-crossing shift of the wage distribution function $G_{\theta}(w)$ with crossing from above. This is illustrated in Figure 2, in which a pair of wage distributions ($G_1(w)$, $G_{\theta}(w)$) and the respective ranges ($[c, w^+_1]$ and $[c, w^+_\theta]$) are displayed. The displacement effect raises the fraction of unemployed workers from $G_1(c)$ to $G_{\theta}(c)$. Meanwhile, the productivity effect widens the range of wages. This results in a more polarized wage structure: a higher fraction of workers without work, and simultaneously a higher fraction of workers at the highest wage rank.

These suggest two possibly opposing effects that labor saving technical change may have on overall inequality. In particular, if the displacement effect dominates, and the productivity effect does not translate into significant wage gains, then a labor saving technical may well improve wage inequality, perhaps paradoxically because it causes more workers join the ranks of the unemployed. By contrast, if the productivity effect gives rise to significant wage gains particularly for workers at relatively higher wage ranks, wage inequality may increase.
As before, define \( w_\theta(g) \) as the wage of worker in the \( g \)'th percentile along the wage distribution. The Lorenz curve is given by

\[
L_\theta(g) = 1 - \frac{\theta a(w_\theta^+ - p_\theta g) - p_\theta(1 - g)}{(\theta a - 1)\bar{w}_\theta} + \left( \frac{\theta a}{a - 1} \right) \left( \frac{w_\theta^+ - p_\theta}{\bar{w}_\theta} \right) g^{\frac{1}{\theta a}}.
\]

Also let \( I_\theta \) denote the Gini coefficient of wage inequality associated with the Lorenz curve \( L_\theta(g) \). Figure 3 plots the relationship between the Gini coefficient and labor saving technical change \( 1 - \theta \). A family of such relationships are shown with successively higher job arrival rates \( \lambda_o \), or equivalently, successively more competitive labor markets. Starting from \( \theta = 1 \), labor saving technical change (reduction in \( \theta \)) decreases the Gini coefficient when the employers wield significant market power (e.g. \( I_\theta(\lambda = 0.7) \) when \( \lambda_o = 0.7 \)). This corresponds to the case where the productivity effect is very small as high levels of employer market power adversely impact the pass-through of productivity gains to workers’ wages. Consequently, inequality actually improves upon introduction of labor saving technical change as more workers enter the unemployment pool.

For higher levels of labor market competition, Figure 3 shows that the Gini coefficient first rises then falls with successive increases in labor saving technical change starting from \( \theta = 1 \). As employer competitive facilitates the pass-through of the productivity effect to raise wages, labor saving technical change increases both unemployment and the share of workers with the highest wages. The result is an increase in inequality. For any given \( \lambda_o \), further increases in \( 1 - \theta \) will continue to reduce the job arrival rate, however. Ultimately, this will have eroded the productivity pass-through to wages so much that any further labor saving technical change will in fact lower wage inequality, as more and more worker enter the unemployment pool. We thus see once again the possibility of a Kuznets type inverse-U relationship between wage inequality and labor saving technical change.

### 3.2 Aggregate Labor Market Consequences

In this section, we show that aggregate labor market performance outcomes associated with labor saving technical change are also impacted by the interplay between the productivity effect, the displacement effect, and the mediating role of the degree of labor market competition.

\[\text{4The parametric assumptions are:} \ P = 30, \ a = 3, \ \theta = 0.5, \ c = 1 \ \text{and} \ r = 2.85 (< ca = 3).\]
The Expected Wage.

To start, consider the expected wage in the labor market:

\[ \bar{w}_\theta = cG_\theta(c) + \int_c^{w_\theta^+} w dG_\theta(w) = \bar{\alpha}_\theta p_\theta + (1 - \bar{\alpha}_\theta)c, \quad (12) \]

where \( \bar{\alpha}_\theta = 1 - (\theta ae^{-\lambda_o a \theta} - e^{-\lambda_o a \theta^2})/(\theta a - 1) \). The expected wage in the economy is a weighted sum of the productivity of labor \( p_\theta \) and the reservation wage \( c \), where the weight placed on productivity, \( \bar{\alpha}_\theta \), once again depends on employer market power \( \lambda_o \), and now also the size of the labor saving technical change \( \theta \). From (11), \( \bar{w}_\theta - \bar{w}_1 > (\leq) 0 \) if and only if the productivity effect is sufficiently large:

\[ \frac{p_\theta - p_1}{p_1 - c} > (\leq) \frac{\bar{\alpha}_1}{\bar{\alpha}_\theta} - 1. \quad (13) \]

Put differently, labor saving technical change increases the expected wage if and only if the productivity effect \( p_\theta - p_1 \) is sufficiently large. The minimum required size of the productivity effect depends critically on how quickly productivity increases are passed through to raise wages, as \( \bar{\alpha}_1 > \bar{\alpha}_\theta \) from the definition of \( \bar{\alpha}_\theta \).\(^5\)

We note that

\[ \lim_{\lambda_o \to \infty} \frac{\bar{\alpha}_1}{\bar{\alpha}_\theta} - 1 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{\lambda_o \to 0} \frac{\bar{\alpha}_1}{\bar{\alpha}_\theta} - 1 = \frac{1}{\theta^3} - 1. \]

It follows, therefore, that

**Proposition 3.** If the productivity effect is sufficiently large:

\[ \frac{p_\theta - p_1}{p_1 - c} > \frac{1}{\theta^3} - 1, \quad (14) \]

a labor saving technical change \( 1 - \theta > 0 \) always gives rise to an increase in the expected wage \( \bar{w}_\theta > \bar{w}_1 \). If, however, the inequality is not satisfied, then there exists a \( \bar{\lambda}_o \in (0, \infty) \) such that for all \( \lambda_o \geq \bar{\lambda}_o \), the labor saving technical change increases the expected wage.

It follows that employer market power may indeed prevent the pass-through of the productivity gains from labor saving technical change from raising the average wage of workers. This occurs particularly when the strength of the productivity effect is not large enough.

\(^5\)To see this, recall that \( \bar{\alpha}_\theta = 1 - (\theta ae^{-\lambda_o a \theta} - e^{-\lambda_o a \theta^2})/(\theta a - 1) \). Routine differentiation shows that \( \bar{\alpha}_\theta < \bar{\alpha}_1 \).
The Average Labor Share.

In our model, there is no explicit bargaining between workers and employers. Any variations in labor share are endogenously determined by how productivity change impacts wages. Importantly, in our context, since the distribution of wages is dispersed, the labor share is dispersed as well. Specifically, define the labor share of any given employer-employee pair as \( s \equiv w/p \).

Using \( G_\theta(w) \), the induced distribution of labor shares, henceforth \( \Psi_\theta(s) \), is given by

\[
\Psi_\theta(s) = G_\theta(sp_\theta) = e^{-\lambda_\omega a_\theta^2 \left( \frac{1 - c/p_\theta}{1 - s} \right)}.
\]  

(15)

and \( s \) ranges between \( c/p_\theta \) and \( \alpha^+ \theta + (1 - \alpha^+ \theta) c/p_\theta \). By inspection of (15), a labor saving technical change shifts the labor share distribution to the left. This result is intuitive following (12), and directly reflects the adverse impact of technical change on productivity pass-through. Consequently, labor saving technical change unambiguously reduces labor share as well.

Per Capita Income.

Turning now to the aggregate efficiency consequences of a labor saving technical change, let \( Y_\theta \) be the sum of total profits and income of all workers including the unemployed, and let \( y_\theta \equiv Y_\theta/N \) denote per capita income:

\[
y_\theta = (1 - G_\theta(c))p_\theta + G_\theta(c)c
\]

\[
= \alpha^y_\theta p_\theta + (1 - \alpha^y_\theta)c,
\]

where \( \alpha^y_\theta \equiv 1 - e^{\lambda_\omega a_\theta^2} \). Thus, national income is also a weighted average of the productivity per worker \( p_\theta \) and the reservation wage \( c \). A labor saving technical change gives rise to an increase (decrease) in per capita national income, \( y_\theta - y_1 \geq 0 \) if and only if

\[
\frac{p_\theta - p_1}{p_1 - c} \geq (\leq) \frac{\alpha^y_\theta}{\alpha^y_1} - 1.
\]

(16)

Thus, labor saving technical change increases per capita income if and only if the productivity effect \( p_\theta - p_1 \) is sufficiently large to compensate for the increase in unemployment. With respect to the condition in (16), it is straightforward to show that \( \alpha^y_\theta < \alpha^y_1 \) is monotonically decrease in \( \lambda_\omega \), and furthermore,

\[
\lim_{\lambda_\omega \to \infty} \frac{\alpha^y_1}{\alpha^y_\theta} - 1 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{\lambda_\omega \to 0} \frac{\alpha^y_1}{\alpha^y_\theta} - 1 = \frac{1}{\theta^2} - 1.
\]

Thus, we have
Proposition 4. If the productivity effect is sufficiently large such that

\[ \frac{p_\theta - p_1}{p_1 - c} > \frac{1}{\theta^2} - 1, \]

a labor saving technical change \( 1 - \theta > 0 \) always gives rise to an increase in per capita income \( y_\theta > y_1 \). If, however, the inequality is not satisfied, then there exists a \( \lambda_\theta^0 \in (0, \infty) \) such that for all \( \lambda_\theta \geq \lambda_\theta^0 \), labor saving technical change increases the per capita income.

The important takeaway here is that a productivity improving labor saving technical change does not guarantee an improvement in overall efficiency. Quite the contrary, unless the productivity effect itself is sufficiently large, a labor saving technical change will need to be coupled with a sufficient competitive labor market, in order for the productivity benefits of the technical change to outweigh its adverse unemployment consequences.

Figures 4a - c respectively plot the aforementioned aggregate labor market outcomes as a function of the degree of market power in the economy. In Figure 4a shows the expected wage schedules as a function of \( \lambda_\theta \) with and without labor saving technical change, and shows that the expected wage impact is positive only what employer competition for labor sufficiently intense. Figure 4b and 4c respectively display the average labor share and the per capita income as a function of labor market competitiveness. Consistent with the discussion above, a labor saving technical change always lowers the labor share, and does not guarantee an increase in per capita income. Quite the contrary, if the productivity effect is not too large, and if the labor market is sufficiently non-competitive, a reduction in per capita income is perfectly consistent with a productivity improving labor saving technical change.

3.3 Pre-conditions for a Labor-Friendly Labor Saving Technical Change

Given that the expected wage consequences of a labor saving technical change may be negative, in the following discussion we examine some pre-conditions that enable workers to better harness the potential benefits of technical change. Thus, consider once again the change in expected wage subsequent to a labor saving technical change

\[ \Delta \bar{w}_\theta \equiv \bar{w}_\theta - \bar{w}_1 = \bar{\alpha}_\theta p_\theta + (1 - \bar{\alpha}_\theta)c - [\bar{\alpha}_1 p_1 + (1 - \bar{\alpha}_1)c] \]

\[ = (\bar{\alpha}_\theta - \bar{\alpha}_1)(p_1 - c) + \bar{\alpha}_\theta(p_\theta - p_1) \]
Henceforth, we consider two types of policies. The first targets worker’s ability to bargain for higher wages through an increase in the opt out wage from \(c\) to \(c + S\), and the second is a tax on labor saving technical change to increase \(r\) to \(r + T\).

By inspection, the expected wage difference before and after labor saving technical change always rising with \(S\). Quite intuitively, being better able to bargain for a higher wage as \(c\) rises, workers are more likely to benefit from a labor saving technical change. By contrast, a tax on labor saving technical change weakens the productivity effect as \(p_\theta\) is replaced by \(p_\theta - T(1 - \theta)/(\theta a)\). We have thus:

**Proposition 5.** The expected wage change due to a labor saving technical change, \(\Delta \bar{w}_\theta\), is strictly increasing with respect to the subsidy on the reservation wage \(S\), and is strictly decreasing with respect to \(T\).

This suggests the need to address the root cause for why expected wage is lower in the presence of a labor saving technical change. In particular, minimizing the productivity effect itself through a tax on employers attempting to save on labor cost cannot bring about an expected wage improvement, but enhancing the ability on the part of workers to bargain for higher wages will.

### 3.4 Long Run Labor Market Consequences

So far, we have taken the total number of employers as constant. We now examine the consequences of labor saving technical change in the long run, assuming that in such a longer time horizon, free entry of employers subject to a fixed cost of entry eventually endogenizes the total number of employers \(\lambda_o\). Since \(\lambda_o\) is our measure of employer market power, we are thus examining circumstances under which in the long run, employer market power can evolve to reflect the profitability of offering new vacancies in the presence of new technologies.

Accordingly, let \(K\) be a fixed cost of entry for every employer seeking to hire enough laborers and alternative inputs to complete the unit of task required to generate revenue \(P\). Free entry occurs until expected profits is equal to the cost of entry, or in other words:

\[
\pi_\theta(w) = [H_\theta(w)]^{\theta a}(p_\theta - w)\theta a = K.
\]

It follows that the wage distribution takes the simple form:
\[ G_\theta(w) = \frac{1}{\theta a} \left( \frac{K}{p_\theta - w} \right). \]

We note that the productivity effect of a labor saving technical through \( p_\theta \) alone continues to shift the wage distribution to the right in as before. With respect to the displacement effect, the unemployment rate is now given by:

\[ G_\theta(c) = \frac{1}{\theta a} \left( \frac{K}{p_\theta - c} \right). \]

Thus, the unemployment rate is monotonically decreasing in \( p_\theta \). It follows, therefore, that the job displacement effect changes signs in the long run, as employer entry more than compensates for the reduction in the number of job openings per employer in the presence of labor saving technical change.

It can now be readily seen that a labor saving technical change induces a first order dominating shift in \( G_\theta(w) \) to the right. This implies that the range of wages widens, and the expected wage rises with labor saving technical change. Finally, the Lorenz curve in the long run can be explicitly expressed as:

\[
L_\theta(g) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{cg}{\bar{w}_\theta} & \text{if } g < G_\theta(c) \\
1 - \frac{p_\theta}{\bar{w}_\theta} + \frac{p_\theta g - G_\theta(c) \ln(g)}{\bar{w}_\theta} & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

The associated Gini coefficient \( I_\theta \) can be expressed simply as follows:

\[
I_\theta = \frac{G_\theta(c)(p_\theta - c)(G_\theta(c) - 1 - \ln G_\theta(c))}{\bar{w}Ew}.
\]

Figures 5a and 5b respectively show the effect of labor saving technical change as entry cost \( K \) increases using the same parametric assumptions as before. In Figure 5a, average wage is indeed always increasing with labor saving technical change as shown above. Furthermore, wage inequality likewise strictly rises with labor saving technical change as the range of wages always expands, and unemployment decreases.

4 Conclusion

This paper brings employer power center stage in the analysis of the consequences of labor saving technical change for efficiency and in particular for equity. In task based model with labor market

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6The addition is the fixed cost of entry and the values are shown in Figures 5a and 5b.
frictions, where there is unemployment and wage inequality even with identical workers and identical employers, we show that the number of employers relative to workers plays a critical role in mediating the impact of technical change. In a series of propositions, we show the nuanced interactions between employer power and labor saving technical change in the determination of wage inequality, including the possibility go Kuznetsian inversu-realionships. In general, when employer power is sufficiently low, including the case where there is free entry of firms, labor saving technical change enhances efficiency but increases wage inequality. Our analysis thus focuses attention on the degree of monopsony power as a key determinant of the efficiency and equity consequences of labor saving technical change, and raises the issue of regulation of employer power as a major policy issue in the era of automation.
Figure 1. Wage Inequality Impact of Employer Market Power
Figure 2. The Realized Wage Distribution $G_{\theta}(w)$
Figure 3. Wage Inequality and Labor Saving Technical Change
Figure 4a. Expected Wage Impact of Technical Change and Employer Market Power

Figure 4b. Average Labor Share Impact of Technical Change and Employer Market Power

Figure 4c. Per Capita Income Impact of Technical Change and Employer Market Power
Figure 5a. Average Wage Impact of Technical Change and Entry Cost

Figure 5b. Wage Inequality Effects of Technical Change and Entry Cost
Reference