Conference Agenda

The concept of political system was first developed by political scientist David Easton in 1953. He adapted theoretical models taken from biology (von Bertalanffy) or sociology (Durkheim or Parsons, cf. Friedman and Allen). According to systems theory, elements in nature or society interact within different systems that tend to evolve towards states of equilibrium. Larger systems (for example, humanity) are composed of smaller ones. Human societies have evolved towards democratic regimes that seemed to represent systems in equilibrium. Reputable political scientists (Francis Fukuyama) have even spoken of an end of history, a situation in which the only form of organization of human communities will be liberal democracy. The stability of democratic regimes is achieved through self-regulation mechanisms (feedback), through which undesirable aspects of their functioning are eliminated or diminished.

Democracy proved to be fragile in the Weimar Republic, which collapsed under the Nazi onslaught in the unique circumstances of the interwar period. It is debatable, however, whether President Hindenburg's regime can be included in the category of consolidated democracies.

Romania adopted democratic institutions starting in 1990 and went through a process of consolidating them, a process that was accelerated after the accession in the European Union. It can be said that the Romanian political system has largely adopted the functioning and adjustment mechanisms typical of liberal democracies. Before the outbreak of the pandemic, there was a rotation in power of the two major parties: the social democrats and the liberals. Immediately after the end of the pandemic, a grand coalition composed of the two parties was reached. However, 2019 also marked the emergence of the first populist party. The phenomenon intensified in 2024 when three such parties gained access to parliament, totaling almost 40% of the parliamentary seats.

This change in the electoral behavior of the population corresponds to a certain extent to the trend existing at European level. The motivations are different, however. Romania has had significant economic growth since the country's integration into the European Union. On the other hand, there are no important regional cleavages, and the migration phenomenon is not significant. Therefore, the causes that fueled the rise of populist parties in other European countries do not exist.

The paper starts from the hypothesis that Romania is faced with a very high level of politicization of the civil service which is also associated with a very high level of corruption. Together, the two phenomena have generated a very high lack of trust in the political class, which has resulted in a general attitude of rejection towards it. This is the probable cause of the rise of sovereignist parties, which we try to analyze in the paper.

Methodology: document analysis (press articles or social media statements); secondary analysis of statistical data; semi-structured interviews.

Crises shape our information environment and are fraught with conflicts, posing challenges to joint knowledge formation and to the principles of democracy. For example, affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019; Skoog 2019) and the rise of populism in politics can accelerate democratic backsliding – a process where somewhat democratic countries become less democratic (Lotta et al. 2024; Silva and Gomide 2024). To address complex societal challenges while safeguarding democracy, fostering both information resilience and effective governance across sectors and levels is needed. We utilize conflicts as an analytical tool to identify those moments in crisis management when democracy is at risk.

Information resilience has been recognized as a knowledge-based approach to societal crisis response, significant to supporting democracy in public administration (Rantamäki, Rossi, and Maijala, forthcoming). In discussion on democratic principles, the midrange proceduralist models hold rule of law and free, general, equal, and fair elections as core of democracy (e.g. Habermas 2015), but add horizontal checks and balancing (O’Donnell 1998) as key components to maintain deliberation and equal possibilities to participate in societal decision-making. A vibrant civil society takes full advantage of the participatory potential of democracy, but protects it from appropriation by influential, yet self-interested political views (Merkel 2018). Accordingly, in the principles regarding information resilience, each member of society has a role not only in preparedness but also in actions during a crisis and in crisis-related learning (Rantamäki 2023). Information resilience emphasizes the need to generate options for action through bottom-up communication (Rantamäki, Rossi, and Maijala, forthcoming), underscoring the importance of democracy, and involving citizens in the development of solutions (Sakurai and Chughtai 2020). Previous research has uncovered five mechanisms that affect democratic society’s information resilience, namely acknowledging uncertainty, enhancing systemic trust, creating processes of learning and unlearning, strengthening democracy through inclusion, and fostering shared situational awareness (Rantamäki, Rossi, and Maijala, forthcoming).

Our data consists of an eDelphi panel, bringing together informants from different policy and societal sectors, such as government authorities, regional and local governance actors, business and NGOs. The informants are asked to reflect on statements and questions related to, e.g. how different sectors’ expertise is utilized in crisis management, how social media is used in reciprocal communication, and how citizens comply with government decisions during crises. The data is analyzed with the analytical tool of conflicts (Rossi and Skarli, forthcoming).

Public Policy and Administration scholars recently called to unpack the critical role of politics, power and political regime in public policy research. This paper offers an institutionalist response to this call. It examines how populist-patrimonial pressures in a world of democratic backsliding can influence institutions and organizations of central banking. It builds on the comparative analysis of institutional change in central banking over the last two decades under the Turkish political transition from liberal democracy to illiberal democracy. Drawing on elite interviews and written sources, it examines how political pressures that result from the shift in political regime from the parliamentary system of government to the presidential system of government generated the de-legitimation of orthodox central banking logic, and its rules, norms and practices. It shows how regime elites employ various repression and cooptation instruments that selectively displace existing institutions with new preferred and desired ones leading to poor policy outcomes and administrative capacity.

In recent decades, two dominant models have shaped criminal legal systems: individual treatment/rehabilitation and retributive justice. These competing paradigms have led to internal inconsistencies within justice systems, as they attempt to balance punishment, rehabilitation, and community safety. This tension has created uncertainty around the prioritization of punitive versus rehabilitative responses to crime. In response, lawmakers and justice system administrators are seeking to clarify the aims of justice policy and management, while exploring innovative pathways for reform.

One such pathway is the growing adoption of restorative justice. Once considered a peripheral approach, restorative justice has increasingly become embedded in law and policy, offering a contemporary and globally relevant solution to justice reform. Countries around the world have developed and implemented restorative legislation and practices—both formally and informally—to varying degrees (Pavelka & Erbe, 2024; Pavelka, 2016; Pavelka, 2008).

This workshop presents a comparative international analysis of restorative justice, revealing the diverse ways in which nations adopt and adapt restorative practices. Key comparative elements include cultural integration, youth justice, legal incorporation, and systemic challenges. For example, New Zealand and Canada have successfully integrated Indigenous justice traditions, enhancing cultural relevance and effectiveness. Nations such as Norway, Australia, and New Zealand prioritize restorative justice in juvenile systems, where rehabilitation is a central goal. Some countries, like Belgium, embed restorative practices within formal legal processes, while others, such as parts of the United States, rely more on community-led initiatives. However, scalability and sustainability remain global challenges, particularly in common law countries where restorative and retributive traditions often clash (Pavelka & Erbe, 2024).

Presenters will share research on the benefits, limitations, and future directions of restorative justice, offering insights into the evolving nature of criminal legal systems (Zehr, 2015; Walgrave, 2024; Pavelka & Erbe, 2024). The session will also highlight successful implementations, provide a platform for knowledge exchange, and foster international collaboration to advance meaningful justice reform (Otis & Umbreit, 2024; Skolnik, 2021). By transitioning from punitive to restorative justice systems, we can cultivate more equitable, compassionate, and effective responses to crime and conflict.