A core idea of bureaucratic organizations is that rule-following is necessary to pursue the public interest (Borry et al., 2018). Rules make bureaucracies' actions predictable and legitimate (Fleming, 2020) and can thus be beneficial for citizens and society. At the same time, rules may not always capture the complexities of the everyday life of citizens and can, in addition to that, be seen as illegitimate, burdensome, or illogical by those who need to enforce them (Bozeman, 2022; Madsen et al., 2022). Frontline officials are often required to be responsive to individual cases and they find themselves at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy where they are “forced to resolve any ambiguity, vagueness, or conflict that exists in public policy” (Zacka, 2017: p. 25). As a result, they sometimes turn to prosocial rule-breaking (PSRB), rather than rule-following, as a means to pursue organizational goals and create public value (Borry, 2017). PSRB refers to violations of organizational policy rules and procedures, but not to contra legem decisions (that is: decisions that defy or violate the laws underpinning a certain policy field).

Rules do not only make public service predictable and legitimate for citizens, they also reduce uncertainty for frontline officials (Raaphorst, 2018). Particularly, when professionals are uncertain about what course of action to take, they resort to rules as a claim of authority (Tummers et al., 2015). Following this reasoning, it can be expected that professionals with a high degree of uncertainty are less likely to deviate from rules and, thus, to engage in PSRB behavior. In this study, we empirically assess how task- and goal-uncertainty affects PSRB, thereby contributing to the increasing number of studies that differentiates between different types of uncertainty among professionals (Bernards et al., 2021; Raaphorst, 2018). Our first aim is thus to empirically assess how task- and goal-uncertainty affect PSRB behavior.

Our second aim is to assess the role of leadership in reducing uncertainty, thus stimulating PSRB. In the absence of rules, leadership may provide professionals with direction and reduce their uncertainty experiences. An increasing number of studies focuses on leadership of public professionals (e.g. Bernards, 2021; Møller & Grøn, 2023), and shows that leadership from supervisors can affect the attitudes and behavior of professionals (Keulemans & Groeneveld, 2019). Following these studies, we expect that task- and goal-oriented leadership reduces professionals' uncertainty, and thus stimulates them to engage in PSRB behavior.

We examine these relationships using a unique multi-source dataset of frontline officials self-reported PSRB behavior and (task- and goal) uncertainty perceptions and their supervisor-reported task- and goal-oriented leadership. Data have been collected in winter 2022-2023 among Dutch social welfare professionals (N = 921) and their supervisors (N = 66).

Although the expectancy theory of work motivation (Vroom, 1964) suggests that positive perceptions of an organizational mission, or mission valence, positively impact employees’ attitudes and work behavior, insights on the mechanisms fostering mission valence and how organizations can harvest its motivational potential are scarce (e.g., Desmidt & Prinzie, 2019; Wright et al., 2012; Wright & Pandey, 2011). Current research points to public service motivation (PSM) as an important, intrinsic motivational driver of employees’ mission valence (e.g., Taylor, 2014; Vandenabeele, 2014; Wright, 2007). However, PSM is (1) often difficult to foster by organizations as it develops, largely, prior to entering an organization (e.g., Ritz et al., 2016) and (2) the complexity of the relationship between PSM and desired organizational attitudes calls for more insights on the interplay between PSM and (employee perceptions of) workplace characteristics and organizational policies (Giauque et al., 2013; Giauque et al., 2012).

To address the cited research gap and help shed light on the mechanisms fostering mission valence, the study at hand not only analyses the relationship between PSM, mission valence and desirable employee attitudes but also focuses the attention on a work-related attitude, which is deemed more malleable by organizations than PSM, namely psychological empowerment (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990).

Based on the self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2008), this study investigates the positive impact of PSM and psychological empowerment on employees’ perceptions of mission valence, and eventually their level of organizational identification, while taking into account the moderating role of PSM. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was used to test the validity of the developed two-way mediation and moderation mediation model, using two-wave data from 342 British employees active in the public/non-profit sector (225) and the profit sector (117).

The results suggest that PSM and workplace psychological empowerment are positively related with perceived mission valence which, in turn, impacts organizational identification. Moreover, the relationship between perceived workplace empowerment and mission valence is significantly moderated by PSM.

Unethical behaviour is an issue of first order importance because, if widespread across public bureaucracies, it diminishes the quality of governance and increases political instability (Dahlström and Lapuente 2022). Next to this, perceived corruption has a significant influence on how citizens evaluate democracy and the level of trust they have on their governments and bureaucracies (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Villoria et al. 2013). Given its importance, studies mainly in the fields of political economy, political science and public administration have proliferated investigating the determinants of unethical behaviour. Built on classic (Wilson 1887; Goodnow 1900; Weber 1928) and contemporary (Moe 1990; Olsen 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) works from these three inter-related disciplines, a promising line of research has emerged focusing on the design of personnel systems in public bureaucracies.

Personnel systems in most public bureaucracies can be organized alongside (at least) two dimensions: employment protection (i.e., closed or open) and career separation between politicians and bureaucrats (i.e., integration or separation). According to Dahlström and Lapuente (2018) the structure of the bureaucrat-politician relationship has been largely neglected in studies examining the causes of unethical behavior and corruption. Rent-seeking and advancement of personal (versus social) interests are equally common behaviours for bureaucrats and politicians (Niskanen 1971; Miller and Hammond 1994). Hence, the strategy to prevent unethical behaviour cannot be to put one on top of the other. Taking a neo-institutionalist view, Dahlström and Lapuente (2018) proposed a new relational contract: the chain of accountability (including recruitment and promotion) of politicians need to be tied to the ruling party (and/or citizens’ will), while the one of bureaucrats to their peers.

Merit-based bureaucracy as envisioned by these authors is able to curb corruption because public employees internalize norms of conduct based on meritocracy, improve their motivation and orient themselves towards a long-term career (Rauch and Evans 2000; Miller 2000; Olsen 2006). Recent research demonstrates that the separation of careers between politicians and bureaucrats contributes to lower degrees of corruption and more government effectiveness (Charron et al. 2016; Dahlström and Lapuente 2018, 2022). These quantitative studies use cross-sectional national surveys and data bases such as the Quality of Government Expert Survey, World Bank and Transparency International indicators. Although interesting, these research designs raise concerns regarding causal inference. Therefore, the first aim of this study is to asses the causal effect of separation of careers on unethical behaviour using an experimental design. This need goes in line with recent calls in public administration research to conduct experimental studies whenever appropriate (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2016; Hassan and Wright 2020).

Public personnel systems are rigid and not easy to change, being indeed dependent on historical socio-economic and political patterns. Assuming that some countries have a system in which the careers of politicians and bureaucrats are de facto or de jure integrated, this raises the concern of what can be done to prevent unethical behaviour in the public bureaucracies of these countries. From the public administration literature, we know that public sector employees often score high on public service motivation (PSM; Buelens and Van den Broek 2007). PSM research maintains that individuals with high PSM levels or who are highly driven to pursue the common good are often attracted to public sector jobs (Perry and Wise 1990; Ritz et al. 2020). Compared with their colleagues with low PSM levels, public employees with high PSM levels are less likely to engage in unethical conduct (Ripoll and Breaugh 2019; Wright et al. 2016). Therefore, the second aim of this research is to test whether public service motivation (PSM) is able to block the positive impact of integration of careers between politicians and bureaucrats on unethical behaviour.

In sum, this study aims to provide an answer to the following questions: Does separation of careers between politicians and bureaucrats decrease bureaucrats’ unethical behaviour? And, can PSM diminish unethical behaviour in integrated systems?

This study makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, most existing studies on unethical behavior study its antecedents in isolation, ignoring its multi-causality nature. As far as we know there is no empirical public administration study that simultaneously test the effects of separation of careers and PSM on ethical behavior. Second, this article combines macro with micro level theories to hypothesize the studied relationships. Institutional theories of bureaucracy are connected with micro level theories of incentives and social identity (applied to PSM). Our third contribution is methodological in nature. Ethics and incentive structures of public bureaucracies, as many other topics in public administration research, are hard to study empirically. Because of this, most quantitative studies on this topic use cross-sectional surveys. Our research design, based on a vignette experiment, allows us to draw causal conclusions about the effects of separation of careers and PSM on unethical behavior.

Research setting

Survey measure of PSM

PSM/public service identity. Since our interest in PSM in this study focuses on it as a unidimensional concept, we adopt the 4-item global measure of PSM by Vandenabeele and Penning de Vries (2016). Responses are measured using a seven-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).

Control variables consist of demographic factors (gender, age, education, length of service in the organization and workgroup).

Experimental setting

The experimental setting is a simple between-subjects experiment. There are two conditions (separation of careers vs. integration), one for each vignette.

Vignette 1 - Separation

Imagine that you are a civil servant working in the treasury department of a cityhall. In your city a swimming pool needs to be renovated. The total cost is €59,000. The norms require a public tender to select the construction company. To give the renovation works to a preferred company, the mayor has decided to divide the cost by 5, so having 5 small contracts of less than €12,000 each (which is the minimum threshold in Spain to be obliged to open a public tender) instead of a big one of €59,000. One day, a representative of the construction company asks you to pay the remaining two contracts. Before paying them, you check within the system whether the first three contracts have already been paid. You find that they were paid by your supervisor, which is a top civil servant that was selected by the mayor. You know that your future professional career does not depend on the working conditions settled by your supervisor, and on your relationship with top level civil servants appointed by political affiliation.

Keeping all this information in mind, please indicate your degree of dis/agreement with each sentence displayed below in a scale ranging from 1 to 7, where 1 is "Totally disagree" and 7 is "Totally agree".

● If I were the civil servant, I will pay the two remaining contracts

Vignette 2 – Integration

Imagine that you are a civil servant working in the treasury department of a cityhall. In your city a swimming pool needs to be renovated. The total cost is €59,000. The norms require a public tender to select the construction company. To give the renovation works to a preferred company, the mayor has decided to divide the cost by 5, so having 5 small contracts of less than €12,000 each (which is the minimum threshold in Spain to be obliged to open a public tender) instead of a big one of €59,000. One day, a representative of the construction company asks you to pay the remaining two contracts. Before paying them, you check within the system whether the first three contracts have already been paid. You find that they were paid by your supervisor, which is a top civil servant that was selected by the mayor. You know that your future professional career depends on the working conditions settled by your supervisor, and on your relationship with top level civil servants appointed by political affiliation.

Keeping all this information in mind, please indicate your degree of dis/agreement with each sentence displayed below in a scale ranging from 1 to 7, where 1 is "Totally disagree" and 7 is "Totally agree".

● If I were the civil servant, I will pay the two remaining contracts

The study of other-oriented behavior and motivation for this behavior has not only been carried within the social sciences, it has a long tradition in other fields. Domains like biology, neurobiology or endocrinology have a solid tradition in addressing issues of altruism and social behavior. Similarly, genetics has made great strides in addressing genetic sources of pro-social behavior. These fields are therefore important in addressing questions of public service motivation that hitherto have remained unaddressed.

The present paper is therefore a theoretical effort in trying to integrate these insights with the present theory of public service motivation. The aim is not to create a reductionist perspective on PSM, but rather to identify possible interactions between these mechanisms and the ones addressed in previous theoretical theoretical frameworks of public service motivation (Perry 2000; Vandenabeele 2007; Schott and Ritz 2018) in order to better understand processes in public HRM in which PSM may play a critical prole.

The paper will be partly building on the work of Sapolski (2018), who distinguishes between three main neurological mechanisms that influence pro-social behavior and which fit remarkably well with the idea of the a two-systems cognition put forward for example the work by Kahnemann and Tversky (2001). Similarly, the genetical approach to prosocial behavior (Ebstein et al 2010), including evolutionary genetics, may offer additional insights to ideas of socialization and internalization that are prevalent in the traditional theory of PSM. Finally, it will also address some of the criticisms voiced in Antonakis (2017) regarding the nature of neuroscience and the challenges to organizational studies. Including these insights will create a broader and a more in-depth understanding of the concept, antecedents and outcomes of PSM and to what extent neuroscience may contribute to this understanding. In this, the paper will also contribute to a broader understanding of how contextual elements can have a neurobiological impact on a for the practice of public HRM important variable as PSM. In this, it can help to understand why certain contextual elements may serve as inhibiting or enhancing factors in public HRM.