This article addresses the question of effects of institutionalized political involvement, i.e., by law or regulation as part of the organizational environment of a public authority, on street-level policy implementation. We assume that this kind of involvement has a confidence-building effect, fosters cooperation between street-level bureaucrats (SLB) and politicians, and ultimately strengthen the acceptance of a policy.
To date, street-level bureaucracy scholarship has addressed the issue of control over SLB or the ability to influence SLB’s behavior (e.g., Brehm and Gates 1997; Brewer 2005; Hill 2006; Riccucci 2005). Different modes of influence on SLB have been investigated (see e.g., Meyers and Vorsanger 2003). One of these modes focus on the (mainly “disruptive”) involvement of politicians in street-level policy implementation and the (mainly negative) implications on SLB’s decisions, such as unequal service provision (e.g., Keiser 1999; Keiser and Soss 1998; Langbein 2000; May and Winter 2009).
This study aims to turn the spotlight on a slightly different issue, namely the effect of institutionalized, i.e., “non-disruptive” and ideally positive, political involvement (e.g., by law or regulation) on public policy implementation. Davidovitz and Cohen (2021, 15–16) conclude that “[p]olicy implementation is a team effort that requires productive cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats.” In a different context, Stauffer, Kuenzler, and Sager (2023) show that collaboration among policy implementation actors increases resilience against “blame-avoiding policy implementation”, which is another way of SLB discretion potentially leading to inequality (see Hinterleitner and Wittwer 2022). Going down this road, we assume that the institutionalized involvement of politicians fosters collaboration among SLB and politicians.
We use original survey and interview data from 66 social assistance authorities in one Swiss canton. Swiss social assistance is implemented by local implementing agencies and monitored by political bodies. The role, and thus the involvement, of these bodies are regulated by law. We apply a mixed method design with a qualitative focus. In addition, we juxtapose our findings with findings from Denmark and Israel (see Davidovitz and Cohen 2021; May and Winter 2009) where many context variables are similar while variance exists in the relevant factor of political involvement.
Preliminary findings show that although the actual monitoring function of politicians as stipulated by law cannot be fulfilled, the institutional anchoring leads to cooperation or at least regular contact between SLB and politicians, which in turn enables the latter to represent and legitimize social assistance in the public, i.e., towards the citizens, and the local and regional politics; an important task – since social welfare expenditures are high and often subject to critical scrutiny – that can most effectively be done by politicians.
References:
Brehm, John O., and Scott Gates. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public. University of Michigan Press.
Brewer, Gene A. 2005. “In the Eye of the Storm: Frontline Supervisors and Federal Agency Performance.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15 (4): 505–27.
Davidovitz, Maayan, and Nissim Cohen. 2021. “Politicians’ involvement in street-level policy implementation: Implications for social equity.” Public Policy and Administration: 095207672110240.
Hill, Carolyn J. 2006. “Casework Job Design and Client Outcomes in Welfare-to-Work Offices.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (2): 263–88.
Hinterleitner, Markus, and Stefan Wittwer. 2022. “Serving quarreling masters: Frontline workers and policy implementation under pressure.” Governance.
Keiser, Lael R. 1999. “State Bureaucratic Discretion and the Administration of Social Welfare Programs: The Case of Social Security Disability.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 9 (1): 87–106.
Keiser, Lael R., and Joe Soss. 1998. “With Good Cause: Bureaucratic Discretion and the Politics of Child Support Enforcement.” American Journal of Political Science 42 (4): 1133.
Langbein, Laura I. 2000. “Ownership, empowerment, and productivity: Some empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of employee discretion.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19 (3): 427–49.
May, Peter J., and Søren C. Winter. 2009. “Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level Bureaucrats: Influences on Policy Implementation.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 19 (3): 453–76.
Meyers, Marcia K., and Susan Vorsanger. 2003. “Street-level bureaucrats and the implementation of public policy.” In Handbook of Public Administration, eds. B. G. Peters and Jon Pierre. Sage Publications CA: Thousand Oaks, CA, 245–55.
Riccucci, Norma. 2005. How management matters: Street-level bureaucrats and welfare reform. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Stauffer, Bettina, Johanna Kuenzler, and Fritz Sager. 2023. “Public agency resilience in times of democratic backsliding: Structure, collaboration and professional standards.” Governance: Early view.