Besides language, religion is a major marker of national identity and consciousness as they emerged through Enlightenment and became politically relevant and powerful in the course of the 19th century resulting in the formation of nation states. Confessions, however, practice very different relations to nations. While the Roman-Catholic Church conceives itself as universal and supranational today avoiding association with individual nations and emphasizing relations with ethnic and national minorities, in the Orthodox sphere the association of the Church with nation and nation state is very close: every nation “in the full sense” has its own Orthodox Church and this Church accompanies the nation and its leaders almost unconditionally through all political circumstances. Also Protestant Churches cultivate a close relationship to nations and nation states by their country-wise organization. Despite of its supra-national character, however, also the Roman-Catholic Church used to be a significant identity marker of many European nations in the 19th century and up to the dawn of secularization starting in the European West. It was even the driving force of some national movements.
Secularization in the sphere of Western Christianity (Catholicism, Protestantism), in the European West mainly driven by commercialization and hedonism, in former Communist Central Europe mainly by a-clerical Communism, however, changed the pattern of religion as markers of national identity essentially. For ‘classical’ Catholic nations like Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese or also Austrians religion has ceased ranking among markers of national identity, while others like Poles, Slovaks, Croats or Maltese style Catholicism still one of its major ingredients. In the (former) Protestant sphere religion is anyway not much more than a historical reminiscence. Much in contrast, the Orthodox sphere continues practicing the close relation between (national) Church and nation and religion has maintained its function as a prominent marker of national identity. An interesting opposite pair are in this context Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina: while both of them are characterized by being composed of Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics, Albanians have arrived at a common national identity mainly based on language, while Bosnia-Herzegovina is still lacking such an identity and the three religious components coincide with national identities.
The paper will not only try portraying this pattern, but also explaining its reasons.

Hungary, a traditionally Christian country, is experiencing a decline in institutional religious practices, placing it among Europe’s moderately religious nations. While most Hungarians believe in God, active church participation has decreased significantly. This trend contrasts with the growing public role of traditional churches and the rise of political Christianity since 2010.

In the second half of the 20th century, political factors led to the omission of religious affiliation questions in censuses. These questions returned in 2001, 2011, and 2022, but responses became voluntary to respect the sensitive nature of religious information.

Census data reveals minimal shifts within religious communities between 2001 and 2022. The historical Christian churches remain dominant: Catholics (73.0%-68.7%), Reformed (21.3%-22.5%), and Evangelicals (4.0%-4.2%). However, the non-affiliated population has grown (14.5%-16.1%), and non-responses have surged to 40.1%, with over 3.9 million individuals opting not to answer. The Catholic Church has suffered the largest decline, losing 2.6 million members.

Our study investigates the regional aspects of this decline, often referred to as secularization, focusing on peripheral areas emphasized by Pope Francis. Using census data, thematic maps, and methods like religious diversity indices, we analyze the territorial patterns of religiosity.

Additionally, we explore the role of institutions operated by the Archdiocese of Eger, such as schools, healthcare, and social services, in influencing religiosity. Do settlements hosting these institutions experience slower rates of secularization?

To understand the causes of declining ecclesiastical religiosity, we conduct interviews with church and secular leaders in the most affected settlements. We examine trends in religious activity over several years, including participation in ceremonies (e.g., baptisms, confirmations, marriages), statistical data on church membership, and engagement in religious education.

This study aims to provide a nuanced understanding of Hungary’s religious landscape and the spatial dynamics of ecclesiastical decline.

In the years around the famous law on the separation of Church and State passed in France in 1905, numerous religious orders left the territory of the République and settled abroad, usually in border dioceses. For this reason, in the small border Italian diocese of Ventimiglia, an extraordinary presence of priests, friars and nuns from French institutes emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. In some cases, their presence lasted only a few years, while in others they remained until very recently. Usually, these religious communities were used continuing to speak their language of origin, gave an active and collaborative contribution to ecclesiastical action, and characterised the territory with a cultural, linguistic, cultic presence that, often still tangible so many years later, constitutes a peculiar element of the local “religious landscape”. The recent crisis in religious vocations caused the closure of numerous convents and monasteries formerly inhabited by French orders, but their structures have been often re-employed for other pastoral or charitable needs that were more urgent or necessary for today’s society (schools, reception of immigrants, assistance to the elderly and disabled, etc.). The first part of the study consists of a census, carried out in local archives and on the territory, of the former convents and monasteries of French religious orders that moved to the diocese of Ventimiglia during that period; then, their subsequent events and their different roles within the diocese are studied; finally, their impact on the territory in contemporary reality is explored.

Muslim places of worship have been increasing in European public spaces for decades. This phenomenon is linked to migration flows from Islamic cultural countries to Europe and the preservation of faith through intergenerational transmission. Mosques and prayer spaces are among the most visible signs of the pluralization of cultural and religious identities emerging in contemporary European societies (Giorda, 2019). Cities, in particular, are the settings where the interplay of human mobility is most evident. Religions have regained prominence in the public sphere of European societies (Habermas, 2008; Casanova, 2000), partly but not exclusively due to the presence of migrants (Peach and Gale, 2003).

The city becomes the stage for these transformations, embodying the coexistence and overlap of spatial practices and uses (Cattedra, 2003). The territory is not merely a container for society but the product of an ongoing relationship between space and society, which evolves daily. It thus serves as a kaleidoscope for understanding these changes (Dematteis, 1985; Turco, 1988; Massey, 1999).

Similarly, lived religion (Orsi, 1999) within the urban context is influenced by specific challenges of urban life (Beaman, 2017). In cities, religion more clearly demonstrates its tendency toward isomorphism (Yang and Ebaugh, 2001). The way it is practiced and perceived interacts with social, political, and economic dynamics characteristic of urbanity, being questioned and shaped by them in a co-evolutionary process (Rüpke, 2021). Some sociological studies on Islam have also adopted this theoretical perspective (Fernando and Fadil, 2015; Jeldtoft, 2011).

This research aims to focus on the spatial dimensions of Islam in Florence. Tuscany is home to approximately 180,000 Muslims (Ciocca, 2019), with a presence in Florence that began to take organized form through associations in the 1990s (Elzir, 2011).