Conference Agenda

Global heating is projected to threaten the livelihoods of billions of people within decades. Despite widespread expansion, renewable energies have not replaced fossil fuels but instead increased overall energy supply. Following a period of relative restraint, fossil capital is once again investing heavily in the renewal and expansion of fossil infrastructure. Executive boards of fossil fuel companies remain confident in the long-term profitability of these investments. Should stranded assets accumulate due to climate policies, the industry is poised to demand extensive compensation from governments and, therefore from the societies. For fossil fuel corporations, coal, oil, and gas reserves represent capital awaiting valorisation. Nearly all 700 major oil and gas companies continue to explore new reserves, while over 1,000 firms plan additional LNG terminals, pipelines, and gas-fired power plants.

This dynamic is reinforced by government policies in key capitalist states, creating what amounts to a fossil fuel backlash. The UN’s Production Gap Report forecasts increasing coal production until 2030 and rising oil and gas production until at least 2050 under current plans. Concurrently, the Emissions Gap Report predicts a global temperature increase of at least three degrees Celsius by 2100, casting doubt on the viability of a “green accumulation regime”.

Why has the socio-ecological transformation been blocked? This contribution examines the barriers on three interconnected economic levels: a) I analyze the investment strategies of leading oil and gas corporations, linking their profit expectations to the potential capital devaluation posed by a fossil fuel phase-out. b) I examine the role of institutional investors, who continue to place significant capital flows into the fossil sector. c) I highlight the structural persistence of fossil energy systems, driven by path dependencies in industrial infrastructure. Crucially, I argue that the social and political power dynamics in Europe and North America remain insufficient to enact consistent socio-ecological reforms and to overcome these barriers.

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is increasingly featured in political strategies as a potential solution to mitigate industrial CO₂ emissions. In Germany, the national carbon management strategy positions CCS as a tool for decarbonizing industries and gas-fired power plants, aligning with climate neutrality goals by 2045. However, CCS’s energy intensity poses a significant challenge to the broader energy transition.

This study evaluates the energy demand of CCS in Germany in 2045, with a particular focus on its application in the power sector. Using a scenario-based model grounded in mixed-methods analysis, the research quantifies the energy implications of CCS under different deployment scenarios. Results reveal substantial variation in energy demand: from 9 TWh annually when CCS is strictly limited to the most unavoidable emissions using advanced technologies, to as much as 190 TWh in a business-as-usual scenario with extensive CCS deployment, including widespread use in power generation.

These findings highlight a critical tension between CCS and the energy transition. With a potential demand of up to 14% of Germany’s projected final energy consumption by 2045, extensive CCS usage could divert valuable renewable energy resources, delaying rapid decarbonization efforts. Consequently, CCS should not be treated as a backstop technology but as a complementary measure within a comprehensive and efficiency-oriented decarbonization strategy with particular attention to the spatial distribution of CO₂ sources, storage sites, and energy resources across Germany.

By analyzing the spatial, sectoral and systemic dynamics of CCS-related energy demand, this contribution scrutinizes the implications of relying on CCS as a cornerstone of climate policy. The findings challenge the assumption that technological fixes alone can drive a sustainable transition, emphasizing the need to confront structural contradictions in capitalist economies that prioritize growth over ecological limits. This critique offers valuable insights for policymakers and economic geographers addressing industrial transformation, resource allocation, and the tensions between economic imperatives and climate goals.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reignited debates about Moscow's dominance in the global nuclear fuel market, prompting a range of fragmented securitization strategies across Europe and North America. Responses varied widely, from transitioning to non-Russian alternative suppliers and investing in domestic fuel production facilities to taking no action at all. These policies reflect parallels with past disruptions in gas exports, fueling concerns that the Kremlin might wield nuclear fuel trade as a tool of diplomatic coercion. But is this comparison justified? Are nuclear fuel markets politically comparable to fossil fuel markets, and could exporters exploit them coercively?

To address these questions, we examined the nuclear fuel supply of EU member states. Drawing on insights from critical geopolitics and critical security studies, we developed an analytical framework to identify the conditions under which nuclear fuel trade could be weaponized by exporting countries. Our study followed a two-step methodology. First, we conducted interviews with 11 key stakeholders in the nuclear supply chain from the UK, Sweden, and France to validate and refine our framework. Next, we applied this framework through 16 additional semi-structured interviews with political and administrative actors involved in policy formulation and by observing four international congresses on nuclear fuel supply.

Our findings indicate that, under current circumstances, the ability of exporters to weaponize nuclear fuel trade against Europe is limited but not negligible, presenting risks under specific conditions. First, diversification strategies have significantly reduced the vulnerability of most European countries to supply disruptions. Second, the physical and organizational flexibility of the enriched uranium trade constrains exporters’ leverage. Third, existing market overcapacity diminishes the potential threat. Finally, exporters’ lack of control over nuclear fuel transportation further restricts their ability to weaponize supply chains effectively.

Spain is a country where the energy transition has been debated and publicized with considerable interest, as an opportunity to improve the sustainability of the territory and the resilience of its economy. In this sense, the large energy companies (oil and electric) form alliances with political power to lead this transition, defending their own interests. Both at the state and regional levels, different governments promote macroprojects of wind or photovoltaic renewable energies, supported by these large companies in peripheral territories, to sustain the major production centers. An example of these new industrial projects is the province of León, a space that has traditionally been defined as a place of energy extraction. First with the coal mines that were exploited for centuries, up to the contentious contemporary closures, then with the hydroelectric reservoirs that flooded towns and fertile valleys, and now with new wind energy mega-projects, which threaten to invade the mountainous landscapes of the Picos de Europa, a romantic sanctuary that was declared one of the first national parks in Europe in 1918. Faced with this new extractive dynamic, León's society has raised its voice, opposing with visible popular resistance. The research question posed in this communication pertains to the myths and realities of the energy transition from a local perspective, focused on the province of León. Is the political and business bet on macro-projects for the production of electrical energy through wind turbines sustainable for the provincial territory of León? The theoretical approach is that of sustainability and resilience of territories in the face of future energy transition perspectives that may be misguided, as they try to maintain economic growth rates that are only feasible today with fossil fuels. The communication will use official documents, public information, and interviews with the main social agents involved in this issue as its primary sources. The aim of the communication is to answer objectively to the research question.