To understand how the institutional environment influences multinational enterprise (MNE) decisions regarding tax havens, we build a theoretical framework that links democracy and natural resource endowments with the use of tax havens in emerging markets. This enables a broader understanding of the institutional factors that influence MNE behaviour towards tax haven locations. Using data drawn from 4,630 emerging market MNEs (EMNEs) from 2008-2018, we empirically test these hypotheses using regression analysis. We find that higher levels of democracy in the home country of an EMNE is associated with a reduction in tax haven use. However, the use of tax havens by EMNEs is positively related to higher natural resource rents in their home economies. Moreover, higher natural resource rents moderate the impact of democracy on tax haven use by EMNEs, such that the natural resource curse undermines the impact of democracy on firm behaviour. Our results have several managerial and policy related implications.

Multinationals’ (MNEs) strategies to reduce carbon emissions require substantial investments in new energy technologies, however, short-term profitability losses create barriers for long-term investments to improve corporate carbon performances (CCP). This study investigates the

impact of investor horizons and investor climate sentiment on the carbon emissions of large multinational firms. Drawing on institutional theory and on the varieties of capitalism literature, we argue that investor horizons are constrained by national capital markets, and investor sentiments are shaped by national climate policy stringency. Our sample contains 1961 firm-year observations of 197 MNEs with an average panel length of 9 years. We find support for our hypotheses and highlight that the impact of investors on carbon-reducing action differs between liberal and coordinated economies. We discuss the complex interrelation between institutions, policies and investors for MNEs’ carbon performances.

In response to growing societal pressure to address climate change, several banks are stating their commitments to transitioning their business models towards net-zero emissions and even carbon-neutrality. However, they continue financing fossil fuel industry through loans and underwriting arrangements, leading to accusations they are “greenwashing”. Since, greenwashing impacts consumer and investor confidence, the decarbonization of the financial industry, and the promotion of sustainable investments, it is crucial for regulators, investors, and consumers to understand its drivers in the global banking industry. This study explores the bank and institutional conditions that contribute to greenwashing in global banking by employing institutional theory and the resource-based view (RBV). We analyse an international sample of the largest banks from both emerging and advanced countries from 2016 to 2022. We define greenwashing by focusing on a single dimension of corporate social performance: environmental pollution, which we proxy by the bank’s total exposure to the fossil fuel industry. We propose that (i) greater global diversity in banks is positively linked to greenwashing; (ii) strong and well-enforced financial regulations are negatively correlated with greenwashing; (iii) a common law origin is positively associated with greenwashing in global banking. Our results provide empirical support for these arguments.

Multinational enterprises (MNEs), like individuals, strategically shape their public image through organizational impression management, often misleading stakeholders. This research investigates why boards, typically seen as oversight bodies, might overlook such tactics. It suggests that increased media visibility could prompt directors to prioritize positive public images, leading to tolerance of impression management behaviors.

We constructed and analyzed a dataset of 164,416 media articles on external directors from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (2010-2021) using a natural language processing tool (LIWC) to analyze the articles. This generated 7,158 firm-year observations from 2,165 MNEs. Our findings reveal a complex link between media attention and impression management: more media focus on board members correlates with reduced earnings manipulation but increased bribery. Disproportionate media attention among board members leads to more earnings manipulation but less bribery, while positive portrayals are associated with increased earnings manipulation but reduced bribery.

This study contributes to corporate governance literature by highlighting the intricate effects of media coverage on organizational impression management.