Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 29th June 2025, 08:23:49am CEST

 
 
Session Overview
Session
Intentional EMI & EMP, High Power Electromagnetics (Part 2)
Time:
Wednesday, 03/Sept/2025:
9:00am - 10:30am

Location: Room 105

75 seats, Tower 44, 1st floor

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Presentations

Real-time jammer localization inside a building based on a machine learning approach

Paul Monferran1, Jonathan Villain1, Antonio Costanzo2, Artur Nogueira de São José3, Virginie Deniau1, Christophe Gransart1

1Université Gustave Eiffel, France; 2CERADE, ESAIP, France; 3University of Brasilia, Faculty of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering, Brazil

Jamming attacks create harmful disruptions in wireless communication systems. Timely and precise localization of a jammer is vital in critical indoor settings, such as airports or hospitals. Inside our laboratory building, machine learning models are built to predict a commercial jammer location based on a antenna network which measures electromagnetic activity. Hence, the proposed methodology in this paper is able to predict in quasi real-time the room where the jammer is activated with a very good accuracy.

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Jammer localization, Antenna network, Indoor Environment, Machine Learning Techniques, Real-time process.



Methodology for Studying a Localized and Non-Intrusive Pulsed Current Injection on an Active Powered System

Léo DURAND1,2, Tristan DUBOIS2, Jean-Michel VINASSA2, Guillaume MEJECAZE1, Laurine CUROS1, Frédéric PUYBARET1

1CEA, DAM, CEA-Gramat F-46500, France; 2IMS laboratory, CNRS UMR 5218, University of Bordeaux, 33405 Talence, France

This paper presents an injection method using Metal Oxide Varistors (MOV) to generate high level currents pulse locally and non-intrusively on power supplies. Most of the commonly used techniques enable the injection of high current pulses at the input of power supplies through capacitive or inductive coupling but no solution allows the injection at specific points inside the power supply. The proposed method uses a properly dimensioned MOV to inject the current at different points on a printed circuit board (PCB), as close as possible to a component of an active powered system. The paper also includes an electrical model of the MOV and presents measurement and simulation correlation results using MOV, to inject high current pulse in a device under test (DUT).



A Frequency-Domain Technique to Verify the Equivalent Area of a D-dot Sensor

Damien Gapillout1, Theo Batista1, Bertrand Daout2, Marc Sallin2

1CEA DAM Gramat, France; 2Montena Technology, Switzerland

Verification of a D-dot sensor requires access to its equivalent area. This characteristic is not directly accessible through one measurement. It is often necessary to perform de-embedding operations on the Balun and RF transmission lines. These tasks are not always straightforward. This paper presents a frequency-based approach to measuring the equivalent area, including the associated measurement uncertainties. This work was validated on a commercial 3 GHz sensor to verify its compliance.



Protecting Sensors from IEMI: Shielding, Absorbers, and Mitigation Techniques

Louis Cesbron Lavau1, Michael Suhrke1, Marian Lanzrath1, Peter Knott2,3

1Fraunhofer INT, Germany; 2Fraunhofer FHR, Germany; 3RWTH Aachen, Germany

Sensors are widely used in modern technology, but their increasing integration into critical systems makes them vulnerable to intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). High-power electromagnetic (HPEM) attacks can disrupt sensor functionality without physical access, raising concerns about their impact on system reliability. This study investigates the susceptibility of sensors to IEMI and evaluates different countermeasures, including shielding, Printed Circuit Board (PCB) modifications, and electromagnetic absorbers. Results confirm that PCB lines act as primary coupling paths, but the sensor chip itself remains vulnerable. While shielding and PCB modifications offer strong protection, their practicality in real-world applications is limited. Absorbers provide a more feasible alternative, though their effectiveness depends on material properties, placement, and frequency. Some absorbers also introduce unintended effects, such as thermal influence and increased system crashes. The findings emphasize the complexity of IEMI protection and the need for further research to develop cost-effective and adaptable mitigation strategies for sensor-based systems.



 
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