Regulatory agencies fulfill crucial tasks in modern governments. Agencies both implement regulation in various economic sectors. Moreover, they are the central actor that monitors, controls and if necessary, sanctions companies that do not comply with regulation. By doing so, regulatory agencies limit the risk-taking behavior of companies and thus ensure the safety of consumers. In carrying out their tasks effectively, agencies must cooperate with numerous different public actors (e.g. ministries and executive bodies, legislative politicians) and societal stakeholders (e.g. regulatees and their interest groups, consumer organizations). Previous literature has demonstrated that trust between these stakeholders is crucial in ensuring the well-functioning of the regime as well as the legitimacy of the regime itself. Yet, we lack a thorough understanding about the factors that enhance and safeguard trust between various actors in regulatory regimes.

Scholars have pointed towards interaction and cooperation between actors in regulatory regimes as a central driver of trust, and provide three main explanations. First, actors which have frequent contacts with one another would also tend to trust one another more. Second, not only having contact but having a (reciprocal) information exchange between actors would enhance trust among actors. Lastly, instead of contacts or information exchanges, actors would base their trust on an ideational basis – trusting those actors that have similar views.

This paper empirically studies these theoretical notions using a novel dataset consisting of survey data on the relations between 752 actors in regulatory regimes in 6 countries and 3 policy sectors. Using these data, we analyze the extent to which the various types of interactions affect the trust levels between actors in the studied regulatory regimes.

Our findings point towards frequent contacts between actors and having similar views as important drivers for trust between actors. Yet, we also find that actors that have opposite views also tend to trust one another. We do not find convincing evidence that points towards an independent effect of information exchanges as trust-enhancing factor.

This paper addresses how regulatory agencies use policy tools in digital markets which have proven difficult to regulate due to technological developments, territorial uncertainty and slow implementation of policies. We discuss, through institutional theory and regulatory governance literature how regulatory agencies within its institutional setting seeks to improve policy performance. To do so we draw on a comparative case study of the gambling agencies in the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden which regulates and control gambling markets. Despite formulating similar political objectives, all three entities organize regulatory practices and market arrangements differently. Through a document analysis the paper fleshes out the role of policy tools in the digital age of government. The findings showcase two-fold implications. While state agencies have been limited in effectiveness due to policy formulation and steering arrangements, recent tendencies show that regulatory agencies have been able to improve policy performance. While digital transformation has proven to be both sluggish and slow, public agencies are increasingly robust in regulating digital markets.

Information exchange on policy formulation between members of parliament and executive agencies

Thijs van den Berg, Rianne Warsen, Koen Migchelbrink & Sandra van Thiel

Paper for the EGPA conference 2023, panel VI Governance of Public Sector Organization

This study investigates the relation between parliament and executive agencies in the process of policy formulation. Existing literature focused on the accountability by executive agencies to parliament, often through ministers and ministries. The interaction between parliament and executive agencies around new policy ideas has not been studied often yet. This study describes the degree to which an information relation exists between parliament and executive agencies in the policy formation process, and which form this relationship can take.

We use different theoretical frameworks to explain if and why members of parliament and public servants within executive agencies exchange information regarding policy formulation. In the existing literature rational calculation or reputation maximization are mentioned as motives for exchange of information and accountability. In addition, we will use ideas from policy theories, legitimacy perceptions and institutional identity. This way we pay attention to both individual motives as well as the institutional context, and thus for meaning attributed by the actors involved.

This study takes a multiple case study approach in which 4 different legislation processes are investigated. These 4 processes differ in policy domains (i.e. education, justice, infrastructure, economic) and the political saliency of the subject matter. The data includes elite interviews with members of parliament and top public servants working for executive agencies. Additionally, supporting staff of both members of parliament and executive agencies are interviewed. Furthermore, video material of policy debates and policy documents are analyzed. Finally, the results of this study aim to contribute to further our understanding of the relation between policy and execution. Moreover, it hopes to contribute to new perspectives on ways how policy and executive practices can be connected in a meaningful, feasible and legitimate way.

About the authors:

Thijs van den Berg is Phd Candidate at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Correspondence: vandenberg@essb.eur.nl

Dr Rianne Warsen is Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Dr Koen Migchelbrink is Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Prof.dr. Sandra van Thiel is Professor of Public Management at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam.