Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

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Session Overview
Session
Session 6: Short Selling
Time:
Friday, 24/Jan/2025:
11:00am - 12:30pm

Session Chair: Carole Gresse, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL

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Presentations

Stealthy Shorts: Informed Liquidity Supply

Amit Goyal1,2, Adam Reed3, Esad Smajlbegovic4, Amar Soebhag4,5

1University of Lausanne; 2Swiss Finance Institute; 3University of North Carolina; 4Erasmus School of Economics; 5Robeco Quantitative Investments

Discussant: Sara Ain Tommar-Thomas (NEOMA Business School)

Short sellers are widely known to be informed, which would typically suggest that they

demand liquidity. We obtain comprehensive transaction-level data to decompose daily

short volume into liquidity-demanding and liquidity-supplying components. Contrary

to conventional wisdom, we show that the most informed short sellers are actually

liquidity suppliers, not liquidity demanders. They are particularly informative about

future returns on news days and trade on prominent cross-sectional return anomalies.

Our analysis suggests that market making and opportunistic risk-bearing are unlikely

to explain these findings. Instead, our results align with recent market microstructure

theory, pointing to the strategic liquidity provision by informed traders.

Goyal-Stealthy Shorts.pdf


Mutual Fund Shorts and the Marginal Benefits of Acquiring Information

Boone Bowles1, Adam Reed2

1Texas A&M University; 2University of North Carolina

Discussant: Vincent Tena (Paris Dauphine University)

We study the information acquisition behavior of mutual funds and the performance of both their long and short positions. We show that managers learn more about their shorts than their longs because the benefit of acquiring information about shorts is larger. Mutual funds' shorts also generate better returns than their longs, but, at least with respect to shorts, performance and information acquisition are inversely related. Though surprising at first glance, this follows from standard theory and we show that managers acquire less information about certain high performing short positions; the clear winners.

Bowles-Mutual Fund Shorts and the Marginal Benefits of Acquiring Information.pdf


 
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