Conference Agenda

This paper examines the complex interplay of patronage and politicization within the central government of Hungary, analyzing how these dynamics are shaped by the country's illiberal and populist governance. Through interviews with senior civil servants and a review of existing literature, analysing the profiles and the pattern of carrier pathes of top burocrats and their connections to politicinas, we explore a landscape marked by the concentration of political power, erosion of institutional checks, and weakening of bureaucratic independence. In this context, the paper suggests that personal loyalty emerges as the primary currency for securing patronage.

Our research paper investigates how these trends compromise the quality and predictability of public administration and policymaking in favor of regime stability. We aim to provide insights into the intricate network of interactions and influences that shape decision-making processes within Hungary's central government, offering a nuanced understanding of its governance dynamics. We explore the level of institutionalism vs de-institutionalism as a key characteristic, wherein formal rules and institutional norms are sidelined in favor of direct political intervention. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of polticization on the level of technocratic expertise and effectiveness of policy formulation and implementation.

Our research also aims to provide insights into the internal functioning and organizational structures of the executive entourages, shedding light on how roles and responsibilities are allocated and how authority is distributed within these teams.

Drawing on document analysis and insights from high-ranking civil servants, our research suggest the dual consequences of these dynamics: while they contribute to short-term political stability by advancing regime priorities, they also fuel bureaucratic chaos, undermining the government's ability to govern effectively. Our study sheds light on the unique challenges posed by illiberal and populist governance in Hungary, offering insights into broader trends in contemporary politics.

Within the machinery of the centre of the Croatian government there are various forms of obtaining policy advice. Besides numerous regulated, formal, official forms, there are those in the grey zone or even behind it. All of them deserve full research attention, because those located out-of-the-scene could be even more influential than the official ones. Some of them can be identified by following comprehensively covered cases in the media, but the majority are functioning behind the curtain and can be traced only by classic sociological-empirical research.

By analysing several interesting cases, we will try to identify who the semi-secret policy advisors are and how they are or can be engaged. We will take into consideration the following cases of policy advice: a) changing the general election units (2023), b) preparation of the so-called Lex Agrokor (2017), and c) engaging legal advisors in the arbitration cases between Croatia and MOL - Hungarian oil company (2021-2023). Using that empirical basis, along with other accessible information, we will try to speculate about the role, range, sources, and ways of obtaining policy advice at all levels of the Croatian governance system.

Why we opted for ethnographic case studies – in-depth understanding of themes, issues or problems in particular settings? During our previous research, we learnt that we cannot rely on official data about policy advice especially in “hot”, i.e. the most publicly sensitive cases. Data formally do not exist and if we submitted the official access to public information request, we would probably not get any information. Because of that, we planned to gather information and reconstruct the picture in three mentioned cases by using other methods of collecting data, including “soft” ones, i.e. informal exchange with informed colleagues, following media traces, and various other methods. We hoped to be able to find out enough elements for our purpose in such a way.

For example, in the first case, about the preparation of the new Law on Electoral Units for General Elections, the media published several statements indicating that four members of the ruling party had a crucial role in preparing the Bill. However, a newspaper article indicated that a member of a research institute, a geographer, was the main source of information used during the preparation of the legislative draft. Finally, a highly influential NGO submitted an official request to the competent ministry and then additionally submitted an appeal to the Public Information Commissioner. The Commissioner issued an order to the ministry requesting it to reveal the members of the working group which supposedly prepared the Bill. The ministry has recently informed the Commissioner that a working group has never been established and that fact makes it is impossible for them to reveal any names. Everyone can see the power point presentation with maps and data on the official Government website. We will see how this case will develop in the future, but it seems that some very influential not formally appointed policy advisers prepared the legislative proposal.

Be that as it may, we need to invest much more time and energy into investigating the three interesting and important cases in order to be able to identify the realistic picture of policy advisers that significantly influence decision-making within the Prime Minister Office and the Cabinet.

Latvia is characterised as a country with low politicisation and limited patronage. Most typically, Latvian ministers have their bureaus consisting of office managers and several political advisers appointed. Roles, functions, and selection criteria for advisers are solely left at the discretion of ministers and the political parties they represent. Mass media, experts and opponents have raised questions on the role of political advisers from time to time, questioning the transparency of recruitment and true power in the policy process. There is also significant public opinion that political advisers are an access point to bureaucratic resources for political parties. The article explores the role of political advisers in Latvian executives since 2019 under different governments to capture functional and policy cycle-related empirically based tendencies in appointing advisers.

Cyprus stands out among other European states due to its Presidential system where the President, elected independently from Parliament, heads both the state and government and is solely responsible for appointing his Cabinet of Ministers (that cannot comprise of MPs). Since the establishment of the Republic in 1960 and until February 2024 there was no formal provision that allowed for the Ministers of Government to select any advisors and/or associates, though for a decade prior to the passing of the relevant legislation, it became common practice for Ministers to select trusted individuals (outside the civil service) to be appointed as advisors. Their role was opaque and they stayed away from the public eye, while the lack of transparency regarding their credentials and their responsibilities contributed to a negative public perception that highlighted nepotism and clientelism as the sole factors determining the selection of these individuals. In the relevant 2024 law on Advisors-Associates of the Members of the Government (i.e. the President, the Ministers and the Deputy Ministers), the criteria for the selection of these individuals are explicitly defined, including the minimum necessary academic or other professional qualifications and/or professional experience. Furthermore, the duties and responsibilities of the advisors-associates are to be related to the work of the Member of Government and defined in the employment contract. Besides appointments by the President at the Presidential Palace, each Minister or Deputy Minister is entitled to one associate with a specified remuneration that could not in any case appeal to senior professionals from the private sector. Under this newly voted legal framework, the paper attempts, with reference to past experience, to examine if and how the advisors could be utilised in a transparent manner, what type of tasks they could be assigned, how they may interact with senior civil service executives, how they may utilise their post for their political advancement and, overall, if they can actually influence politics and decision-making at the national level.