Conference Agenda

Over the past decades, public administrations have undergone significant managerial transformations, introducing various control and performance management tools (Hood, 1991). These tools, embedded in a top-down logic inspired by New Public Management, were designed to enhance efficiency. However, their reception and appropriation by frontline civil servants—the agents who directly interact with the public—remain insufficiently explored (Lipsky, 1980; Bezes, 2020).

This research investigates how frontline public agents appropriate and adapt control packages (Malmi & Brown, 2008) in their daily work, particularly in response to performance incentives embedded within these systems. Control packages integrate different control mechanisms, including cybernetic controls—which may involve financial performance measures—but also cultural, administrative, and planning controls. Rather than focusing solely on financial aspects, this study adopts a systemic approach to understand how these tools interact and influence street-level bureaucrats.

A central paradox emerges: while performance incentives are designed to enhance efficiency and accountability, they often conflict with the complex, multifaceted nature of frontline work (Peeters & Campos, 2022). Public agents are expected to meet quantifiable performance targets while simultaneously addressing the diverse, sometimes unpredictable, needs of users (INSEE, 2019). This dual pressure creates tensions between the bureaucratic logic of control and the professional logic of service, leading to contradictory behaviors. On one hand, some agents engage in strategic compliance, prioritizing measurable outcomes at the expense of qualitative service (Peters & Pierre, 2004). On the other, others develop pragmatic adaptations, bypassing or reinterpreting performance criteria to better serve users, sometimes in ways that contradict managerial expectations (Brodkin, 2011).

To address these dynamics, we rely on an ethnographic methodology, conducting fieldwork within various French public administrations (Moisdon, 2015 ; Van Maanen, 2011). By drawing on the literature on street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980 ; 2010) and packages control (Malmi & Brown, 2008; Grabner, I., & Moers, F., 2013; Otley, 2016; Van der Kolk, 2019), we explore how agents navigate these paradoxes in their daily practice. Our preliminary findings suggest that performance incentives, rather than uniformly driving efficiency, create situational trade-offs: agents must constantly arbitrate between complying with administrative targets and responding to the contextual realities of their interactions with users. These trade-offs shape both individual decision-making and collective organizational practices, sometimes leading to unintended consequences such as mission distortion, procedural overload, or workarounds that undermine the intended efficiency gains (DGAFP, 2023).

This research contributes to the broader debate on the real-world implementation of public management reforms, shedding light on the gap between centrally designed control mechanisms and their practical enactment on the ground. By adopting a bottom-up approach, we offer new insights into how control packages and performance incentives shape decision-making in frontline public services, with critical implications for public policy effectiveness, organizational governance, and the balance between managerial control and public service values.

In an era of performance-driven governance, publicly funded higher education institutions are increasingly managed through formalized performance frameworks and outcome-based metrics. Scottish universities, operating within this global trend, are under pressure to enhance their international competitiveness through ranking-related indicators while also fulfilling their public missions. One area where this tension is particularly pronounced is international student recruitment, especially from high-demand markets such as China.

While a growing body of research has examined the mechanisms behind university rankings and performance metrics, much of this work has concentrated on institutional outcomes rather than the perspectives of key stakeholders. One notable gap lies in the limited exploration of international students as active participants in performance-driven governance. Specifically, there is a lack of understanding regarding how these students perceive and respond to institutional performance signals—an issue that is particularly relevant within the context of the Scottish–Chinese higher education corridor. Although global rankings are widely presented as objective measures of institutional quality, their impact on strategic decision-making and stakeholder behavior—especially in relation to international student recruitment—remains underexplored. Given China’s status as the world’s largest source of international students, it serves as a critical case study. Yet, empirical research is scarce on how Scottish universities’ performance management strategies align with the expectations of Chinese students, or how these students interpret and react to signals embedded in ranking systems.

This study investigates how performance management systems in Scottish higher education—particularly those shaped by international rankings and key performance indicators (KPIs)—influence recruitment strategies targeting Chinese students. It also explores how these students evaluate institutional performance and make study decisions based on perceived signals of quality.

This study addresses this gap through a mixed-methods design. First, a quantitative survey was conducted with over 50 prospective Chinese students, capturing their university preferences and selection criteria, and perceptions of university rankings and performance indicators. Second, semi-structured interviews were held with 10–15 university stakeholders from both Scottish institutions and Chinese recruitment agencies, including administrators, faculty, and recruitment professionals, exploring how performance management and recruitment practices are operationalized. The analysis is grounded in Stakeholder Theory and the Balanced Scorecard framework, highlighting how external performance demands are internalized and operationalized within public sector organisations..

Preliminary findings suggest that rankings—particularly QS and THE—hold significant sway over Chinese students’ perceptions of institutional quality, often outweighing traditional public service values like teaching quality or cost. In response, Scottish universities have embedded ranking-relevant KPIs—including research output, international student ratios, and employability metrics—into their performance management systems. However, this shift has created tensions between public mission values and market-oriented behaviors, particularly in resource allocation and academic culture.

This study contributes to the agenda by illustrating how performance management in the public sector is influenced by transnational accountability regimes. It calls for a more balanced, stakeholder-responsive performance model in higher education—one that preserves public mission values while supporting strategic positioning in a global education market.

Understanding why public organizations manipulate performance data has become an essential theme in public administration scholarship. We extend the insights of political cycle theory to explore the temporal dimension of data manipulation in the public sector. Employing quarterly data from 273 cities in China (2013-2020), we examine the political cycle of data manipulation. Our analysis uncovers that GDP (gross domestic product), a key indicator for evaluating the achievement of Chinese local officials, is more likely to be inflated in the fourth quarter. Moreover, we identify a cyclical pattern of manipulation: a tendency for underreporting in the first quarter, followed by progressively increasing GDP overstatement throughout the year, culminating in peak manipulation during the fourth quarter. Furthermore, we find that the effect of political cycle is moderated by organizational slack and institutional environment, with cities characterized by lower fiscal autonomy and reduced marketization exhibiting a greater propensity to manipulate GDP figures in the fourth quarter. In the discussion section, we further elaborate on the theoretical and managerial implications of the main findings.