Programme de la conférence

In contemporary France, under a Fifth Republic's regime whose dual-headed Executive dominates a usually docile Parliament, the essential and multi-faceted role played by the entourages of political advisors surrounding ans serving the President, the Prime Minister, and the ministers is a key feature of the political life (partisan and electoral) as well as of decision-making processes in public policymaking. Inherited from previous regimes, the system of vast and powerful "ministerial cabinets" has continued to thrive, especially since the 1980s. The "hyper-presidential" form of power practiced by Emmanuel Macron in recent years has further exacerbated this phenomenon, to the detriment of a "hollowed-out" presidential party/movement and of MPs belonging to the majority in the National Assqembly, often reduced to insignificance. These are the major features of the very particular French "policy advisory system" (PAS) that my proposed paper aims to better describe, comprehend, and explain.

This paper examines the development of ministerial cabinets (MCs) in Italy from unification in

1861 to 2022, offering a historical perspective on the dynamics of ministerial advisory structures.

Employing the framework of historical institutionalism, the study highlights how the MCs have

evolved through gradual institutional change, characterized by path dependence and a process of

conversion. While rooted in the Napoleonic administrative tradition, the Italian MCs have adapted

incrementally to shifting political contexts, including critical junctures such as the Fascist era, the

post-war democratic transition, and the 1990s party system collapse. These junctures, however, did

not disrupt the fundamental institutional legacy of MCs but rather reinforced their continuity

through reinterpretation and reconfiguration of their roles. The findings reveal that the persistence

of MCs, despite significant political transformations, reflects the limited veto capacity of Italy’s

ministerial bureaucracy and the discretionary power of political elites in reshaping inherited

institutions. This research contributes to research on ministerial advice systems, offering insights

into how legalism, administrative traditions, and political instability influence institutional

trajectories. By originally extending the historical institutionalist lens to this domain, which despite

the flourishing research on ministerial advisors has rarely been analyzed from this perspective, the

paper underscores the value of diachronic analysis in understanding the interplay between political

agency and institutional continuity.

Coordination at the top of the Belgian state, regardless of the power layer considered (federal, regional, or community), is centralized at political actors’ level (Frognier, 1997; De Winter et al. 1996). More specifically, it is within the Council of Ministers that all government decisions are made, which, as in many parliamentary democracies, are the basis for the development of most public policies and legislative projects (Goransson, 2014). These councils bring together, on a weekly basis, each government’s ministers, who are prepared in advance by their ministerial staff. The latter, gathered in often bloated cabinets, play a predominant role at the heart of the Belgian executive. Cabinet members negotiate the implementing decrees, sometimes line by line, monopolizing all decision-making processes, thereby excluding senior civil servants from any involvement in public policy development and negotiations (Goransson & Eraly, 2015). Cabinet members then retain control over the translation of public policies into concrete measures.

This monopoly is far from inconsequential for civil servants, who may develop a sense of irresponsibility and, above all, a degree of resistance on the part of general civil servants who are required to implement measures in whose development they were not involved (Goransson, 2014; de Visscher & Randour, 2011; Pichault, 2007). This results in a feeling of mistrust among cabinet members toward the administration, a feeling themself contributed to, which justifies the strengthening of their team of advisors to the minister. This is an initial vicious circle that takes place at the heart of the political-administrative relationship due to the functions assumed by ministerial entourages at the heart of the executive branch. A second vicious circle within the political-administrative relationship can also be observed due to the practice of secondment within the entourages, which allows ministers to benefit from the expertise of the administration in their cabinets but contributes to its politicization. The latter also fuels politicians’ mistrust of senior civil servants.

This paper aims to analyze this political-administrative dynamic of mistrust at the heart of the executive branch in Belgium and the effects produced by cabinets composition on the one hand and on the other their predominant role in coordination at the top of the state. So, the first part of this article looks at how executive branches work in Belgium. It mainly explains the roles of political actors and the bodies that bring them together, both within the federal government and within federated entities (the Flemish Community, the French Community, the Walloon Region, and the Brussels-Capital Region). Secondly, federal ministers and federated entities entourages are described, through a presentation of their composition and the functions performed by ministerial cabinets’ members. Next, the effects of cabinets on the administration are examined. Finally, and in conclusion, a change in the political-administrative interface is proposed, which is currently experiencing renewed tensions due to the arrival of new governments, particularly in the Walloon Region and the French Community.