Programa del congreso

This study examines the interplay between two key governance mechanisms—CSR contracting and Say-on-Pay (SOP)—in mitigating Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSiR). Drawing on agency theory and impression management theory, we investigate how CSR contracting, which links executive compensation to ESG objectives, reduces CSiR, and how SOP moderates this relationship by introducing competing shareholder priorities. Using a large panel dataset and employing Negative Binomial regression, alongside robustness checks with fixed effects and Poisson models, we find that CSR contracting significantly mitigates CSiR by aligning managerial incentives with long-term stakeholder goals. However, SOP weakens this effect by encouraging symbolic compliance, shifting managerial focus toward shareholder-visible and short-term ESG outcomes. These findings highlight the nuanced dynamics between shareholder- and stakeholder-oriented governance mechanisms, underscoring the importance of carefully integrating SOP to enhance, rather than dilute, the effectiveness of CSR contracting. The study contributes to the literature on sustainable corporate governance by offering theoretical and practical insights into the design of governance systems that balance shareholder and stakeholder interests to foster long-term ESG performance.

Our paper analyses the effect on firm corruption of the presence of the family name in the firm's name (i.e., eponymous firm), the role of its ownership percentage and the importance of the family structure (lone-owner vs. multiple family owners). With this aim, a sample of 850 companies, from 30 countries for the years 2015 to 2022, resulting in 3,348 firm-year observations, has been used. Thus, the results obtained show a relationship between eponymy and corruption, so that the presence of the family name leads a reduction of corporate corruption. In addition, we test that the existence of a lone family owner increases the probability of corruption, although this effect is reversed when the firm is an eponymous firm. Finally, contrary to expectations, the likelihood of corruption in eponymous companies increases as family ownership grows.

The analysis of ESG factors has provided a framework for understanding the implementation and performance of key sustainability actions in firms. The appearance of controversies in this realm has a potential impact on market perception and firm performance. Besides, the institutional framework establishes rules and may homogenize the behavior of the firm. We analyze the dynamics of improvement in corporate reputation by analyzing 12 years of data from European firms. We study how ESG controversies affect market valuation, revenues, and business results, moderated by the belonging to the European Union and the Eurozone. Our research builds on stakeholder, legitimacy, and agency theories, offering actionable insights for corporate leaders aiming to rebuild trust and align ESG practices with strategic objectives. Policymakers are encouraged to enhance reporting standards and incentivize proactive controversy management, moving beyond compliance-driven approaches. The findings underscore the need for context-sensitive ESG strategies that foster accountability and sustainable growth, benefiting stakeholders.

Corporate corruption is a collective phenomenon that has negative externalities on the behavior of the other companies, organizations and individuals in a country. Hence the importance of analyzing the factors that affect it. This paper focuses on analyzing the effect on corporate corruption of the identity (family, State, investment fund), the foreign nature and the honor culture of the main shareholder. For this purpose, we use a sample of 6,076 companies (34,874 firm-year observations) from 36 countries with free press for the years 2015-2022. Our results show, in line with the role of ownership into the Socioemotional Wealth (SEW) Theory, a non-linear relationship between corruption and family-owned firms, such that, at low levels of family ownership, the probability of corporate corruption increases; while at high levels of ownership (higher than 25%), the probability of corruption decreases. We also test that the honor culture of the main shareholder and his foreign nature affect the probability of corruption, in the former case by reducing it and by increasing it in the latter.