From daily cold plunges to meticulous morning routines to obsessive fitness tracking, there is a rising cohort of American male influencers centered around the notion of reaching “maximum potential” physically and mentally. Focusing on a cohort I’m calling “Masculinized Optimization Influencers,” I argue that this group is best understood through the lens of Sara Ahmed’s (2004) “affective economies.” Defined as those who place a dual focus on men’s need to hustle equally at the gym and in their career, Masculine Optimization Influencers present a particular vision of masculinity that binds together physical discipline with financial success. Crucially though, this is presented as much more than a selfish pursuit, this cohort’s approach joins a long American tradition of presenting bodywork as a moral imperative (White et al., 1995). Moreover, as this research will argue, they construct this path of self-optimization as a sacred pursuit. Such an approach attempts to justify hierarchical relations at a time when masculinity and capitalism are facing critique. Through identifying how “emotions circulate between bodies and signs,” and paying particular attention to the emotions of shame and disgust, this research examines how this affective economy mobilizes emotions to sacralize their ascendance in a dissymmetric economic system (Ahmed, 2004, p. 119).

This paper studies the mainstreaming of far-right radicalisation on social media platforms and the ways online visuals help this type of extremism to spread, by examining a recent and popular online phenomenon: male self-help influencers.The article first argues that the purported expertise, rhetoric, and technological affordances used by male self-help influencers serve to spread toxic masculinity, misogyny, and heteronormativity. These influencers brand themselves as entrepreneurial and authoritative experts embedded within the global neoliberal consumer landscape, consistent with burgeoning mainstream interest in ‘wellness’ and ‘male success’. Second, the paper shows how seemingly “apolitical” and “neutral” media content (self-help videos) and their creators (self-help influencers), combined with references to global media cultures and manosphere memes, perpetuate a covert and “acceptable” form of far-right ideology. In participating in and creating this seemingly “apolitical” wellness culture, these influencers become fun and accessible symbols of a widespread far-right movement online, perpetuating stereotypical gender norms and an idealised performance of masculinity. To examine men’s self-help videos by UK creators and the extent of their “covert” but widespread far-right radicalisation, we focused on the mainstream visual-centric social media platforms of YouTube and TikTok, identifying three case studies of self-help influencers with large followings and prominent online visibility: Hamza (2.03M YouTube subscribers), 1STMAN (158K YouTube subscribers), and Garrygunnshow (395K TikTok followers). Due to the reach of these influencers, we argue that they reflect the mainstreaming of online gender-based radicalisation in the UK (and on a global scale due to the wider reach of content in English).

For decades, scholars and public intellectuals have touted a “crisis of masculinity”: the notion that men are isolated, lonely, and hopeless, which makes them more susceptible to the messaging of right-wing backlash movements. Our paper focuses on how this narrative plays out within BreadTube, a community of YouTubers who espouse leftist and socialist views on a range of issues, and who often capitalize on trends in the alt-right media sphere to generate content that aims to counter reactionary rhetoric online. We examine how these BreadTubers respond to the “crisis of masculinity” narrative by analyzing a data set of 27 videos collected through a “digital snowball” sampling method. Our findings suggest that BreadTube creators are not only keenly aware of the aforementioned debate surrounding a “crisis of masculinity,” but are also eager to participate in it themselves (although not without tension or disagreement). Furthermore, we find that this discussion is driven almost entirely by accounts which could be classified as part of the platform’s “influencer industry”, which indicates the extent to which the political economy of YouTube plays some part in shaping the contours of this debate. Ultimately, we argue that this network of video creators works to articulate a specific left-wing perspective on manhood, which we term BreadTube Masculinities. This articulation of masculinity is distinguished by its empathy for men’s alienation under a capitalist system of production, while simultaneously arguing that men must find sources of identity, meaning, and community-building outside of the individualist, capitalist gender role of “economic provider.”

The failure of the youth from low-privilege backgrounds in obtaining quality private education to become more employable in the competitive job market has coincided with the growth and affordability of the smartphone-Internet in India. Using ethnographic methods, both in-person and online, with 20 young men from low-privileged backgrounds in Kolkata (India), this ongoing research investigates how they access content of the digital industries, mostly on YouTube, to acquire skills for and information about income opportunities against a lack of access to quality institutions. It asks whether and how the outcomes of such Internet use are shaped by their specific life contexts which influence the scope of application of such information. Domesticating the affordable Internet resources, the young men exercise their agency to attempt to fill the deficiencies of formal institutions. This indicates an overcoming of the second digital divide, although not uniformly. In line with the third digital divide, these findings reveal greater obstacles in the efficacy of applying livelihood-related online resources in terms of the nature of livelihoods sought, availability of energy and time, social expectations, and the availability of avenues for finding lesser employment via offline ties. With examples, I aim to argue that the extent of divide (2nd or 3rd) is not uniform for individuals in a population group but varies with uses. This research contributes both to knowledge of digital experiences from the Global South and extends the theories of domestication of digital technology and digital divides to youth in low-privilege settings.