In the UK several local authorities are under pressure to bring about strategic improvements because of interventions by central government. From 2000 to 2010, interventions were triggered because of systematic audit systems and performance assessment ratings, and, subsequently, because of more ad hoc decisions. The current wave of interventions has occurred under a set of conditions that include a new central government interest in devolving more matters to sub-national level. The other conditions are the existence of ‘at risk’ authorities on the edge of financial collapse, a head of pressure created by fiscal austerity, under investment, and a reinvigorated interest in local government from central government in the form of the attention of a specific government minister and the newly created Office for Local Government. This third phase of intervention is manifested in a flurry of Secretary of State letters being issued to local authorities.

Given the new conditions that prevail, it seems likely that the processes and actor interaction patterns of interventions, and the turnaround strategies that are developed in response to interventions, are going to be different in some respects from what they were in the past. To steer research intended to explore these matters a whole set of questions can be posed. For example, to what extent will local authorities take a whole-of-council approach to responding to interventions by means of the preparation of strategic and financial plans? What decisions will councils make about pacing their responses in terms of change and improvement? How will changes to corporate governance and leadership of councils feature in the programmes of strategic improvements? How will the tension between making strategic improvements and continued attention to delivery of the councils' public services be managed as part of the change process? How will the councils’ political and administrative leadership develop an advantageous relationship with commissioners overseeing the intervention and how will this leadership simultaneously manage a diverse set of stakeholder relationships? How much will the response of local councils be shaped by the intention of central government that the local authority (council) will take responsibility for putting things right and making improvements?

The questions about how the council reacts and responds during intervention may well be best understood as a strongly shaped by its interaction with central government. Therefore, pertinent issues in relation to the actions of central government are: what theory of change do the ministers and civil servants think applies in an intervention; have ministers and civil servants a clear understanding of how to provide support to local councils to enable them to exit quickly from intervention - and do ministers and civil servants the capacity for providing such support; and to what extent are interventions biased by party politics?

Using original case study evidence from the UK, the analysis and discussion of this paper will focus on providing insights into the process of intervention, into the interactions of the major parties in the process, and their consequences for the success of strategic planning and the making of strategic improvements. Included in these insights we hope will be how council leaderships construct the right relationship with central government appointed commissioners and create a shared agenda in building organisational capacity and in tackling the issues that triggered the intervention.

The paper will conclude with practical recommendations for local councils to develop positive and effective ways to engage with interventions and to plan and execute successful strategic improvements on a whole-of-council basis.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are major players in both domestic economies and global markets, many of them are among the largest corporations in the world. Beyond their relevance as economic phenomenon, they also play other, non-economic roles. Our analysis focuses on SOEs that provide public services for the society or performs a public function in a broader sense.

Due to state ownership, SOEs significantly differ from privately owned companies in terms of strategic planning and organizational competencies. Following recent literature defining particular categories of goals pursued by SOEs, this article aims to explore, in a European Union context, the effect of state-ownership on strategic decisions of such companies in times of the coronavirus crisis and the ongoing war in Ukraine. We argue that, as a response to risks and uncertainties emerged as a result of such crises, goals set by governments for their SOEs mainly include financial and industrial policy goals. However, in certain European countries (like Hungary), political motives are often hidden behind these, and therefore SOEs may also be used as instruments of ideological and nationalist strategies. At the same time, political motives like these may rarely be identified from publicly available strategic plans and other documents directly related to the company’s activities. Instead, such objectives may rather be inferred from an analysis of the regulatory context and central government communication, as well as from changes in the range of market players in the sector.

The above argument will be tested by an empirical analysis focusing on selected SOEs from CEE countries (top ten companies by annual turnover from those providing public services/performing public function in utility sectors) based on data from international corporate databases, annual company reports and strategic plans, and publicly available statistics. The study also includes multiple case-study of SOEs in two selected EU Member States. As two similar cases from the same region, the sample companies of Hungary and Poland will be examined in more details. The economic policy of these countries is influenced by strong nationalist and protectionist political ideology represented by the governing party, and therefore these Member States serve as appropriate examples to illustrate political motives behind government’s strategic goals for their SOE’s.

As a result of the analysis, we seek to identify those country-specific factors that may influence SOEs role and strategic decisions in times of multiple crises. In the light of the results, we also aim to assess whether the European Union’s available policy and legal instruments may offer any solutions to the challenges of strategic planning identified in our research.

The implementation and ongoing development of the strategic state has been documented in relation to the Scottish government. But, more recently there have been serious questions raised around the so-called 'ferries fiasco' (a procurement exercise for two ferries that has, so far, gone £200 million over budget and six years past deadline); a drop of an estimated 30,000 party members; a seemingly missing £600,000; the resignation of the party's independent auditors; Police Scotland questioning of the former party chief executive; treasurer; even the seizure by Police Scotland of a luxury motorhome from the home of the former chief executive's mother; as well as ongoing questions around the highest levels of drug deaths in Europe, the persistent education attainment gap and failing public services. Where did it all go wrong? Up until the start of 2023 the SNP were considered by many to be the most trustworthy party in the UK and their leader, Nicola Sturgeon, was frequently polled as being considered the most competent political leader in the UK. What does this mean for the strategic state? Do recent events prove that the strategic state never existed, that having a strategic state doesn't matter or something else? In this update to my previous research in this area I explore the antecedents of recent events and discuss what this means for how we understand the strategic state.