Healthcare costs contribute to consumer medical liabilities and by extension should affect their creditworthiness and access to credit. Yet credit bureaus face significant frictions in collecting consumer medical debt liabilities data which spurred an intense ongoing policy debate. This paper sheds light on this debate by examining how information collection frictions affect the quality of the creditworthiness indicators and related consumer access to credit. Leveraging a novel driver of healthcare costs based on Medicare spending, we document that in the presence of the information collection frictions, local healthcare costs lead to upward (downward) bias in consumer credit scores (DTIs). Consumers in high-healthcare-cost CBSAs are 16.4% more likely to default than those in low-healthcare-cost CBSAs. These effects are more pronounced among consumers with low credit scores and high DTIs. Lenders internalize these information collection frictions and impose higher mortgage rejection rates in high-healthcare-cost CBSAs, particularly for riskier applicants. These effects intensify following a policy shift that removed small medical liabilities from credit reports, confirming the role of the information collection frictions. Our findings highlight that limiting the flow of medical liabilities data undermines the predictive accuracy of standard credit metrics, impairs the information value of credit bureau outputs, and leads to less efficient credit allocation.