Conference Agenda

This paper presents a systematic literature review on civil service politicisation in Europe since the turn of the century. We provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of the research, producing a summary of empirical trends, including geographical patterns, theoretical foundations, and methods. Civil service politicisation is a bedrock theme in public administration scholarship and is intimately related to big issues facing the continent: democratic backsliding, government performance, and corruption. As these issues have established themselves as long-term processes in many European countries, we consider assessing their (potential) consequences for the civil service as a very timely task.

We depart from the conceptualization of the three core types of civil service politicisation discussed in the academic literature: formal, functional, and administrative politicisation. These types respectively refer to the (1) politicisation of civil service appointments, (2) civil service behaviour, and (3) the influence of ministerial advisers. These three conceptualizations of civil service politicisation are the focus of this review, and thus serve as one of the three criteria for inclusion, alongside with geographical scope (Europe), and temporal scope (since 2000).

Using the PRISMA framework, we initially included 1,249 studies, but ultimately selected and reviewed 70 relevant empirical studies. Our findings summarise almost 25 years of empirical findings, highlighting geographical patterns across the continent, the commonly used research designs and theoretical approaches used to study the phenomenon of politicisation. Three preliminary findings stand out. First, the study of politicisation is spread across the continent, but it takes different shapes east, west, north, and south. Second, the literature remains overwhelmingly quantitative by design, although sophisticated research designs including hypothesis testing are more common in some countries than in others. Third, the literature on politicisation of appointments (formal) is dominant over the literature of politicisation of behaviour (functional), whereas the literature on administrative politicisation is only yet emerging. Theoretically, scholars assess both antecedents and consequences of politicisation, but descriptive studies loom large among the selected papers.

Based on these findings, we diagnose the state of the literature on civil service politicisation in Europe, identify gaps, and make recommendations for researchers urging them to align future studies with the pressing issues that are facing European governments. Overall, this paper provides a valuable resource for scholars, policy makers, and practitioners who are interested in understanding civil service politicisation in Europe.

In parliamentary democracies, ministers frequently serve as the ultimate decision-makers in the appointment of senior bureaucrats. In such contexts, both individual ministers and the cabinet are incentivized to adhere to the ally-principle when selecting appointees. Empirical research on appointment patterns has found evidence consistent with party-political considerations being employed when senior bureaucrats are selected. Indications of political dynamics in appointments are even observed under institutional constraints that prohibit the use of political criteria (Askim et al., 2022; Dahlström & Holmgren, 2019). Quantitative evidence on dismissal and appointment politicization, based on party background and exit timing, suggests a different level of politicization in bureaucracies that are typically seen as highly meritocratic in cross-country surveys (Nistotskaya et al., 2021). While the latter body of research may be influenced by the vested interests of experts, politicians, and bureaucrats in promoting a more meritocratic image of their bureaucracies than is warranted, the former may suffer from oversimplification.

Considering these methodological limitations and inconsistencies within existing research, more nuanced observational data sources should be pursued. This paper examines intra-cabinet decision-making on appointments using a novel dataset of minutes from Norwegian cabinet meetings (1945-1981, n=2880) and senior bureaucrat appointment data. The confidential nature of cabinet meetings, with minutes documented solely for internal ministerial use, renders this data source highly suitable for an in-depth exploration of the following research questions: When are appointments of senior bureaucrats raised to the cabinet level and when are they subject to cabinet discussions? To what extent do these discussions revolve around political criteria or evaluations of meritocratic criteria?

To address these questions, the paper utilizes a mixed-methods design. First, text-as-data techniques are used to identify when appointment cases are elevated to discussions at the cabinet level. Secondly, topic models are utilized to estimate the characteristics of these discussions. Finally, covariates related to the candidates' careers and government-level factors are included in structural topic models to explore factors contributing to variability in political discussions of appointments. Furthermore, a qualitative examination is conducted on a subset of the cases with lengthy discussions.

The paper shows that senior bureaucrat appointments are routinely part of the cabinet's agenda, but that they are often just rubber-stamped. When (co-)partisans are among the candidates for appointment and in election years, discussions are more likely. However, discussions (and disagreement) among ministers are centered around evaluations of merit rather than patronage in the Norwegian context.

Populist parties are steadily gaining influence across Europe, achieving record-high vote shares (Rooduijn et al., 2023). In Germany, young voters are increasingly drawn to political fringes, with the populist AfD enjoying significant support (ARD, 2025). As populist movements grow, concerns arise about their impact on public administration. This paper explores how German higher civil servants perceive their role amid rising populist political pressures, contributing to the broader literature on populism, bureaucracy, and resilience. Populist governments often seek to reshape bureaucratic institutions to ensure compliance with their agenda (Peters & Pierre, 2022). Their strategies include politicization, co-optation, intimidation, and institutional dismantling (Bellodi et al., 2024; Bauer & Becker, 2020; Moynihan, 2021). Some replace expert bureaucrats with loyalists, impose legal and informal restrictions, and centralize decision-making to curb institutional autonomy (Bauer et al., 2021). Others use subtler tools, such as budget cuts and reputation attacks, to weaken bureaucratic independence (Caillier, 2020; Lotta et al., 2024). These actions create an environment of fear and marginalization, potentially leading to administrative paralysis (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2022). However, bureaucrats are not merely passive actors. As custodians of institutional memory, they can employ various strategies to resist policy dismantling (Bauer et al., 2021). Resistance may serve personal interests or uphold collective values, taking the form of shirking (reducing effort), sabotage (actively undermining implementation), exit (leaving their position), and voice (expressing dissent) (Guedes-Neto & Peters, 2021; Brehm & Gates, 1999; Golden, 1992; Olsson, 2016; Ingber, 2018; Bauer, 2024). Some bureaucrats challenge policies openly, document opposition formally, or transfer to less politically sensitive roles (Lotta et al., 2024). Others engage in "guerrilla government," covertly resisting policies they perceive as unethical or undemocratic (O’Leary, 2017). Empirical research suggests that responses to democratic backsliding range from neglecting duties to public resignations or overt obstruction (Schuster et al., 2022; Bauer, 2024). Nonetheless, not all bureaucrats resist. Many comply due to career concerns, institutional loyalty, or fear of political retaliation (Bischoff, 2023; Kucinskas & Zylan, 2023). Case studies of bureaucracies under Trump, Bolsonaro, and Poland’s PiS government indicate that responses depend on ideological alignment, perceived risks, and ethical commitments (Piotrowska, 2024; Morais de Sá e Silva, 2022; Tse & Mak, 2022). These variations highlight the complexity of bureaucratic behavior under populist rule. This paper investigates how public service motivation and politicization shape bureaucratic resistance among German higher civil servants. Applying established concepts—such as shirking, sabotage, exit, and voice (Brehm & Gates, 1999; Guedes-Neto & Peters, 2021)—alongside research on public sector motivation (Ripoll & Schott, 2023; Hollibaugh et al., 2020) and institutional contexts (Cooper & Reggie, 2025; Bauer, 2024), It examines how bureaucrats respond to superiors making unprincipled demands or harmful policies (Kucinskas & Zylan, 2023; Schuster et al., 2022). Utilizing data from the 2025 Political Administrative Elite (PAE) survey, which gathers insights from federal and state-level officials, this study evaluates bureaucrats’ propensity to resist populist pressures that challenge democratic norms. The findings contribute to research on bureaucratic resilience, offering a deeper understanding of administrative behavior in the face of democratic backsliding.

This paper presents a comparative analysis aimed at assessing different patterns of politicization within public administration bodies tasked with combating discrimination—commonly referred to as Equality Bodies (EBs)—across European Union member states. The analysis focuses on how institutional design shapes the relationship between EBs and political influence, examining factors such as the EB’s connection to its parent political authority, its internal leadership structure (monocratic versus collegial), the type of body (tribunal-type versus promotion-type), and the length and legal security of leadership mandates. In addition, the paper draws on responses from 17 EU member states EB chairpersons and public managers who completed a questionnaire reflecting their perceptions of politicization within their institutions.

The theoretical framework guiding the analysis is grounded in theories of agencification, the separation between political decision-making and bureaucratic expertise, and the principal-agent model. The study finds that while there is no singular European model for how these bodies operate, certain overlapping patterns emerge. An EB tends to exhibit greater autonomy from political influence when: (1) its parent authority cannot directly interfere with its mandate; (2) it is governed by a collegial rather than monocratic leadership structure; (3) its leadership mandate is fixed and legally protected; and (4) it possesses the authority to impose sanctions on public actors, including its parent authority.

The paper concludes that within the New Public Management framework EBs represent a hybrid form of public agency where the boundaries between the political and bureaucratic spheres are becoming increasingly blurred. At the same time, the European approach to human rights policy reflects a belief that anti-discrimination efforts should be treated as a non-political endeavor—one that requires additional insulation from political interference to ensure integrity and effectiveness.