During crises, traditional bureaucratic principles that govern administrative organizations may prove inadequate in dealing with high levels of uncertainty. In such situations, bureaucrats may resort to coping mechanisms, such as rule-bending, risk-taking, or entrepreneurism, to swiftly address the challenges at hand. Understanding the factors that influence bureaucratic responses in times of uncertainty is crucial for effective governance in public sector organizations. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the factors that enable or hinder rule-bending behavior among bureaucrats during crises, this paper presents a set of proposed explanations. Existing literature suggests that organizational factors, including leadership and red tape, are associated with rule-bending behavior, although the exact relationship remains unclear. Additionally, the nature of the crisis is expected to influence bureaucrats' inclination towards rule-bending, as certain client attributes and characteristics of the affected population can heighten the propensity for such actions. The explanatory factors are tested in a preregistered randomized survey experiment among 448 bureaucrats in Germany. The experiment looks at the odds of bureaucrats adhering to public procurement regulations under manipulated 1) leadership, 2) red tape, and 3) crisis context conditions. Preliminary findings indicate significant effects of different crisis types on the willingness to deviate from procurement regulations, suggesting that lower levels of red tape and a lack of leadership support contribute to greater adherence to existing regulations. As such, the findings provide valuable insights into the role of organizational factors and can inform governance strategies and decision-making processes within public sector organizations.

The future of government surveillance is unmistakable: it increases. Yet, despite increase in implemented surveillance measures, we lack an understanding of how institutional conditions shape governments’ legitimizing of such measures. This paper argues that ways of legitimizing surveillance technology are influenced by privacy regime and overarching strategies of problem-solving when facing a crisis. With a cross-country comparison, the study finds both similar and different legitimacy strategies of governments in Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The analysis demonstrates the significance of privacy regimes and governmental problem-solving capacities in shaping technological change and future directions for public administration.