Crises demand resilience and the competence to deal with stress from frontline workers when adjusting to increased demands and risks. Problem-solving at the frontline becomes especially cruical during crises. Simultaneously, populist leaders may jeopardize frontline work for political reasons. Little is known about how a context of crisis and populism affects frontline work. This paper asks: how did the pandemic change the work of frontline workers in a populist context? And how did support by government affect their self-efficacy? Based on an online survey of 3229 Brazilian frontline workers during the pandemic, we use automated text analysis to identify changes in frontline work, and logistic regression for testing effects of government support, demands and resources on frontline workers' perceived self-efficacy. Results show important changes in frontline work—but not in the use of discretion. Lacking political support negatively affected frontline workers' self-efficacy. Resources and managerial support had positive effects—but a limited ability to “buffer” for lacking political support. Overall, thus, leadership support appears crucial for SLBs' role as problem-solvers during crises.

This article addresses the question of effects of institutionalized political involvement, i.e., by law or regulation as part of the organizational environment of a public authority, on street-level policy implementation. We assume that this kind of involvement has a confidence-building effect, fosters cooperation between street-level bureaucrats (SLB) and politicians, and ultimately strengthen the acceptance of a policy.

To date, street-level bureaucracy scholarship has addressed the issue of control over SLB or the ability to influence SLB’s behavior (e.g., Brehm and Gates 1997; Brewer 2005; Hill 2006; Riccucci 2005). Different modes of influence on SLB have been investigated (see e.g., Meyers and Vorsanger 2003). One of these modes focus on the (mainly “disruptive”) involvement of politicians in street-level policy implementation and the (mainly negative) implications on SLB’s decisions, such as unequal service provision (e.g., Keiser 1999; Keiser and Soss 1998; Langbein 2000; May and Winter 2009).

This study aims to turn the spotlight on a slightly different issue, namely the effect of institutionalized, i.e., “non-disruptive” and ideally positive, political involvement (e.g., by law or regulation) on public policy implementation. Davidovitz and Cohen (2021, 15–16) conclude that “[p]olicy implementation is a team effort that requires productive cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats.” In a different context, Stauffer, Kuenzler, and Sager (2023) show that collaboration among policy implementation actors increases resilience against “blame-avoiding policy implementation”, which is another way of SLB discretion potentially leading to inequality (see Hinterleitner and Wittwer 2022). Going down this road, we assume that the institutionalized involvement of politicians fosters collaboration among SLB and politicians.

We use original survey and interview data from 66 social assistance authorities in one Swiss canton. Swiss social assistance is implemented by local implementing agencies and monitored by political bodies. The role, and thus the involvement, of these bodies are regulated by law. We apply a mixed method design with a qualitative focus. In addition, we juxtapose our findings with findings from Denmark and Israel (see Davidovitz and Cohen 2021; May and Winter 2009) where many context variables are similar while variance exists in the relevant factor of political involvement.

Preliminary findings show that although the actual monitoring function of politicians as stipulated by law cannot be fulfilled, the institutional anchoring leads to cooperation or at least regular contact between SLB and politicians, which in turn enables the latter to represent and legitimize social assistance in the public, i.e., towards the citizens, and the local and regional politics; an important task – since social welfare expenditures are high and often subject to critical scrutiny – that can most effectively be done by politicians.

References:

Brehm, John O., and Scott Gates. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public. University of Michigan Press.

Brewer, Gene A. 2005. “In the Eye of the Storm: Frontline Supervisors and Federal Agency Performance.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15 (4): 505–27.

Davidovitz, Maayan, and Nissim Cohen. 2021. “Politicians’ involvement in street-level policy implementation: Implications for social equity.” Public Policy and Administration: 095207672110240.

Hill, Carolyn J. 2006. “Casework Job Design and Client Outcomes in Welfare-to-Work Offices.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (2): 263–88.

Hinterleitner, Markus, and Stefan Wittwer. 2022. “Serving quarreling masters: Frontline workers and policy implementation under pressure.” Governance.

Keiser, Lael R. 1999. “State Bureaucratic Discretion and the Administration of Social Welfare Programs: The Case of Social Security Disability.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 9 (1): 87–106.

Keiser, Lael R., and Joe Soss. 1998. “With Good Cause: Bureaucratic Discretion and the Politics of Child Support Enforcement.” American Journal of Political Science 42 (4): 1133.

Langbein, Laura I. 2000. “Ownership, empowerment, and productivity: Some empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of employee discretion.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19 (3): 427–49.

May, Peter J., and Søren C. Winter. 2009. “Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level Bureaucrats: Influences on Policy Implementation.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 19 (3): 453–76.

Meyers, Marcia K., and Susan Vorsanger. 2003. “Street-level bureaucrats and the implementation of public policy.” In Handbook of Public Administration, eds. B. G. Peters and Jon Pierre. Sage Publications CA: Thousand Oaks, CA, 245–55.

Riccucci, Norma. 2005. How management matters: Street-level bureaucrats and welfare reform. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Stauffer, Bettina, Johanna Kuenzler, and Fritz Sager. 2023. “Public agency resilience in times of democratic backsliding: Structure, collaboration and professional standards.” Governance: Early view.

Implementation failure and ineffective policies plague democratic systems, especially in complex policymaking areas, such as environmental policy. While the literature confers on the importance of both well-informed policy design and implementation to avoid policy inefficacy, the potential contributions of street-level implementation tend to be overlooked. Introducing a novel conceptualization of street-level integration based on institutional capacities for articulation, consultation and evaluation, this paper advocates for a greater alignment between policymaking and implementation. Systematically comparing the direct and indirect effects of street-level integration on environmental outcomes in 21 OECD countries from 1980 to 2012, the findings reveal that street-level integration not only directly enhances policy outcomes but also acts as a vital factor for increasing the effectiveness of existing and newly adopted policies. Hence, the study contributes a novel conceptualization of street-level integration, emphasizes the importance of the implementation level for successful policymaking, and offers practical recommendations for politico-administrative reforms.

Scholars have demonstrated the significance of trust in understanding street-level work from various perspectives. On one hand, trust influences citizens' behaviour towards the state (Van Ryzin, 2011). On the other hand, studies have shown how the trust (or lack thereof) from street-level bureaucrats to citizens affects the delivery of public services (Davidovits and Cohen, 2020). However, this article argues that trust is a dynamic process that is influenced by the multiple and daily relationships between citizens and street-level bureaucrats across different organizations. Given that citizens interact with diverse types of street-level bureaucrats daily, their experiences with certain bureaucrats may impact their trust not only in those individuals but also in other parts of the state. This article proposes a more dynamic analysis of trust at the street level, examining how interactions with specific street-level bureaucrats shape citizens' trust in other street-level bureaucrats and the state as a whole.

To achieve this, the study analyses the perceptions of homeless individuals who experience markedly different and contrasting interactions with street-level bureaucrats. Specifically, it focuses on homeless individuals with a history of drug and alcohol abuse, residing in a highly violent territory with a substantial state presence. These citizens encounter situations of violence and distrust with police officers, while also engaging with street-level bureaucrats involved in providing care policies, such as health and social workers, who rely on establishing trust. By investigating these conflicting and opposing experiences, the study aims to explore their impact on citizens' trust in street-level bureaucrats and the state.

The analysis is based on data obtained from an eight-month ethnographic survey and 89 structured interviews conducted with homeless individuals residing in Crackland, which is Brazil's largest drug use scene. The findings contribute to the field of street-level bureaucracy by providing a broader understanding of how trust is generated and influenced during policy implementation.