Politically appointed “special advisors” are not a novelty in France: the first “creatures” serving a “master” appeared in the 1700s, with the prototypic figure of Father Joseph, “the Grey Eminence” serving Prime Minister-Cardinal de Richelieu. First modern ministerial cabinet was the one of Lucien Bonaparte, minister of the Interior (January 1800). Since then, despite revolutions and regime changes, ministerial (and presidential) cabinets have been one of the most constant, resilient, flourishing institutions in France: despite tiny legal bases, they have deep roots into the French politico-administrative culture. These entourages consist in a system of oversized and powerful cabinets of politically appointed personal advisors to ministers, Prime Ministers and Presidents, copied in other continental European countries. In terms of historic sociogenesis, it is a counter-model to British (and former British dominions) small “ministers’ private offices”, while the rise of “special advisors” in Westminster systems since the 1980s has transformed the situation. The entourages of the Executive are major players of the governing of France, forming a “triangle” with the political masters and the senior bureaucrats/ “cadres dirigeants” appointed by presidential decree taken in the Council of ministers (emplois à la decision du gouvernement). Yet, differently from what is observed in classic parliamentary democracies, French cabinets are not that much a tool of “political control” over the bureaucracy than a shadow space of “administratification” of politics.

Since 1981, there was a constant growth in size of these entourages, with a climax of 730 persons was reached under President Mitterrand in the 1990s. Variation between 500 and 600 according to the number of ministers since then. Often criticized for their uncontrolled influence, two attempts to cut drastically their number to foster direct cooperation between ministers and directors-general in person with a view to increase efficiency in decision-making were made by President Chirac and PM Juppé (1995-1997), and by President Macron, and PM Edouard Philippe (2017-2020). Both attempts of “decabinetization” à la française (if this was so) have failed lamentably. For example, Government E. Philippe had only 300 advisers (« Jaune », 1st August 2018), but half a year later, burn-out and resignations among advisers were growing, and ministers were allowed to add more collaborators. Then, in July 2020, a new PM, Jean Castex, restores the previous ceilings, confirmed in 2022 with new PM Elisabeth Borne. As a result, the total amounts to 570 persons in 2021 as in 2022. It is a return to the world before!

This recent failed reform is a real-life experience which demonstrates that the French Core Executive cannot operate without huge teams of collaborators: cabinets remain essential to the governance of France!

The paper focuses on the role of the ministerial cabinets in the Italian policy processes. To this end, it takes into account the structure of the Italian ministerial cabinets, the rules governing them and the tasks that they have effectively performed during the last decades.

Against this backdrop, the paper offers an in-depth analysis of the role of ministerial cabinets by analyzing a sort of case-study: indeed, it takes into account the better regulation and the performance management reforms promoted in each of the four cycles of administrative reforms that took place between 1993 and 2018. By relying on semi-structured interviews and documentation, the paper emphasizes the tasks performed by the ministerial cabinets in these eight reform episodes and thus their impact on the policy processes.

The paper emphasizes the persistent role of ministerial cabinets during the years under analysis despite the changes of the political landscape and the various political phases which marked the period 1993-2018 (the transition from the traditional party system to new one, 1992-1996; the bipolar competition, 1996-2013; the crisis of the bipolar competition due to the rise of the Five Star Movement, 2013-2018). In doing so, it confirms the research hypothesis concerning the resilience of the ministerial cabinets.

In 2024 Greece is celebrating 50 years since the restauration of democratic rule following the collapse of the military junta in 1974. It has been alleged that despite the consolidation of a healthy electoral democracy, the Greek polity has been experiencing ‘democratic backsliding’, or even a ‘flawed democracy’. Some of the problems, which are commonly discussed in the literature, are the rise of populist parties, patronage, political clientelism, partitocracy, concentration and misuse of political power, a weak civil society, corruption, and an overtly partisan press. It has been argued that although the 2010 economic crisis led to wide economic reforms it did not result to any significant politico-institutional ones. One aspect of this discussion concerns the role of political entourages to ministers and prime ministers. In the 2022 Greek surveillance scandal (Predatorgate), possibly one of the biggest political scandals in the last 50 years, one of the key protagonists is the nephew and former General Secretary (chief of staff) to the Prime Minister, who in 2019 was given responsibility for political oversight of the National Intelligence Service – NIS (EYP). The present paper attempts to answer whether political staffers working for politicians rule behind the scenes in a way that causes problems to the quality of Greek democracy, or whether they are just symptoms of broader problems that need to be tackled by political and institutional reform. To do so the paper discusses the trajectory and influence of political entourages in the Greek executive triangle of ministers, ministerial advisers and senior civil servants in the backdrop of broader developments in the Greek democratic polity. The paper is a preliminary draft of a future book chapter prepared for an edited book volume.