Lobbying has never been as sophisticated, complex, and well-funded as it is today. Significantly, interest group strategies appear to be more advanced than the regulatory practices meant to contain them. This raises concerns about policymakers’ ability to resist institutional capture, and unwanted interest group influence. Moreover, it indicates an alarming risk of political corruption. Notable efforts to regulate government affairs are taking place across the globe through digital lobbying registers. Nevertheless, we know little about the performance of these registers from an empirical perspective. Significantly, we lack a conceptual model to comparatively assess them. This paper reviews the performance of 16 lobbying registers according to 3 interlinked dimensions: (a) transparency; (b) regulatory capacity; and (c) interoperability. Under ‘transparency’, the paper examines the scope of lobbying information collected by the register in question, as well as how that information is administered and subsequently disclosed. ‘Regulatory capacity’ refers to how a register is enforced and to what extent it requires actors to report information about other regulatory issues such as political donations and public procurement. ‘Interoperability’ looks at whether and how a register is designed to enable cross-checking with other public data sets in the same country and with other lobbying registers across jurisdictions when providing the public an opportunity to freely download data.

By looking at these three dimensions, the paper conducts a systematic comparative assessment, benchmarks the registers’ performance, and highlights good practice examples. The paper’s overall aim is to advance an evidence-based debate on what constitutes an effective lobbying register and what kinds of related reforms could improve

transparency in policymaking. At the end, the paper provides some concrete suggestions on improving the effectiveness of lobbying registers with respect to the three dimensions discussed, and its conceptual implications.

This study explores the impact of Dark Triad personality traits—Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy—on integrity among public employees in Belgium. Using a dataset comprising responses from 320 public servants, we utilized a mixed-method approach incorporating both vignette techniques and surveys. This methodology was chosen to assess integrity and Dark Triad traits comprehensively, while minimizing the impact of social desirability bias, which is often a concern in self-reported data involving sensitive topics such as personal ethics and integrity.

The Dark Triad traits are known for their potentially disruptive influence in workplaces, especially in roles involving significant trust and ethical decision-making. Machiavellianism is associated with strategic manipulation and a focus on personal gain, Narcissism with grandiosity and entitlement, and Psychopathy with impulsivity and a lack of empathy (Paulhus and Williams 2002). These traits were measured using validated instruments adapted to fit the cultural and organizational context of the Belgian public sector.

Integrity was operationalized through multiple dimensions, including adherence to ethical standards, likelihood of engaging in or tolerating corrupt practices, and resistance to unethical behaviors. The use of vignette-based scenarios alongside traditional survey questions allowed us to simulate real-life situations that might not be openly discussed or admitted in direct questioning, thus providing a richer, more accurate picture of how these personality traits interact with ethical behavior in the public sector.

Preliminary findings indicate varying influences of the Dark Triad traits on integrity. For instance, Machiavellianism was found to correlate with a pragmatic but unethical view of organizational practices, where the ends often justify the means. Narcissism was linked with a reduced perception of the harmfulness of corrupt acts, likely due to narcissists’ inflated self-perception and entitlement. Conversely, Psychopathy was strongly associated with a higher propensity for direct engagement in corrupt behaviors, consistent with the trait’s links to impulsivity and empathy deficits.

This research underscores the complex interplay between personality and integrity within public organizations. The insights derived from this study could be instrumental for HR departments in screening and training programs, aiming to mitigate the risks associated with these personality traits. The use of both vignettes and traditional surveys provides a methodologically robust approach to studying sensitive issues like corruption, offering a valuable model for future research in organizational ethics.

The findings from this study are intended for publication in a peer-reviewed journal focusing on public administration and ethics, contributing to ongoing discussions about the role of personality in shaping ethical conduct within public sector organizations.

The paper's main goal is to explore the different perspectives of the changeable relationship between auditors and managers in public organizations. The inquiry examines how a new pattern of interaction between these key players influences the policymaking process, which can range from strict control to collaborative approaches.

The control bodies in democratic nations have expanded their roles, aiming to ensure values of integrity, accountability, and transparency in public administration. The so-called explosion of audits was accompanied by several changes in the role played by these institutions, sometimes extrapolating legal formalities. In this sense, the separation between policy design/implementation and auditing is no longer the standard procedure, as control bodies now surpass this border, standing the uncontested flags of anti-corruption, ethics, and performance improvement across a wide range of public policies.

The significant level of autonomy gained by auditors—whether in terms of technical expertise, financial resources, professional quality, or access to information—has resulted in greater bureaucratic capacity and an unprecedented influence on policy decision-making.

This scenario may also reveal dissonances in responsibilities between oversight bodies and public organizations in charge of policy design and implementation. It sheds light on how auditors and policy managers evaluate their relationships, whether these are restricted to a control-based approach or are more collaborative. The core puzzle is: have oversight bodies overstepped their traditional role as watchdogs—monitoring rules and laws compliance — to also act as shepherds, advising public administration towards effective policy performance and management principles?

To answer this question, the paper analyzes the perceptions of auditors from the General Comptroller of the Union (CGU), Brazil's federal internal control ministry, and their counterparts in policy management roles within sectoral ministries. The research involved conducting sixteen semi-structured interviews with middle-level bureaucrats and top officials from these organizations to compare their views, perceptions, and opinions on dissonances and convergences in the relationships and roles of control bodies and audited entities in the policymaking process. The research findings offer several insights. First, auditors and managers share a surprisingly similar perspective on the CGU's preventive and supportive role. Second, the dissonance in their practical application of roles cannot be simply categorized as a binary concept. It appears that the role of sheepdog and watchdog can be put in perspective if managers ask for helping when they do not know how to position in the face of the demands of obedience to legal rules of integrity and accountability. Furthermore, dissonances between CGU and managers regarding policy evaluation may not exist or be mitigated if it confirms the results obtained, but it can be seen as a reputational risk if audits make public the low performance of public management. In conclusion, the research reveals an unexpected collaborative pattern in the perception of the CGU’s policymaking roles that do not compromise their commitment to promoting integrity, transparency, and accountability. The paper contributes to this crucial debate by suggesting that shifts in the relationship between control and management may be a natural progression in an increasingly complex and democratic public administration.

Abstract paper and presentation EGPA SG Athens 2024

Leo Huberts, emeritus professor Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

The central topic of the sessions of the SG in Athens is 'Making Integrity and Ethics Work'.

That reminds me of a topic that seems directly related to that central subject, in summary “What helps to protect and promote integrity and to prevent integrity violations?”

And/or “What works in integrity management and policy”, or “what are the characteristics of an effective organizational integrity system”?

This leads to the proposal to pay attention in my presentation (and paper) to that topic. A bit problematic is that I did also present on that topic a number of years ago at EGPA, but I am more than willing to (try to) focus my presentation on aspects that are more central in the 2024 sessions (including a number of todays ethical and integrity dilemma’s and the presence of the topic in organizational life and decision-making).

A bit general for now, to be followed up, but I hope enough for you both to come to a ‘notification to the author’ (presentation okay?), to enable me to start organizing my presence in Athens.

Leo Huberts 13-5-2024.